Idaho Wool Growers Ass\u27n, Inc. v. State Clerk\u27s Record Dckt. 38743 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
8-15-2011
Idaho Wool Growers Ass'n, Inc. v. State Clerk's
Record Dckt. 38743
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Idaho Wool Growers Ass'n, Inc. v. State Clerk's Record Dckt. 38743" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3606.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3606
IN THE / 
REM 0 RT 
v 
FTHE LAW CLE K 
T T OFlD HO 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellant 
v 
Appealed from the Di trict ourt of the 
Third Judicial District of the tate of 
Idaho in and for Adams ounty 
Hon. BRADLY 
LA DIDDL 
Attorney for Appellant 
I 5 2011 
7 
• • 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IDAHO WOOL GROWERS ASSOCIATION 
FRANK SHIRTS JR; RONALD W SHIRTS; 
LESLIE SHIRTS and JOHN T SHIRTS; 
Dba SHIRTS BROTHERS SHEEP, 
Plaintiff/Appellants, 
vs 
STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH & GAME 
COMMISSION; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
FISH & GAME; CAL GROEN, Director, 
Defendant/Res ondents. 
SUPREME COURT #38743-2011 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Adams. 
HONORABLE BRADLY S FORD 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
SAMUEL A DIDDLE 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & 
McKlveen Chtd 
PO Box 1368 
Boise,ID 83701-1368 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
I 
STEVEN W STRACK 
Deputy Attorney General 
Statehouse PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page No. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Filed April 1, 2010...... ... 1 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Filed April 20, 2010 ............................................................... 9 
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO IDAHO RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
12(b)(I), 12(b)(6), AND 12(b)(7), AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Filed May 19, 2010 ............................................................ .... 20 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
Filed May 19, 2010 ............................................................ .... 23 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES Filed August 17, 2010 .............. 66 
DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF ERRATA AND SUBSTITUTE EXHIBIT 
Filed August 30, 2010 ............................................................. 83 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISMISS Filed August 30, 2010 .................. .............................. 86 
PLAINTIFFS ' SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS Filed September 14,2010 ... .................. ................ ... 131 
DEFENDANTS ' SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF RE: DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS Filed September 27,2010 ...... ..................... 153 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES Filed February 4,2011 171 
JUDGMENT Filed March 4, 2011 ....................................................... , 199 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Filed April 15, 2011 .. , ............ ........................ ...... 202 
REGISTER OF ACTIONS................................................................ 206 
TABLE OF CONTENTS II 
INDEX 
Page No. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Filed April 1, 2010......... 1 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
Filed May 19,2010 ................................................................ 23 
DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF ERRATA AND SUBSTITUTE EXHIBIT 
Filed August 30, 2010 ............................................................. 83 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISMISS Filed August 30, 2010 .......................................... ...... 86 
DEFENDANTS ' SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF RE: DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS Filed September 27,2010........................... 153 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Filed April 20, 2010 ............................................................... 9 
JUDGMENT Filed March 4,2011 ........................................................ 199 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES Filed February 4,2011 171 
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO IDAHO RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), AND 12(b)(7), AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Filed May 19, 2010 ................................................................ 20 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Filed April 15, 2011 ............................................. 202 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES Filed August 17, 2010 .............. 66 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS Filed September 14,2010 ........................................ 131 
REGISTER OF ACTIONS................................................................ 206 
INDEX III 
Samuel A. Diddle, ISB No. 4967 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW & 
MCKLVEEN, CHTD. 
11 11 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 
Post Office Box 1368 
Boise,ID 83701-1368 
Telephone: (208) 344-8535 
Facsimile: (208) 344-8542 
sdiddle@eberIe.com 
Attorneys for PlaintitIs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS 
IDAHO WOOL GROWERS 
ASSOCIA TION, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
individually and on behalf of its members; 
FRANK SHIRTS, JR., individually and as a 
member of the Idaho Wool Growers 
Association; RONALD W. SHIRTS, 
LESLIE SHIRTS and JOlIN T. SHIRTS, 
individually and d/b/a SHIRTS BROTHERS 
SHEEP and as members of the Idaho Wool 
Growers Association, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH & 
GAME COMMISSION; IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF FISH & GAME; CAL 
GROEN, Director of Idaho Department of 
Fish and Game. 
Defendants. 
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COME NOW the Plaintiffs, Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc., Frank Shirts, Jr., and 
Ronald W. Shirts and Leslie Shirts, husband and wife, and John T. Shirts d/b/a Shirts Brothers 
Sheep, by and through their counsel of record, Samuel A. Diddle of the firm Eberle, Berlin, 
Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, and for a cause of action against the Defendants 
hereby allege and complain as follows. 
I. 
PARTIES 
1. Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc. ("IWGA") is a non-profit association 
incorporated in Idaho with its principal place of business in Boise, Ada County, Idaho. 
2. Frank Shirts, Jr. ("Shirts") raises sheep and is a member ofIWGA. He has grazed 
sheep in the Payette National Forest since 1977. His principal place of business is in Wilder, 
Canyon County, Idaho. 
3. Ronald W. Shirts and Leslie Shirts, husband and wife, and John T. Shirts operate 
Shirts Brothers Sheep ("Shirts Brothers") and are members of IWGA. Shirts Brothers raises 
sheep. Shirts Brothers' principal place of business is Weiser, Washington County, Idaho. Shirts 
Brothers has grazed sheep in the Payette National Forest since 1979. 
4. The Idaho Fish and Game Commission is a duly constituted entity of the State of 
Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code § 32-102. 
5. The Idaho Department of Fish and Game is a duly constituted entity under the 
supervision, management and control of the Idaho Fish and Game Commission. 
6. Cal Groen is the Director of the Idaho Department of Fish and Game. 
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II. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
7. Venue is proper in Adams County pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-402. 
8. Jurisdiction is appropriate pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514 and Article I, Section 8 
and Article V, Section 20 of the Idaho Constitution. 
III. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
9. Paragraphs 1 through 8 above are incorporated herein by this reference as though 
fully set forth. 
10. Prior to 1997, domestic sheep grazmg was permitted upon National Forest 
Systems lands of the Payette National Forest within the Hells Canyon area, and Shirts and Shirts 
Brothers were permitted to graze their sheep on certain allotments in the Payette National Forest 
at different times during the year. 
11. These grazing permits were and are essential to the success and viability of the 
Shirts' and Shirts Brothers' grazing operations. 
12. While Bighorn Sheep were historically abundant in the Hells Canyon area of 
Idaho and Oregon, they were extirpated from the area by around 1945. 
13. In approximately 1996/1997, various federal agencies, wildlife agencies of other 
states, and the Idaho Department of Fish and Game all reached an understanding regarding 
cooperation among the governmental agencies to reintroduce Bighorn Sheep to the Hells Canyon 
area. 
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14. In or around 199611997, the federal and state agencies mentioned above 
announced their intention to institute the transplant program. 
15. On or about January 1, 1997 the Idaho Department of Fish and Game notified the 
IWGA that several dozen head of Bighorn Sheep would be transplanted to the Hells Canyon area 
within a few weeks. 
16. The IWGA and several of its members were concerned that this transplant 
program would disrupt domestic sheep operations and/or lead to the cancellation or termination 
of federal land or state land domestic sheep grazing allotments in or around Hells Canyon. 
Among those members who were concerned were Frank Shirts, Jr. and Ronald Shirts and John T. 
Shilis d/b/a Shirts Brothers Sheep. 
17. In the late 1996/early 1997 time period, the IWGA on behalf of its members and 
the Shirts objected to the Bighorn reintroduction plan and threatened to object to the plan and 
seek legislation in the Idaho Legislature opposing the reintroduction. 
18. As a result of the threatened opposition from IWGA and its members, and in an 
effort to resolve the dispute and eliminate IWGA' s and its members' objections and resistance to 
the reintroduction of the Bighorn Sheep, the member governmental entities of the Hells Canyon 
Bighorn Sheep Restoration Committee, including the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, 
signed a Letter Agreement and sent it to the IWGA. A true and correct copy of that Letter 
Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
19. The Letter Agreement provided that the state wildlife agenCIes would take 
"whatever action is necessary to reduce further losses of Bighorn Sheep without adversely 
impacting existing domestic sheep operators" and recognizes "the existing domestic sheep 
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operations in or adjacent to the Hells Canyon Complex, on both National Forest and private 
lands .... " 
20. The intent of the Letter Agreement was that domestic sheep operators not only 
would not be held responsible for losses of Bighorn Sheep, but that the state wildlife agencies, 
including the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, would take whatever action was necessary so 
that Idaho domestic sheep operations and operators would not be harmed as a result of the 
reintroduction of Bighorn Sheep in Hells Canyon. 
21. As a result of the agreement with the wildlife agenCIes, and based on the 
execution of the Letter Agreement, the IWGA and its members forbore from objecting to the 
reintroduction of the Bighorn Sheep in Hells Canyon. 
22. Based on this Agreement, on March 24, 1997 the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho 
Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D), which among other things required that the Department of Fish and 
Game give notice of Bighorn sheep transplants to any affected federal grazing permittees stating 
that the existing sheep operations in the area of any such Bighorn Sheep transplant "are 
recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep 
when the same invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted." 
23. For several years all parties to this agreement honored their commitment. The 
Idaho Department of Fish and Game sent notices to Frank Shirts, Jf. and Ron and John T. Shirts 
d/b/a! Shirts Brothers Sheep regarding reintroduction pursuant to Idaho Code § 36-1 06( e )(5)(D). 
24. In or around April of 2007, however, the Forest Service reneged on its 
commitment in the Letter Agreement and began to modify various grazing permits in 2007, 
2008, 2009 and 2010, including those of Shirts and Shirts Brothers. 
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25. The Idaho Department of Fish and Game took no action to block the Forest 
Service from modifying the grazing allotments for Shirts and Shilis Brothers and took 
insufficient action to prevent Shirts and Shirts Brothers from being harmed from these decisions. 
26. As the result of the prior and continuing grazing permit modifications, IWGA, 
Shirts and Shirts Brothers have suffered significant economic losses and will continue to suffer 
economic losses. 
IV. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach Of Contract) 
27. Paragraphs 1 through 26 above are realleged and incorporated herein by this 
reference as though fully set forth. 
28. The Letter Agreement constitutes a contract between the Idaho Department of 
Fish and Game and the IWGA and its members, specifically Shirts and Shirts Brothers. 
29. The Idaho Department of Fish and Game has breached its contractual 
commitments. 
30. As a proximate result of this breach, the IWGA, Shirts and Shirts Brothers have 
suffered economic loss in an amount to be proven at trial. 
V. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach Of The Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing) 
31. Paragraphs 1 through 30 above are realleged and incorporated herein by this 
reference as though fully set forth. 
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32. Every contract in Idaho includes an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
33. The Idaho Department of Fish and Game has breached the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing towards IWGA, Shirts and Shirts Brothers. 
34. This breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing has proximately 
resulted in significant economic damages to IWGA, Shirts and Shirts Brothers in an amount to 
be proven at trial. 
VI. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Violation Of Statute) 
35. Paragraphs 1 through 34 above are realleged and incorporated herein by this 
reference as though fully set forth. 
36. Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) requires the Idaho Department ofFish and Game to 
protect domestic sheep operations from economic harm caused by the reintroduction of Bighorn 
Sheep. 
37. Shirts and Shirts Brothers are domestic sheep operators who have been harmed by 
the reintroduction of Bighorn Sheep. 
38. The Idaho Department of Fish and Game is obligated under the statute to remedy 
any harm caused to Shirts and Shirts Brothers by the reintroduction of Bighorn Sheep, but has 
failed to do so. 
39. This failure has caused significant economic losses to Shirts and Shirts Brothers 
in an amount to be proven at trial. 
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VII. 
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
40. Plaintiffs have been required to retain attorneys to prosecute this action and have 
agreed to pay said attorneys a reasonable attorney's fee which Plaintiffs are entitled to recover 
pursuant to Idaho law, including Idaho Code §§ 12-117, 12-118 and 12-120. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs hereby demand judgment from 
Defendants as follows: 
1. On each of Plaintiffs' claims for relief, damages in an amount to be proven at 
trial; 
2. For costs, disbursements and attorney fees incurred by Plaintiffs in bringing this 
action; 
3. For pre- and post-judgment interest; and 
4. For such other and fUliher relief as this Court may deem just. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial on all issues pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 38(b). 
7' 
DATED this ~ day of March, 2010. 
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COME NOW the Plaintiffs, Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc., Frank Shirts, Jr., and 
Ronald W. Shirts and Leslie Shirts, husband and wife, and John T. Shirts d/b/a Shirts Brothers 
Sheep, by and through their counsel of record, Samuel A. Diddle of the firm Eberle, Berlin, 
Kading, Turnbow & McKlvcen, Chartered, and for a cause of action against the Defendants 
hereby allege and complain as follows. 
I. 
PARTIES 
1. Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc. ("IWGA") is a non-profit association 
incorporated in Idaho with its principal place of business in Boise, Ada County, Idaho. 
2. Frank Shirts, Jr. ("Shirts") raises sheep and is a member of IWGA. He has grazed 
sheep in the Payette National Forest since 1977. His principal place of business is in Wilder, 
Canyon County, Idaho. 
3. Ronald W. Shirts and Leslie Shirts, husband and wife, and John T. Shirts operate 
Shirts Brothers Sheep ("Shirts Brothers") and are members of IWGA. Shirts Brothers raises 
sheep. Shirts Brothers' principal place of business is Weiser, Washington County, Idaho. Shirts 
Brothers has grazed sheep in the Payette National Forest since 1979. 
4. The Idaho Fish and Game Commission is a duly constituted entity of the State of 
Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code § 32-102. 
5. The Idaho Department of Fish and Game is a duly constituted entity under the 
supervision, management and control of the Idaho Fish and Game Commission. 
6. Cal Groen is the Director of the Idaho Department of Fish and Game. 
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II. 
JURISDICTION AND VENU};: 
7. Venue is proper in Adams County pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-402. 
8. Jurisdiction is appropriate pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514 and Article I, Section 8 
and Article V, Section 20 of the Idaho Constitution. 
III. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
9. Paragraphs 1 through 8 above are incorporated herein by this reference as though 
fully set forth. 
10. Prior to 1997, domestic sheep graZll1g was permitted upon National Forest 
Systems lands of the Payette National Forest within the Hells Canyon area, and Shirts and Shirts 
Brothers were permitted to graze their sheep on certain allotments in the Payette National Forest 
at different times during the year. 
11. These grazing permits were and are essential to the success and viability of the 
Shirts' and Shirts Brothers' grazing operations. 
12. While Bighorn Sheep were historically abundant in the Hells Canyon area of 
Idaho and Oregon, they were extirpated from the area by around 1945. 
13. In approximately 1996/1997, various federal agencies, wildlife agencies of other 
states, and the Idaho Department of Fish and Game all reached an understanding regarding 
cooperation among the governmental agencies to reintroduce Bighorn Sheep to the I-Iells Canyon 
area. 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3 
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14. In or around 199611997, the federal and state agencIes mentioned above 
announced their intention to institute the transplant program. 
IS. On or about January 1, 1997 the Idaho Department of Fish and Game notified the 
IWGA that several dozen head of Bighorn Sheep would be transplanted to the Hells Canyon area 
within a few weeks. 
16. The IWGA and several of its members were concerned that this transplant 
program would disrupt domestic sheep operations and/or lead to the cancellation or termination 
of federal land or state land domestic sheep grazing allotments in or around Hells Canyon. 
Among those members who were concerned were Frank Shirts, Jr. and Ronald Shirts and John T. 
Shilts d/b/a Shirts Brothers Sheep. 
17. In the late 1996/early 1997 time period, the IWGA on behalf of its members and 
the Shirts objected to the Bighorn reintroduction plan and threatened to object to the plan and 
seek legislation in the Idaho Legislature opposing the reintroduction. 
18. As a result of the threatened opposition from IWGA and its members, and in an 
effort to resolve the dispute and eliminate IWGA's and its members' objections and resistance to 
the reintroduction of the Bighorn Sheep, the member governmental entities of the Hells Canyon 
Bighorn Sheep Restoration Committee, including the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, 
signed a Letter Agreement and sent it to the IWGA. A true and correct copy of that Letter 
Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
19. The Letter Agreement provided that the state wildlife agencIes would take 
"whatever action IS necessary to reduce further losses of Bighorn Sheep without adversely 
impacting existing domestic sheep operators" and recognizes "the existing domestic sheep 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL -4 
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operations in or adjacent to the Hells Canyon Complex, on both National Forest and private 
lands .... " 
20. The intent of the Letter Agreement was that domestic sheep operators not only 
would not be held responsible for losses of Bighorn Sheep, but that the state wildlife agencies, 
including the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, would take whatever action was necessary so 
that Idaho domestic sheep operations and operators would not be harmed as a result of the 
reintroduction of Bighorn Sheep in I-Iells Canyon. 
21. As a result of the agreement with the wildlife agencIes, and based on the 
execution of the Letter Agreement, the IWGA and its members forbore from objecting to the 
reintroduction of the Bighorn Sheep in Hells Canyon. 
22. Based on this Agreement, on March 24, 1997 the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho 
Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D), which among other things required that the Department of Fish and 
Game give notice of Bighorn sheep transplants to any affected federal grazing permittees stating 
that the existing sheep operations in the area of any such Bighorn Sheep transplant "are 
recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep 
when the same invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted." 
23. For several years all parties to this agreement honored their commitment. The 
Idaho Department of Fish and Game sent notices to Frank Shirts, 1r. and Ron and John T. Shirts 
d/b/a! Shirts Brothers Sheep regarding reintroduction pursuant to Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D). 
24. In or around April of 2007, however, the Forest Service reneged on its 
commitment in the Letter Agreement and began to modify various grazing permits in 2007, 
2008,2009 and 2010, including those of Shirts and Shirts Brothers. 
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25. The Idaho Department of Fish and Game took no action to block the Forest 
Service from modifying the grazing allotments for Shirts and Shirts Brothers and took 
insufficient action to prevent Shirts and Shirts Brothers from being harmed from these decisions. 
26. As the result of the prior and continuing grazing permit modifications, IWGA, 
Shirts and Shirts Brothers have suffered significant economic losses and will continue to suffer 
economic losses. 
IV. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach Of Contract) 
27. Paragraphs 1 through 26 above are realleged and incorporated herein by this 
reference as though fully set forth. 
28. The Letter Agreement constitutes a contract between the Idaho Department of 
Fish and Game and the IWGA and its members, specifically Shirts and Shirts Brothers. 
29. The Idaho Department of Fish and Game has breached its contractual 
commitments. 
30. As a proximate result of this breach, the IWGA, Shirts and Shirts Brothers have 
suffered economic loss in an amount to be proven at trial. 
V. 
SECOND CAUSE HI<' ACTION 
(Breach Of The Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing) 
31. Paragraphs 1 through 30 above are realleged and incorporated herein by this 
reference as though fully set forth. 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL -6 
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32. Every contract in Idaho includes an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
33. The Idaho Department of Fish and Game has breached the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing towards IWGA, Shirts and Shirts Brothers. 
34. This breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing has proximately 
resulted in significant economic damages to IWGA, Shirts and Shirts Brothers in an amount to 
be proven at trial. 
VI. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Violation Of Statute) 
35. Paragraphs 1 through 34 above are realleged and incorporated herein by this 
reference as though fully set forth. 
36. Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) requires the Idaho Department ofFish and Game to 
protect domestic sheep operations from economic harm caused by the reintroduction of Bighorn 
Sheep. 
37. Shirts and Shirts Brothers are domestic sheep operators who have been harmed by 
the reintroduction of Bighorn Sheep. 
38. The Idaho Department of Fish and Game is obligated under the statute to remedy 
any harm caused to Shirts and Shirts Brothers by the reintroduction of Bighorn Sheep, but has 
failed to do so. 
39. This failure has caused significant economic losses to Shirts and Shirts Brothers 
in an amount to be proven at trial. 
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VII. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Promissory Estoppel) 
40. Paragraphs 1 through 39 above are realleged and incorporated herein by this 
reference as though fully set forth. 
41. IWGA and its members, specifically Shirts and Shirts Brothers, detrimentally 
relied upon the express and/or implied promises or representations of the Idaho Department of 
Fish and Game in the Letter Agreement. 
42. In reliance on the Idaho Department of Fish and Game's actions, IWGA and its 
members, specifically Shirts and Shirts Brothers have suffered substantial economic loss, in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
43. The substantial economic loss suffered by IWGA and Shirts and Shirts Brothers 
in reliance on the Idaho Department of Fish and Game was or should have been foreseeable by 
the Defendants. 
44. The reliance by IWGA and its members, specifically Shirts and Shirts Brothers, 
on the Idaho Department of Fish and Game's promises in the Letter Agreement was reasonable 
and justified. 
VIII. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Equitable Estoppel) 
45. Paragraphs 1 through 44 above are realleged and incorporated herein by this 
reference as though fully set forth. 
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46. The Idaho Department of Fish and Game's express and/or implied representations 
to IWGA and its members, specifically Shirts and Shirts Brothers, were false representations or 
concealments of material fact and the Idaho Department of Fish and Game had knowledge of the 
false representations in the Letter Agreement. 
47. The IWGA and Shirts and Shirts Brothers did not know or could not discover the 
truth of the Idaho Department ofFish and Game's false representations or concealments. 
48. The Idaho Department of Fish and Game made the false representations or 
concealed facts with the intent that the IWGA and Shirts and Shirts Brothers would rely on the 
false representations or concealments, upon which the IWGA and its members, specifically 
Shirts and Shirts Brothers, justifiably relied and were subsequently damaged thereby, in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
IX. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Quasi Estoppel) 
49. Paragraphs 1 through 48 above are reallegcd and incorporated herein by this 
reference as though fully set forth. 
50. The Idaho Department of Fish and Game implied and/or expressly represented 
that it would take "whatever action is necessary to reduce further losses of Bighorn Sheep 
without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep operators" and recognize "the existing 
domestic sheep operations in or adjacent to the Hells Canyon Complex, on both National Forest 
and private lands ... " and implied and/or expressly represented that the intent of the Letter 
Agreement was that domestic sheep operators not only would not be held responsible for losses 
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of Bighorn Sheep, but that the state wildlife agencies, including the Idaho Department of Fish 
and Game, would take whatever action was necessary so that Idaho domestic sheep operations 
and operators vvould not be harmed as a result of the reintroduction of Bighorn Sheep in Hells 
Canyon. 
51. The Idaho Department of Fish and Game is now taking a different position 
relating to its representations in the 1997 Letter Agreement. 
52. IWGA and its members, specifically Shirts and Shirts Brothers, were induced to 
change positions, and did in fact change positions to their detriment. 
53. Based upon the legal principle of quasi estoppel the Defendants may not now 
repudiate the promises and commitments set forth in the Letter Agreement. 
x. 
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
54. Plaintiffs have been required to retain attorneys to prosecute this action and have 
agreed to pay said attorneys a reasonable attorney's fee which Plaintiffs are entitled to recover 
pursuant to Idaho law, including Idaho Code §§ 12-117, 12-118 and 12-120. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs hereby demand judgment from 
Defendants as follows: 
l. On each of Plaintiffs' claims for relief, damages in an amount to be proven at 
trial; 
2. For costs, disbursements and attorney fees incurred by Plaintiffs in bringing this 
action; 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FORJURYTRIAL -10 
44561-11 OOI92058.000.DOC 
3. For pre- and post-judgment interest; and 
4. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial on all issues pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 38(b). 
DATED this day of April, 2010. 
--_.---'---
EBERLE, BERLIl'}nKADING, TURNBOW 
& McKLVEEN(CHARTERED 
By: .c~/ ) 0 '5?;k~ 
!~muel A. Diddle, of the Firm ,/ 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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ORIGINAL 
LAWRENCE G. \VASDEN 
Attomey General 
CLIVE J. STRONG 
Deputy Attomey General 
Chief, Natural Resources Division 
STEVEN W. STRACK (ISB # 3906) 
Deputy Attomey General 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 854-8072 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS 
IDAHO WOOL GROWERS ) 
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
individually and on behalf of its members; ) 
FRANK SHIRTS, JR., individually and as a ) 
member of the Idaho Wool Growers ) 
Association; RONALD W. SHIRTS, LESLIE ) 
SHIRTS and JOHN T. SHIRTS, individually ) 
and d/b/a! SHIRTS BROTHERS SHEEP and ) 
as members of the Idaho Wool Growers 
Association, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH & GAME 
COMMISSION; IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF FISH & GAME; CAL GROEN, Director 
of Idaho Department ofFish and Game. 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-----------------------------) 
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COMES NOW the Defendants State of Idaho, Idaho Fish and Game Commission, Idaho 
Department ofFish and Game, and Cal Groen, Director of Idaho Department ofFish and Game, 
and move this Court, pursuant to the authorization ofIdaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 
12(b )(6), and 12(b )(7), to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for failure to join an indispensable party. 
Additionally, Defendants request, pursuant to the authority ofIdaho Code § 12-117, that 
they be awarded their attorney fees and other reasonable expenses incurred in defending this 
action. 
Points and authorities in support of this Motion to Dismiss and in support of Defend ants' 
Request for Attorney Fees are provided in Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss, filed concurrently with this Motion. 
DATED this / XiI, day of May 2010. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
CLIVE J. STRONG 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Natural Resources Division 
STEVEN "V. STRACK 
Deputy Attorney General 
~l 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this Jg-~day of May 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing, MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO IDAHO RULE OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), AND 12(b)(7), AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY 
FEES by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Samuel A. Diddle 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd. 
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 
Post Office Box 1368 
Boise, ID 83701-1368 
STEVEN W. STRACK 
Deputy Attorney General 
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Attorneys for Defendants. 
FILED 
MAY 1 9 2010 ~ '.00 ~~ 
SHERRY WARD, CLERK 
~~\\"_k_~ '5 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS 
IDAHO WOOL GROWERS ) 
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
individually and on behalf of its members; ) 
FRANK SHIRTS, JR., individually and as a ) 
member of the Idaho Wool Growers ) 
Association; RONALD W. SHIRTS, LESLIE ) 
SHIRTS and JOHN T. SHIRTS, individually ) 
and d/b/a! SHIRTS BROTHERS SHEEP and ) 
as members of the Idaho Wool Growers 
Association, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH & GAME 
COMMISSION; IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF FISH & GAME; CAL GROEN, Director 
of Idaho Department of Fish and Game. 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
---------------------------) 
:23 
Case No. CV -2010-2567 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
I. INTROI)UCTION ....................................................................................................................... 1 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND .................................................................................................... 1 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW ...................................................................................................... 4 
IV. ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................................... 5 
1. All causes of action in the Amended Complaint must be dismissed for failure 
to join an indispensable party ...................................................................................... 5 
2. All causes of action in the Amended Complaint must be dismissed for failure 
to state a claim because any economic harm suffered by the Shirts as a result 
of the Forest Service's modification of Plaintiffs' grazing permits does not, 
as a matter oflaw, give rise to damages .................................................................... 14 
3. All causes of action asserting breach of contract or estoppel must be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim because Plaintiffs failed to set forth any 
facts demonstrating that the claimed damages of lost profits were within the 
contemplation of the parties signing the 1997 Letter ................................................ 17 
4. All causes of action alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and 
promissory estoppel must be dismissed for failure to state a claim because 
the Amended Complaint does not set forth any facts demonstrating a 
representation by IDFG that it would block the Forest Service from 
modifying the Shirts' grazing permits ....................................................................... 18 
5. All causes of action alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and 
promissory estoppel must be dismissed for failure to state a claim because it 
was not possible for IDFG to perform the duty alleged to be owed plaintiffs, 
i.e., blockage of the alleged breach of the 1997 Letter by the Forest Service ........... 24 
6. All claims for damages for violation ofldaho Code S 36-106(e)(5)(D) must 
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim ......................... 26 
7. IDFG must be awarded its attorney fees and other reasonable expenses .................. 30 
a. If the Court enters an order dismissing this action, IDFG is the 
prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney fees ................................... 31 
b. The entry of an order dismissing this action for the reasons set forth 
herein necessarily includes the determination that there is no reasonable 
basis in law or fact for the causes of action set fOlih in the Amended 
Complaint .......................................................................................................... 32 
V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 32 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...................................................................................................... 35 
Appendix 1 .................................................................................................................................... 36 
-11- 15 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
PAGE 
Cases 
Ada County Highway Dist. y. Total Success Invs., LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 179 PJd 323 
(2008) ........................................................................................................................................... 5 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) ............................................................................................. 9 
Allison v. Shapiro & Burson, LLP, 2009 WL 4015410 (W.D. Va. 2009) ...................................... 9 
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Austin, 75 F.3d 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ........................................................... 7 
Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ........................................................... 7 
Anderson v. United States, 73 Fed. CI. 199 (2006) ......................................................................... 7 
Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 804 
P.2d 900 (1991) ......................................................................................................................... 23 
Bogner v. State Dept. of Reyenue and Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 693 P.2d 1056 (1984) ............ 30 
Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 203 P.3d 694 (2009) ..................................... 20 
Canyon County Bd. of Equalization v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., LLC, 143 Idaho 58,137 
P.3d 445 (2006) ......................................................................................................................... 28 
Cardiosom, LLC v. United States, 2010 WL 723790 (Fed. CI. 20ID) .......................................... 26 
City of Caldwell v. Roark, 98 Idaho 897,575 P.2d 495 (1978) ...................................................... 3 
Clifford R. Gray, Inc. v. LeChase Const. Servs., LLC, 819 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y.A.D. 
2006) .................................................................................................................... : ..................... 21 
Cloverleaf Standardbred Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Nat'l Bank of Wash., 699 F.2d 1274 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983) ................................................................................................................................... 10 
Corsi v. Eagle Publishing, Inc., 2008 WL 239581 (D. D.C. 2008) ............................................... 10 
Ente Naziona1e Idrocarburi v. Prudential Sec. Group, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990) .................................................................................................................................... 10, 13 
Enter. Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. United States ex reI. Hodel, 883 F.2d 890 (lOth Cir. 
1989) .......................................................................................................................................... 10 
Erickson v. Idaho Bd. of Registration of Prof1 Eng'rs and Prof 1 Land Surveyors, 146 
Idaho 852, 203 PJd 1251 (2009) .............................................................................................. 28 
Fiscus v. Combus Fin. AG, 2007 WL 4164388 (D.N.J. 2007) ............................................... 10,13 
Fulton v. United States, 825 F. Supp. 261 (D. Nev. 1993) ............................................................ 15 
Grover v. Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 205 P.3d 1196 (2009) ........................................................ 23 
Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. CI. 147 (Fed. CI. 1996) ...................................................... 8, 15,16 
Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. CI. 570 (2002) .............................................................................. 15 
Hamilton v. Morris Resources, Ltd., 225 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. Civ. App. 2007) .............................. 22 
Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 835 P.2d l346 (Ct. App. 1992) ............................................. 3, 4 
Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674, 201 P.3d 647 (2009) ................................................................... 5 
Horne v. Idaho State Univ., 138 Idaho 700, 69 PJd 120 (2003) .................................................. 28 
Idaho Comm'n on Human Rights v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 215, 506 P.2d 112 (1973) ..................... .4 
Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 (1991) ............ 20 
Jablon v. United States, 657 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1981) ................................................................ 23 
Johnson v. Nasi, 309 P.2d 380 (Wash. 1957) .................................................................................. 6 
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) ......................................................................... 17, 25 
Landis v. Hodgson, 109 Idaho 252, 706 P.2d 1363 (Ct. App. 1985) ............................................ 24 
-iii- ,)4, 
Lane v. Dashiell, 75 A.2d 348 (Md. 1950) .................................................................................... 24 
Lee v. Blumenthal, 588 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir.1979) ........................................................................ 26 
Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 109 P.3d 1104 (2005) ........................... 21, 23 
Logan Canyon Cattle Ass'n v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 165 (1995) .......................................... 26 
Metcalfv. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 778 P.2d 744 (1989) ..................................... 20 
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 636 (2009) ................. 7 
O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796, 810 P.2d 1082 (1991) ................................................................ 6 
Osborne v. United States, 145 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1944) ............................................................... 15 
Paguette v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2009 WL 2168918 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) ............. 21 
Peters v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., 533 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2008) ....................................................... 23 
Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 903 P.2d 58 (1995) ..................................................................... .4 
Price v. U.S. General Services Admin., 894 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1990) ......................................... 26 
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S.313 (1934) .......................................................... 9 
Pro Indiviso, Inc. v. Mid-Mile Holding Trust, 131 Idaho 741,963 P.2d 1178 (1998) ................... 6 
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968) ............................... 14 
Record Steel & Const., Inc. v. Martel Const., Inc., 129 Idaho 288, 923 P.2d 995 (Cl. App. 
1996) .......................................................................................................................................... 19 
Regency Hosp. Co. ofNw. Ark., LLC v. Ark. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 2009 WL 5174246 
(E.D. Ark. 2009) ........................................................................................................................ 21 
Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. 2180 (2008) .................................................. 12, 14 
Rincover v. State, Dept. of Finance, 132 Idaho 547, 976 P.2d 473 (1999) ............................. 31, 32 
Robbins v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management, 438 F.3d 1074 (10th Cir. 2006) .......................... 26 
Roe v. Harris, 128 Idaho 569, 917 P.2d 403 (1996) ..................................... ~ ................................ 32 
Sanders v. Lankford, 134 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823 (2000) ............................................................... 31 
Saydes v. Cuoio, 71 Idaho 17,226 P.2d 172 (1951) ....................................................................... 3 
Schoonover v. Bonner County, 113 Idaho 916, 750 P.2d 95 (1988) ............................................. 22 
Sherwood v. Stephens, 13 Idaho 399, 90 P. 345 (1907) ................................................................ 22 
Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. 130 (1855) .......................................................................................... 13 
Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 879, 42 PJd 672 (2002) ......................... 17 
Snyder v. City of Minneapolis, 441 N.W.2d 781 (Minn. 1989) .................................................... 21 
Sparton Tech., Inc. v. Uti I-Link, LLC, 248 Fed. Appx. 684 (6th Cir. 2007) ................................ 21 
State v. Adams, 90 Idaho 195, 409 P.2d 415 (1965) ..................................................................... 22 
State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 198 P .3d 749 (Ct. App. 2008) ................................................... 24 
State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 224 P.3d 480 (2009) ...................................................................... 18 
State v. Peterson, 226 P.3d 535 (Idaho 2010) ................................................................................. 6 
Steinberg v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 435 (2009) ......................................................................... 7 
Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1983) .......................................................................... 15 
Taylor v. Browning, 129 Idaho 483, 927 P.2d 873 (1996) ............................................................ 18 
Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352,48 PJd 1241 (2002) ..................................... 22 
Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Indian Reservation v. United States, 637 F. 
Supp. 2d 25 (D. D.C. 2009) ......................................................................................................... 5 
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Household Int'l, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 518 (D. Conn. 1991) ......................... 9 
United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. Kempthorne, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1296 
(E.D. Okla. 2009) ........................................................................................................................ 9 
United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944) .......................................................... 7 
United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203 (1970) ............................................................................ 7 
-JV- :t 1 
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941) .......................................................................... 11 
Utah Env'J Congo v. Richmond, 483 F.3d 1127 (lOth Cir. 2007) .................................................. 13 
W. Watersheds Project V. U.S. Forest Service, 2007 WL 1430734 (D. Idaho 2007) ..................... 3 
W. Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest Service, 2007 WL 1729734 (D. Idaho 2007) ..... 3, 4, 13,25 
Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 353 P.2d 782 (l960) ......................................................... .4 
Woodbury v. United States, 313 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1963) .............................................................. 7 
Woodland Furniture, LLC V. Larsen, 142 Idaho 140, 124 P.3d 1016 (2005) ............................... 27 
Young Elec. Sign Co. v. State ex reI. Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 25 P Jd 117 (2001) ..................... 22 
U.S. Statutes 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 ................................................................................................................ 12 
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) ............................................................................................................ 11, 26 
28 U.S.C. § 1491 ................................................................................................................ 11, 14,25 
Idaho Statutes 
Idaho Code § 12-117 ............................................................................................................... 30, 32 
Idaho Code § 12-117(1) ................................................................................................................. 30 
Idaho Code § 36-106 ....................................................................................................................... 2 
Idaho Code § 36-1 06(e)(5)(D) ................................................................................................ passim 
Idaho Code § 67-5270 ................................................................................................................... 28 
Idaho Code § 67-5273 ....................................................................................................... 27, 28, 33 
Idaho Code § 67-5279 ................................................................................................................... 28 
Idaho Code §§ 67-5201 through 67-5292 ...................................................................................... 28 
Session Laws 
1997 Idaho Sess. L. 865 ................................................................................................................... 3 
1997 Idaho Sess. L. 867 ............................................................................................................. 3, 27 
2000 Idaho Sess. L. 675 ................................................................................................................. 30 
Regulations 
36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (2000) ....................................................................................................... 12, 13 
Court Rules 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7) ................................................................................................................... 5 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 ............................................................................................................................. 5 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ............................................................................................................................. 5 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) ............................................................................................................. 1, 4 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ....................................................................................................... 1, 4, 26 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7) ............................................................................................................. 1, 4 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 19 .............................................................................................................. 5, 12, 13 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 19(a)(I) ................................................................................................... 5, 6, 8,11 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2) ............................................................................................. 11, 12, 13, 14 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) ............................................................................................................... 31 
Other Authorities 
4 James Moore, Federal Practice § 19.02[3] (3d ed. 2010) ........................................................... 13 
4 James Moore, Federal Practice § 19.03[ 1] (3d ed. 2010) ............................................................. 5 
-v- l '7J 
65 Fed. Reg. 43,026 (Sept. 20, 2000) ............................................................................................ 12 
American Heritage Dictionary 1460 (4th ed. 2000) ...................................................................... 29 
Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 2.3 (1973) .......................................................................................... 21 
http://WV\'\¥.1egislature.idaho.gov/legislationl20 1 0/H0421.pdf ..................................................... 30 
-VJ- 'J.. ~ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Concurrently with this Memorandum, Defendants State ofldaho, Idaho Fish and Game 
Commission, Idaho Department of Fish and Game, and Cal Groen, Director of Idaho Department 
ofFish and Game (hereinafter collectively referred to as "IDFG") filed a Motion to Dismiss this 
action pursuant to the authorization ofIdaho Rule of Civil Procedure ("I.R.C.P.") 12(b)(1), for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 12(b )(6), for failure to state a claim, and 12(b )(7), for failure 
to join an indispensable party. This Memorandum is provided in support of the Motion to 
Dismiss. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On April 1, 2010, Plaintiffs Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc., ("IWGA") Frank 
Shirts, Jr., Ronald W. Shirts, Leslie Shirts and John T. Shirts, individually and d/b/a Shirts 
Brothers Sheep (hereinafter collectively "Plaintiffs"), filed an action against IDFG. The action 
alleges that in 1996 and 1997, IDFG, in cooperation with federal agencies and wildlife agencies 
in other states, took action to reintroduce bighorn sheep to the Hells Canyon area. 
The Amended Complaint further alleges that in response to objections made by Plaintiffs, 
the Wallowa-Whitman National Forest sent to Plaintiff Idaho Wool Growers Association 
("IWGA"), on January 16, 1997, a letter that stated the intent to reintroduce bighorn sheep to 
historic habitat in Hells Canyon. Amended Complaint, Exhibit A (hereinafter the" 1997 Letter"). 
The 1997 Letter was cosigned by the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, the Oregon 
Department ofFish and Wildlife, the Washington Department ofFish and Wildlife, the United 
States Bureau of Land Management, and the Foundation for North American Wild Sheep, who 
collectively were referred to as the "Hells Canyon Bighorn Sheep Restoration Committee." Id. 
The 1997 Letter stated the Committee's interest "in having the support of the woolgrowers 
3D 
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industry for this effort to repopulate parts of Hells Canyon with bighorn sheep." Id. The 1997 
Letter recognized the potential for transmission of diseases from domestic sheep to bighorn 
sheep and included the following provisions: 
• "These bighorns will be considered 'at risk' for potential disease transmission and 
death." 
• The Committee members "will assume the responsibility for bighorn losses and 
further disease transmissions." 
• The fish and wildlife agencies, including IDFG, would "take whatever action is 
necessary to reduce further losses of bighorn sheep without adversely impacting 
existing domestic sheep operators." 
• "Bighorns straying into currently active sheep allotments will be considered 'at 
risk' by all of the Committee entities." 
• The Committee members would "recognize[] the existing domestic sheep 
operations in or adjacent to the Hells Canyon complex," and "accept[] the 
potential risk of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when bighorns 
invade domestic sheep operations." 
Id. The 1997 Letter was sent to Stan Boyd, executive director of the IWGA, but was not signed 
by Mr. Boyd or any other representative of the IWGA. Id. 
After execution of the 1997 Letter, the Idaho Legislature took action to amend Idaho 
Code § 36-106 to include a new subsection, Idaho Code § 36-1 06(e)(5)(D), which provided: 
Upon any transplant of bighorn sheep into areas they do not now inhabit or a 
transplant to augment existing populations, the department shall provide for any 
affected federal or state land grazing permittees or owners or leaseholders of 
private land a written letter signed by all federal, state and private entities 
responsible for the transplant stating that the existing sheep or livestock 
operations in the area of any such bighorn sheep transplant are recognized and 
that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep 
when the same invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted. 
1997 Idaho Sess. L. 865. The legislation included an emergency clause causing it to go into 
effect as of March 24, 1997, but did not state an intent to make it retroactive or applicable to the 
3\ 
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1997 Letter. 1997 Idaho Sess. L. 867.' 
In 2007, the Payette National Forest and Nez Perce National Forest (hereinafter 
collectively "Forest Service"), in response to a federal court action filed by Western Watersheds 
Project, took action to modify grazing permits held by Frank Shirts, Jr. and Ron and John T. 
Shirts d/b/a! Shirts Brothers Sheep (hereinafter collectively the "Shirts"). W. Watersheds Proiect 
v. U.S. Forest Service, 2007 WL 1430734, at *1 (D. Idaho 2007).2 The modifications limited 
domestic sheep grazing on six allotments in order to prevent the transmission of diseases from 
domestic sheep to bighorn sheep. Id. The Shirts requested an administrative stay of the grazing 
limitations, which was denied. W. Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest Service, 2007 WL 
1729734, at * 1 (D. Idaho 2007). The Shirts appealed the denial of the administrative stay to the 
district court, which held that the Shirts were unlikely to prevail on setting aside the denial of the 
stay, and denied preliminary injunctive relief. Id., at *3-*4. The court concluded that given the 
evidence of disease transmission between domestic sheep and bighorns, and the past failure to 
separate bighorns from domestic sheep on the Shirts' allotments, the Forest Service had 
sufficient reason to adopt a "different approach" to "more strictly limit grazing on that 
allotment." Id., at *3. 
J Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(0) was amended in 2009. Among other actions, the subsection 
was amended to require that the parties responsible for transplanting or relocating bighorn sheep provide 
an "agreement" to affected grazing permittees instead of the "letter" required in the 1997 legislation. 
Because all actions alleged in the Complaint occurred prior to the 2009 amendments, all citations to Idaho 
Code § 36-1 06( e )(5)(0) herein will be to the statute as adopted in 1997 and in effect until amended in 
2009. A copy of Idaho Code § 36-1 06( e)( 5)(0), as it existed prior to the 2009 amendments, is attached to 
this Memorandum as Appendix 1. 
2 On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court, ill addition to considering those 
facts stated on the face of the complaint, may consider "those facts of which the court may properly take 
judicial notice." Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535,537 n.3, 835 P.2d 1346, 1348 n.3 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Among the facts of which a court may take judicial notice are the circumstances surrounding related 
litigation as set forth in court records. See City of Caldwell v. Roark, 98 Idaho 897, 899 n.l, 575 P.2d 
495, 497 n.1 (1978) (citing Saydes v. Cuoio, 71 Idaho 17, 226 P .2d 172 (1951), as authority for taking 
judicial notice "offacts set forth in prior opinion in related case"). 
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Plaintiffs allege that as "the result of the prior and continuing grazing permit 
modifications, the IWGA and the Shirts have suffered significant economic losses and will 
continue to suffer economic losses." Amended Complaint, ~ 26. Plaintiffs' claims against IDFG 
arise solely from the allegation that IDFG failed to "block" the Forest Service from modifying 
the Shirts' grazing permits. Amended Complaint ~ 26. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
For a complaint to be dismissed under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) on the ground that the complaint 
fails to state a claim, it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in 
support of their claims which would entitle them to relief. Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 
405, 353 P.2d 782, 787 (1960). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
every reasonable intendment will be made to sustain a complaint. Idaho Comm'n on Human 
Rights v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 215, 217, 506 P .2d 112, 114 (1973). The Court may consider only 
those facts stated on the face of the complaint and "those facts of which the court may properly 
take judicial notice." Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 537 n.3, 835 P.2d 1346, 1348 n.3 (Ct. 
App. 1992). 
A motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) "is a question of 
law that can be raised at any time." Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 471,903 P.2d 58, 60 
(1995). 
On motions to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(7) for failure to join an indispensable 
party, the "moving party has the burden to demonstrate the indispensability of [the absentee]." 
Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Invs., LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 372, 179 P.3d 323, 335 
(2008). Federal courts construing the identical federal rule hold that the courts "may consider 
materials outside the pleadings in resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b )(7) ... and 
33 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS Page 4 
consideration of such materials will not convert the motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary 
judgment." Three Affiliated Tribes ofFOli Berthold Indian Reservation v. United States, 637 F. 
Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D. D.C. 2009). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
1. All causes of action in the Amended Complaint must be dismissed for failure to join 
an indispensable party. 
I.R.C.P. 19(a)(1) provides that persons shall be joined as parties if"(1) in the person's 
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims 
an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action 
in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to 
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed 
interest." Persons who shall be joined if feasible are commonly referred to as "necessary" 
parties. The criteria in Rule 19( a)(1) for determining a necessary party are phrased in the 
disjunctive, and thus "an absentee whose nonjoinder results in any of the three problems 
identified by the Rule is necessary." 4 James Moore, Federal Practice § 19.03[1] (3d ed. 2010) 
("4 Federal Practice").3 
a. The claims set forth in the Amended Complaint raise particular issues relating to 
the enforceability of the 1997 Letter as applied to the absentee Forest Service. The Amended 
Complaint alleges that the Forest Service "reneged on its commitment in the Letter Agreement 
and began to modify various grazing permits in 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, including those of 
Shirts and Shirts Brothers." Amended Complaint ~ 24. The only injury alleged to be caused by 
3 The operative provisions of I.R.C.P. 19 are substantially identical to Rule 19 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Under such circumstances it is appropriate to refer to authorities construing the 
federal rules for guidance. Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674, 678, 201 PJd 647, 651 (2009). 
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Idaho is IDFO's failure "to block the Forest Service from modifying the [Shirts'] grazing 
allotments." Amended Complaint '125. Idaho's alleged liability is predicated, in other words, on 
a finding that the 1997 Letter is a contract enforceable against the United States and that the 
United States breached said contract by modifying the Shirts' grazing permits. Plaintiffs thus 
must establish that the 1997 Letter is a contract, since "[t]he burden of proving the existence of a 
contract and the fact of its breach is upon the plaintiff." State v. Peterson, 226 P.3d 535, 537 
(Idaho 2010), quoting O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796,813,810 P.2d 1082, 1099 (1991). The 
plaintiff "must prove each essential fact, including the existence of a mutual intention." Id., 
quoting Johnson v. Nasi, 309 P.2d 380, 382 (Wash. 1957). 
b. Because the Amended Complaint alleges that the United States violated the 1997 
Letter by modifying the Shirts' grazing permits, it is impossible, under I.R.C.P. 19(a)(1), to 
accord complete relief among the parties without the presence ofthe Forest Service, for the 
applicability of the 1997 Letter to the Forest Service's actions is at the heart of this matter. 
Absentees "who have an interest in the object of the suit," as opposed to a mere interest in the 
subject matter of the suit, are necessary parties, particularly where the rights of the plaintiffs 
against defendant cannot be determined independent of the rights of the absentee. Pro Indiviso, 
Inc. v. Mid-Mile Holding Trust, 131 Idaho 741, 746, 963 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1998). Here, because 
this suit requires a determination of whether the Forest Service breached any binding obligations 
under the 1997 Letter, the Plaintiffs' claims against IDFO cannot be determined independently. 
Adjudication of Plaintiffs' claims will require the Court to determine whether the 1997 Letter 
was a contract applicable to the Forest Service under federal law and whether the terms of the 
1997 Letter would be void for inconsistency with statutes governing grazing on national forest 
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lands. "Generally, a provision in a government contract that violates or conflicts with a federal 
statute is invalid or void." Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Austin, 75 F.3d 1535, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
Such unique legal issues cannot be adequately adjudicated without the presence of the 
United States. "The validity and construction of contracts through which the United States is 
exercising its constitutional functions, their consequences on the rights and obligations of the 
parties, the titles or liens which they create or permit, all present questions of federal law not 
controlled by the law of any state." United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 210 n.12 (1970) 
(quoting United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 183, (1944)); see also Woodbury 
v. United States, 313 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1963) ("the law to be applied in construing or 
applying provisions of government contracts is federal, not state law"). 
When a cause of action is based on the allegation that the federal government breached a 
contractual obligation, the plaintiff "must establish the existence of a valid contract." Anderson 
v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 199,201 (2006). The elements necessary to establish a contract 
binding on the Forest Service require inquiry into facts known only by the Forest Service. For 
example, the 1997 Letter would not bind the federal government unless, among other elements, 
the government representative signing the Letter had "actual authority to bind the United States 
in contract." Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003). This "general 
requirement[) appl[ies] equally to express and implied-in-fact contracts." Id. at 1353 n.3. See 
Steinberg v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 435, 447 (2009) (dismissing complaint for failure to plead 
signatory officer had authority to bind government); Northern Colorado Water Conservancy 
Dist. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 636,647-48 (2009) (plaintiff has burden of establishing 
federal officer's authority to sign contract). 
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Here, the Forest Service's joinder is necessary to resolve the unique questions of fact and 
federal law posed by the Amended Complaint, including whether the officer signing the Letter 
on behalf of the Wallowa-Whitman National Forest had authority to bind the Forest Service 
generally. This is a critical question since it was the Payette National Forest, not the Wallow-
Whitman National Forest, that modified the Shirts' grazing permits. The Forest Service's 
joinder is also necessary to determine whether the Forest Service had legal authority to enter into 
a "contract" that would limit its discretionary authority to cancel grazing permits. Federal courts 
have questioned whether the Forest Service possesses the "requisite authority to enter into a 
grazing contract" with persons using the national forests for grazing purposes, since federal 
grazing privileges are mere licenses "revocable at the government's discretion." Hage v. United 
States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 167 (Fed. Cl. 1996). "Forest Service personnel cannot contractually bind 
the government without the proper legal authority." Id. 
Because of the unique status of the Forest Service and the complex web of rules 
governing determination of whether the Forest Service was contractually obligated to refrain 
from modifying the Shirts' grazing permits, it is impossible to accord complete relief among the 
parties without joining the Forest Service. 
c. Even if the Court were to discount the unique nature of the claims vis-a-vis the 
Forest Service, the Forest Service's joinder would still be required by the second and third 
factors of I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l), which inquire whether as a practical matter litigation without the 
absentees will impair or impede the absentees' ability to protect their interests in the suit's 
subject matter, and whether proceeding without the absentees will leave IDFG subject to a 
"substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of 
the claimed interest." 
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Where the existence and validity of a contract are a central issue in litigation, all parties 
to the contract must be joined, since a judicial determination that a contract was formed will 
affect the rights of each party. "[A] contracting party is the paradigm of an indispensable party." 
United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. Kempthorne, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1296, l301 (E.D. 
Okla. 2009), quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Household Int'l, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 518, 527 (D. 
Conn. 1991); see also Allison v. Shapiro & Burson, LLP, 2009 WL 4015410, at *6 (W.O. Va. 
2009) ("[i]n determining the validity of a contract ... the parties to the contract are necessary 
parties). Here, a judicial declaration that the 1997 Letter is in fact an enforceable contract could 
as a practical matter impair the interests of the absentee signatories to the Letter, since it would 
fundamentally transform the relations among the signatories by requiring IDFG to interpret the 
letter as a contract. Such a determination would also put IDFO at risk of inconsistent obligations 
. in the event the other parties refuse to recognize the 1997 Letter as a contract, particularly if the 
court determined that IDFO was obligated to compensate grazing permittees in the event other 
signatories took actions inconsistent with the Letter. 
The risk of inconsistent obligations is magnified by the fact that, with one exception, the 
signatories to the 1997 Letter are sovereign governments, each with specific laws that govern 
that sovereign's conduct and define the circumstances under which documents such as the 1997 
Letter constitute a contract binding upon the sovereign. Generally speaking, the interests of a 
sovereign cannot be litigated without its consent. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999), 
quoting Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934) ("private suits 
against nonconsenting sovereigns are not 'of a justiciable character"'). For this reason, courts 
have held that sovereign governments are necessary and indispensable parties to any litigation 
that seeks to adjudicate the sovereign'S interest in a contract. Enter. Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. 
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United States ex reI. Hodel, 883 F.2d 890, 892-94 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding Indian tribe was 
indispensable party in suit seeking validation of contract with tribe since "the suit would also 
effectively abrogate the Tribe's sovereign immunity by adjudicating its interest in that contract 
without consent"). Because the determination of whether the 1997 Letter is a contract is, as to 
each sovereign party, defined by that sovereign's laws and waivers of sovereign immunity, there 
is a heightened risk of inconsistent obligations arising from proceeding in the absence of the 
other signatories. 
The risk of inconsistent obligations is also heightened because the alleged economic harm 
to Plaintiffs was solely the result of the Forest Service's modification of the Shirts' federal 
grazing permits. This case cannot proceed without determining: (1) the Forest Service's 
obligations under the 1997 Letter, and (2) whether the Forest Service breached those obligations. 
"All three Rule 19(a) concerns are implicated when the person whose obligation is centrally at 
issue is missing from the action." Cloverleaf Standardbred Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Nat'l Bank of 
Wash., 699 F.2d 1274, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The absentee's joinder is necessary where 
"plaintiffs' claims cannot succeed" in the "absence of proof of a breach" by absentee. Corsi v. 
Eagle Publishing, Inc., 2008 WL 239581 at *3 (D. D.C. 2008). Where the "central question in 
Plaintiffs breach of contract claims" is whether an absentee "upheld its obligations under the 
Letter Agreement," and "a finding that [the absentee] breached the Letter Agreement is a 
necessary factual predicate to all of Plaintiffs remaining claims," then the non-party is a 
necessary party. Fiscus v. Combus Fin. AG, 2007 WL 4164388, at *5 (D.N.J. 2007); see also 
Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi v. Prudential Sec. Group, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 450,457-58 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990) (absent party was necessary where it was "not merely a passive entity without affirmative 
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legal rights" but rather had "both clear rights and affirmative obligations under the contract 
which [the court] must construe"). 
In sum, this case presents a number of unique legal and factual issues that compel the 
conclusion, under the terms ofLR.C.P. 19(a)(1), that the United States is a necessary party that 
should be joined. Joinder, however, is infeasible since "[t]he United States, as sovereign, is 
immune from suit save as it consents to be sued." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,586 
(1941). With regard to claims based on alleged contracts, the United States has waived its 
sovereign immunity, but with strict forum limitations. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, 
provides that any actions against the United States founded on express or implied contract for 
damages in excess of $1 0,000 must be heard exclusively in the court of federal claims. The 
Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.c. § 1346(a)(2), provides that federal district courts may hear breach 
of contract actions for damages under $10,000. The United States has not waived its sovereign 
immunity to allow it to be joined in breach of contract actions in state court. 
d. Because the United States is a necessary party under I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l), the criteria 
ofI.R.C.P. 19(a)(2) must be applied to determine if the United States is an indispensable party in 
whose absence this matter must be dismissed. The factors that determine whether a party is 
indispensable are as follows: "first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence 
might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by 
protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice 
can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be 
adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for 
nonjoinder." LR.C.P. 19(a)(2). 
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The analytical process for determining whether a sovereign government is an 
indispensable party was recently clarified, and arguably streamlined, in Republic of Philippines 
v. Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. 2180 (2008). There, the Supreme Court suggested the following black 
letter rule: "A case may not proceed when a required-entity sovereign is not amenable to suit." 
Id. at 2191. "[W]here sovereign immunity is asserted, and the claims of the sovereign are not 
frivolous, dismissal of the action must be ordered where there is a potential for injury to the 
interests of the absent sovereign." Id. Application of the "not frivolous" test would require 
dismissal here, but Defendants nevertheless analyze the Rule 19 issue with respect to precedent 
that did not have the benefit of the guidance in Pimentel. 
First, applying the first prong ofI.R.C.P. 19(a)(2), any judgment rendered in the absence 
of the United States would be highly prejudicial to IDFO, since the Amended Complaint requires 
the threshold determination that the United States breached the 1997 Letter by modifyingthe 
Shirts' grazing permits. IDFO is not able to adequately defend this action without the 
participation of the United States, which is in sole possession of the facts and legal expertise 
necessary to determine a number of threshold issues, including: (l) whether the 1997 Letter 
legally binds the United States; (2) whether the 1997 Letter is consistent with federal statutes 
governing the administration of grazing permits on national forest lands; (3) whether changed 
circumstances or changes in law after signature of the 1997 Letter made the United States' 
compliance with the Letter impossible or impracticable;4 and (4) whether the 1997 Letter, under 
4 Among the changed circumstances that may be relevant to the Forest Service's modification of 
the grazing permits are the ongoing amendments of the forest plan for the Payette National Forest and 
related litigation. Nothing in the 1997 Letter relieved the Forest Service from its obligation to prepare a 
forest plan in accordance with the terms of the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 
and its accompanying regulations, which required "(fJish and wildlife habitat" to be "managed to maintain 
viable populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrae species." 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 
(2000). Regulations issued in 2000 eliminated that provision (65 Fed. Reg. 43,026 (Sept. 20, 2000)), but 
the Payette forest management plan was formulated under the earlier regulations and was subject to 
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federal law, restricted the Forest Service's legal authority to modify grazing permits without 
compensation to Permittees. Proceeding with this litigation without the presence of the Forest 
Service prejudices IDFG by making it potentially liable for actions of the Forest Service that 
may, in fact, be legal under federal law. See Fiscus v. Combus Fin. AG, 2007 WL 4164388, at 
*6 (D. N.J. 2007) (where finding that absentee breached agreement was a "necessary factual 
predicate" to plaintiffs claims, the absentee was indispensable); Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi v. 
Prudential Sec. Group, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 450,457-458 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (where absentee's 
obligations under contract would have to be construed to provide claimed relief, absentee was 
indispensable). 
Second, because the United States' actions and authorities are so fundamental to the 
threshold issues presented, there is, under the second prong of I.R.C.P. 19(a)(2), no means by 
which relief can be shaped to lessen or avoid the prejudice to IDFG. If in fact the Forest Service 
would not be liable for actions inconsistent with the 1997 Letter, then any award of damages 
against IDFG imposing liability for the Forest Service's actions would be prejudicial. See,~, 
Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. 130, 139 (1855) ("indispensable" absentees include persons whose 
absence would leave "the controversy in such a condition that its final termination may be 
wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience"). I.R.C.P. 19 incorporates fundamental 
principles of justice prohibiting the imposition of liability upon IDFG for harm caused solely by 
the conduct of an absentee party. See 4 Federal Practice § 19.02[3] (policies underlying Rule 19 
include "avoiding unfair imposition of liability on the defendant"). 
§ 219.19. See Utah Env'l Congo V. Richmond, 483 F.3d 1127, 1131-32(lOth Cir. 2007)(discussing 
transition between 1982 and 2000 regulations). Subsequent administrative and judicial appeals of the 
Payette forest plan resulted in modification of the grazing permits. See generally W. Watersheds Project 
V. U.S. Forest Service, 2007 WL 1729734 (D. Idaho 2007) (discussing appeals). Without the Forest 
Service's participation it may be impossible to determine whether the Forest Service's obligation to 
comply with those administrative and judicial determinations preempted the obligations, if any, that it 
incurred by signing the 1997 Letter. 
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Third, under the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, a judgment rendered in the 
absence of the Forest Service would not be adequate, because it would not address the harm 
alleged by Plaintiffs, which arises solely from the Forest Service's modification of the Shirts' 
grazing permits. "[A]dequacy refers to the 'public stake in settling disputes by wholes, 
whenever possible." Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. at 2193, quoting Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 111 (1968). Where going forward "would not further the public 
interest in settling the dispute as a whole" due to the presence of necessary absentees not bound 
by the judgment, the action should be dismissed. Id. Here, a judgment rendered in the Forest 
Service's absence would do nothing to curtail the only harm alleged in the Amended Complaint, 
i.e., the continuing modification of the Shirts' grazing permits, and, assuming the truth of the 
allegations presented, would leave IDFG vulnerable to continuing liability for actions of an 
absentee which IDFG is powerless to stop. 
Fourth, the Plaintiffs, under the last prong of I.R.C.P. 19(a)(2), have an adequate remedy 
in the event of dismissal of this action for nonjoinder, since they may proceed against the United 
States under the terms of the Tucker Act to recover damages in the court of federal claims, which 
has jurisdiction to render judgment against the United States upon any claim founded in express 
or implied contract with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491. Since the harm identified in the 
Amended Complaint arises solely from the allegation that the 1997 Letter contractually 
prohibited the Forest Service from modifying the Shirts' federal grazing permits, such claims are 
properly heard in federal claims court. 
2. All causes of action in the Amended Complaint must be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim because any economic harm suffered by the Shirts as a result of the 
Forest Service's modification of Plaintiffs' grazing permits does not, as a matter of 
law, give rise to damages. 
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The Plaintiffs allege that the Shirts "were permitted to graze their sheep on certain 
allotments in the Payette National Forest at different times of the year." Amended Complaint, 
~ 10. The Plaintiffs allege that in the years 2007-2010, the Forest Service "began to modify 
various grazing permits" held by the Shirts. Amended Complaint, ~ 24. They also allege that 
"[a]s the result of the prior and continuing grazing permit modifications, IWGA, Shirts and 
Shirts Brothers have suffered significant economic losses and will continue to suffer economic 
losses." Amended Complaint, ~ 26. 
In short, the only harm alleged by the Plaintiffs is the Forest Service's modification of the 
Shirts' grazing permits. Their cause of action against IDFG is based solely on the allegation that 
IDFG "took no action to block the Forest Service from modifying the grazing allotments for 
Shirts and Shirts Brothers and took insufficient action to prevent Shirts and Shirts Brothers from 
being harmed from these [Forest Service] decisions." Amended Complaint, ~ 25. 
a. By federal law, a federal "grazing permit is a fully revocable, nontransferable 
privilege." Fulton v. United States, 825 F. Supp. 261,262 (D. Nev. 1993). "[G]razing permits 
are merely a license to use the land rather than an irrevocable right of the permit-holder." Hage 
v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570, 586 (2002). Federal grazing permits are "licenses which 
confer certain privileges to the permittee, revocable at the government's discretion." Hage v. 
United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 167 (1996). "It is safe to say that it has always been the intention 
and policy of the government to regard the use of its public lands for stock grazing, either under 
the original tacit consent or, as to national forests, under regulation through the permit system, as 
a privilege which is withdrawable at any time for any use by the sovereign without the payment 
of compensation." Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d 712, 719 (9th Cir. 1983), quoting Osborne v. 
United States, 145 F.2d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 1944). 
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In shOlt, federal grazing permits are not contracts, Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 167, and holders 
of such permits "do not have a property interest in the permit or in the rangeland themselves." 
Id. at 170. Because federal grazing permits are mere licenses, "the cancellation of [a permit] 
does not give rise to damages." Id. at 150. Thus, the sole harm alleged in Amended Complaint, 
economic harm resulting from modification of the Shirts' grazing permits, is not cognizable as a 
matter of law. 
b. Given the limited nature of the grazing privileges held by the Shirts, and assuming 
the truth of all allegations in the Amended Complaint, this action must be dismissed. The Shirts' 
grazing privileges are defined by federal law as neither contractual rights nor property rights, but 
instead as licenses revocable at the Forest Service's discretion without compensation. Nothing in 
the 1997 Letter or Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D expresses an intent to confer additional grazing 
rights upon the Shirts. The 1997 Letter provided that the Committee "recognizes the existing 
domestic sheep operations in or adjacent to the Hells Canyon complex," and Idaho Code § 36-
106(e)(5)(D required that that the "existing sheep or livestock operations in the area of any such 
bighorn sheep transplant are recognized" (emphasis added). 
Under both the 1997 Letter and Idaho Code § 36-1 06( e )(5)(D, IDFG was obligated only 
to recognize the grazing privileges held by the Shirts under their then-existing grazing permits, 
and nothing in the Letter or the statute purported to confer additional grazing rights upon the 
Shirts. Moreover, any attempt to confer additional rights on the Shirts by contract or by 
operation of state law would be preempted by the federal statutes defining the Shirts' grazing 
privileges. When Congress enacts legislation respecting federal lands, "the federal legislation 
necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause ... [a] different rule 
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would place the public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation." 
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,543 (1976) (internal quotation omitted). 
Thus, even assuming the truth of the allegationsthat a duty was imposed on IDFG to 
block the Forest Service's modification of the Shirt's grazing privileges by the 1997 Letter, 
Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D, or by the various estoppel theories expounded by Plaintiffs, 
IDFG's failure to prevent such modification did not result in harm to any legal rights cognizable 
under Idaho law or federal law. Because the Forest Service was authorized by federal law to 
modify the grazing permits at its discretion, no action can lie against IDFG for damages alleged 
to result from such modification. 
3. All causes of action asserting breach of contract or estoppel must be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim because Plaintiffs failed to set forth any facts demonstrating 
that the claimed damages of lost profits were within the contemplation of the parties 
signing the 1997 Letter. 
Even assuming, solely for purposes of this motion, that the 1997 Letter was a contract, 
that the Forest Service's modification of the Shirts' grazing permits was a breach of said 
contract, and ignoring the fact that grazing permits are revocable without compensation, 
Plaintiffs' claims for damages must still be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs allege 
that "[a]s the result of the prior and continuing permit modifications [by the Forest Service], 
IWGA, Shirts and Shirts Brothers have suffered significant economic losses and will continue to 
suffer economic losses." Amended Complaint, ~ 26. 
"Damages recoverable for breach of contract are those that arise naturally from the 
breach and are reasonably foreseeable." Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 
879, 884, 42 P.3d 672, 677 (2002). "Lost profits are generally not recoverable in contract unless 
there is something in that contract that suggests that they were within the contemplation of the 
parties and are proved with reasonable certainty." Id. at 884-85,42 P.3d at 677-78; see also 
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Taylor v. Browning, 129 Idaho 483, 492, 927 P.2d 873, 882 (1996) (denying lost profits 
damages claims because the subject "agreements do not contain any clauses which suggest that 
lost profits were within the contemplation of the parties"). 
Here, Plaintiffs' claims for economic losses resulting from modification of their grazing 
permits is tantamount to a claim of lost profits, and all claims based on the representations in the 
1997 Letter, including breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and promissory estoppel, must be dismissed as a matter of 
law, because the Amended Complaint fails to identify any provisions in the 1997 Letter 
suggesting that payment of lost profits for modification of grazing permits was within the 
contemplation of the parties signing the Letter. 
4. All causes of action alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and promissory estoppel must 
be dismissed for failure to state a c1aini because the Amended Complaint does not 
set forth any facts demonstrating a representation by IDFG that it would block the 
Forest Service from modifying the Shirts' grazing permits. 
Central to Plaintiffs' cause of action is the allegation that IDFG was committed, either 
contractually or by estoppel, "to block the Forest Service from modifying the grazing allotments" 
of the Shirts. Amended Complaint, ~ 25. Solely for purposes of this motion to dismiss, IDFG 
assumes the 1997 Letter is an enforceable agreement between IDFG and IWGA, and that the 
Shirts are a beneficiary of such agreement. 5 The Amended Complaint must be dismissed, 
however, for failure to identify any language in the 1997 Letter or in any other communication 
between IDFG and the Plaintiffs that constitutes a promise by IDFG to block the Forest Service 
from modifying grazing permits. 
5 If this matter were to proceed, one of the central issues to be decided is whether there is 
sufficient evidence to establish that the 1997 Letter fulfills the basic elements of a contract, including 
"subject matter, consideration, mutual assent by all the parties to all the terms, and an agreement that is 
expressed plainly and explicitly enough to show what the parties have agreed." State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 
413,415,224 PJd 480, 482 (2009). 
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a. The only statement identified by Plaintiffs as a source ofthe alleged duty to block 
the Forest Service from modifying grazing permits is the language in the 1997 letter whereby 
IDFO stated that it and the other fish and wildlife agencies would "take whatever action is 
necessary to reduce further losses of bighorn sheep without adversely impacting existing 
domestic sheep operators." Amended Complaint, Exh. A. 
The plain meaning of such language is that IDFO would take whatever action was 
necessary to protect bighorn sheep. Nothing in such language commits IDFO to taking 
"whatever action is necessary" to protect domestic sheep operators. The stated intent to avoid 
adverse impacts on domestic sheep operators is only a limitation on the scope of actions that 
IDFO may take to protect bighorns. In other words, the plain language of the 1997 Letter states 
that IDFO, in taking "whatever actions" are necessary to protect transplanted bighorn sheep, will 
refrain from taking actions that have adverse impacts on domestic sheep operators. Nothing in 
the plain language of the 1997 Letter requires IDFO to take affirmative action to protect 
domestic sheep operators from Forest Service modification of their grazing permits. Thus, 
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract must be dismissed. 
h. Because the 1997 Letter lacked any provision requiring IDFO to block Forest 
Service modification of the Shirts' grazing permits, their claimed cause of action alleging IDFO 
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must also be dismissed. The 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "applies to all contracts" and "requires only that 
the parties perform in good faith the obligations imposed by their agreement." Record Steel & 
Const., Inc. v. Martel Const., Inc., 129 Idaho 288, 292, 923 P.2d 995,999 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(internal quotations omitted). The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "arises only 
regarding terms agreed to by the parties," and "[ n]o covenant will be implied which is contrary 
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to the terms of the contract negotiated and executed by the parties." Bushi v. Sage Health Care, 
PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 768, 203 P.3d 694, 698 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). The implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is "only violated when 'action by either party ... violates, 
nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the ... contract.'" Idaho First Nat'! Bank v. Bliss 
Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 289,824 P.2d 841, 864 (1991), quoting Metcalfv. 
Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 778 P.2d 744 (1989). The implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing does "not result in a cause of action separate from the breach of contract 
claims." Id. Thus, to prevail, the plaintiff must "identify [the] specific term within the operating 
agreement that [defendants] breached." Bushi, 146 Idaho at 768, 203 P.3d at 698. Here, because 
Plaintiffs fail to identify any term in the 1997 Letter specifically requiring IDFG to block Forest 
Service modification of grazing permits, the cause of action alleging that IDFG breached the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to block such modifications must be 
dismissed as a matter of law. 
c. Plaintiffs' claimed causes of action based on promissory estoppel, equitable 
estoppel, and quasi-estoppel likewise must be dismissed because they are based on the alleged 
"reliance by IWGA and its members ... on the Idaho Department ofFish and Game's promise 
in the Letter Agreement," Amended Complaint, ~ 44 (emphasis added); allegations that the 
"Idaho Department of Fish and Game is now taking a different position relating to its 
representation in the 1997 Letter Agreement, " Amended Complaint, ~ 44 (emphasis added); 
and allegations that "the Defendants may not now repudiate the promises and commitments set 
forth in the Letter Agreement." Amended Complaint, ~ 53 (emphasis added). In short, the 
Amended Complaint does not identify any representations made by IDFG other than the 
representation in the 1997 Letter. Therefore, in the event that the Court finds that the causes of 
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action based on the 1997 Letter must be dismissed, the causes of action based on various forms 
of estoppel thus must also be dismissed, since each simply seeks to stop IDFO from denying 
representations in the 1997 Letter. 
d. To the extent that Plaintiffs seek to use estoppel to prove the existence of an 
agreement outside the plain terms of the 1997 Letter, such claims must also be dismissed, for 
equitable estoppel is not a substitute for an agreement. See Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 
141 Idaho 362, 367,109 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2005) (refusing to apply equitable estoppel because 
"[e ]quitable estoppel assumes the existence of a complete agreement, which is lacking here") 
Indeed, "[t]he word estoppel 'means simply that someone is "stopped" from claiming or saying 
something; usually he is stopped from saying the true facts or claiming a lawful claim. '" Snyder 
v. City of Minneapolis, 441 N.W.2d 781, 790-91 (Minn. 1989) (quoting Dobbs, Law of 
Remedies § 2.3, at 41. (1973)). As such, estoppel is "a shield, not a sword," and does not furnish 
an independent basis for damage claims. Id.; see also Clifford R. Gray, Inc. v. LeChase Const. 
Servs., LLC, 819 N. Y.S.2d 182, 186-87 (N. Y.A.D. 2006) (finding "fundamental and fatal flaw" 
in cause of action seeking money damages based on equitable estoppel); Regency Hosp. Co. of 
Nw. Ark., LLC v. Ark. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 2009 WL 5174246, at *6 (E.D. Ark. 2009) 
(equitable estoppel may not be used as a basis for the recovery of money damages); Paquette v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2009 WL 2168918, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) ("[e]quitable 
estoppel is not a cause of action but is utilized as a defense"); Sparton Tech., Inc. v. Util-Link, 
LLC, 248 Fed. Appx. 684, 689 (6th Cir. 2007) (equitable estoppel is not recognized as a cause of 
action). 
Moreover, "[ e ]quitable estoppel may not ordinarily be invoked against a government or 
public agency functioning in a sovereign or governmental capacity." Young Elec. Sign Co. v. 
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State ex reI. Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 810, 25 P.3d 117, 123 (2001), quoting State v. Adams, 90 
Idaho 195, 201, 409 P.2d 415, 421 (1965). Management of wildlife is a core sovereign function. 
See Sherwood v. Stephens, 13 Idaho 399, 403, 90 P. 345, 346 (1907) (state exercises police 
power to regulate taking of fish and game based on fact that the "wild game and fish within a 
state belong to the people in their collective sovereign capacity") (internal quotation omitted). 
Therefore, IDFG can not be required by a claim of equitable estoppel to take action not required 
by statute or contract. 
e. The doctrine of quasi-estoppel has been described by the Idaho Supreme Court as 
an "affirmative defense" that provides "essentially a last-gasp theory under which a defendant 
who can point to no specific detrimental reliance due to plaintiffs' conduct may still assert that 
plaintiffs are estopped from asserting allegedly contrary positions where it would be 
unconscionable for them to do so." Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 357, 358, 
48 P.3d 1241, 1246, 1247 (2002) (emphasis added), quoting Schoonover v. Bonner County, 113 
Idaho 916, 919, 750 P.2d 95, 99 (1988); see also Hamilton v. Morris Resources, Ltd., 225 
S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. Civ. App. 2007) ("[q]uasi-estoppel is an equitable doctrine that operates 
as an affirmative defense"). The doctrine of quasi-estoppel "precludes a party from asserting to 
another's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by him." Thomas, 
137 Idaho at 357, 48 P.3d at 1246, quoting Schoonover, 113 Idaho at 919, 750 P.2d at 99. Here, 
the Amended Complaint does not allege that IDFG has asserted any rights against Plaintiffs 
arising from the 1997 Letter; rather, the Amended Complaint alleges only that IDFG failed to 
perform certain duties alleged to be owed Plaintiffs under the terms of the 1997 Letter. As such, 
the doctrine of quasi-estoppel has no application, and any claims arising under it must be 
dismissed. 
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f. Generally, promissory estoppel can be pled as "an affirmative cause of action and 
thus differs from equitable estoppel, which operates defensively to bar the assertion of a claim or 
defense." Peters v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., 533 FJd 594, 599 (7th Cir. 2008); Jablon v. United 
States, 657 F.2d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[p ]romissory estoppel is a sword, and equitable 
estoppel is a shield"). Under Idaho law, however, promissory estoppel is "a substitute for 
consideration, not a substitute for an agreement between the parties." Lettunich v. Key Bank 
Nat'l Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 367,109 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2005) "While promissory estoppel may 
provide consideration for a contract, there must be a sufficiently definite agreement to have an 
enforceable contract." Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 119 
Idaho 171, 178,804 P.2d 900, 907 (1991); Grover v. Wadsworth, ]47 Idaho 60, 64, 205 PJd 
1196, 1200 (2009)(where "there was no underlying promise between" the parties, "promissory 
estoppel is the incorrect legal theory"). Thus, promissory estoppel would do nothing more than 
provide a means for establishing one of the elements necessary to conclude that the 1997 Letter 
is a contract. Here, however, Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim fails for reasons unrelated to 
consideration. 
In summary, assuming the truth of the allegation that the 1997 Letter is a contract, 
nothing in said "contract" obligates IDFG to take action against the Forest Service in the event 
the Forest Service modifies the grazing permits of the Shirts. Plaintiffs' claims of good faith and 
fair dealing, equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and promissory estoppels do not impose any 
obligations beyond those apparent in the plain language of the 1997 Letter. At most, the cited 
estoppel doctrines may be employed to establish that the 1997 Letter is a contract - thus, if the 
Amended Complaint is dismissed for failure to plead a contractual obligation to block Forest 
5;L 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS Page 23 
Service modifications of the Shirts' grazing permits, the causes of action based on equitable 
estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and promissory estoppels must likewise be dismissed. 
5. All causes of action alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and promissory estoppel must 
be dismissed for failure to state a claim because it was not possible for IDIi'G to 
perform the duty alleged to be owed plaintiffs, i.e., blockage of the alleged breach of 
the 1997 Letter by the Forest Service. 
Plaintiffs allege that IDFG breached its contractual commitment to Plaintiffs by taking 
"no action to block the Forest Service from modifying the grazing allotments for Shirts and 
Shirts Brothers." Amended Complaint ~ 25. This allegation fails to state a cause of action for 
breach of contract or breach of duty imposed by equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, or 
promissory estoppel, because the alleged duty to block modification of the Shirts' grazing 
permits was impossible to perform. Assuming, solely for purposes of argument, that IDFG was 
under a duty to "block" the Forest Service from modifying the Shirts' grazing permits, IDFG is 
excused for its nonperformance of such duty under the doctrine of impossibility. Under Idaho 
law, when performance of a contractual duty is made impossible by events occurring after 
execution of the contract, failure to perform is excused. State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 523, 
198 P.3d 749, 752 (Ct. App. 2008). 
"One such superseding event has been the government imposition of a new law, 
regulation or order which makes the performance of a duty impractical." Landis v. Hodgson, 
109 Idaho 252, 257, 706 P.2d 1363, 1368 (Ct. App. 1985). "[A] contractual duty is discharged 
where performance is subsequently prevented or prohibited by a judicial, executive, or 
administrative order, in the absence of circumstances showing either a contrary intention or 
contributing fault on the part of the person subject to the duty." Id" quoting Lane v. Dashiell, 75 
A.2d 348, 353-54 (Md. 1950). 
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Here, the Forest Service issued administrative orders prohibiting the Shirts from grazing 
sheep on certain subunits of the Shirts' grazing allotments. W. Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest 
Service, 2007 WL 1729734, at * 1 (D. Idaho 2007). The Shilis sought to enjoin preliminarily the 
administrative orders, which motion was denied by the federal district court for the district of 
Idaho. Id., at *4. 
The Forest Service's administrative order modifying the Shirt's grazing permits was an 
unforeseen superseding event that excuses Idaho's performance of any contractual duties to 
protect the grazing rights of the Shirts under the predecessor permits. While Plaintiffs allege that 
IDFG had the authority and the duty to "block" the issuance of the administrative order, they fail 
to allege the existence of any contract or statute granting such authority to IDFO. IDFO's 
authorities do not include the authority to override administrative orders of the Forest Service 
regarding use of grazing allotments. Even if the Legislature had granted such authority to IDFO, 
it could not be exercised: under the Supremacy Clause and Property Clause of the United States 
Constitution, any attempt by the State to override federal land management decisions would be 
preempted. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,540-43 (1976) (Property Clause provides 
Congress the power to control the occupancy and use of public lands, and to prescribe the 
conditions upon which others may obtain rights in them, and "when Congress so acts, the federal 
legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause"). 
Thus, IDFG's only avenue to "block" the Forest Service's orders modifying the Shirts' 
grazing permits would have been a judicial action seeking to enforce the 1997 Letter. Such an 
action, however, is forbidden by federal law. While Congress has waived federal sovereign 
immunity to allow actions against the United States to recover damages for breach of contract,6 it 
6 The waivers offederal sovereign immunity are found in the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.c. § 1491 
(court of federal claims may hear actions against United States founded on express or implied contract), 
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has not waived sovereign immunity to allow actions for specific performance of contractual 
provisions. "An action seeking specific performance, rather than damages, against [the federal 
government] is an action against the sovereign and is not maintainable unless consented to." 
Price v. U.S. General Services Admin., 894 F.2d 323, 324-25 (9th Cir. 1990), quoting Lee v. 
Blumenthal, 588 F.2d 1281,1282 (9th Cir.1979); Cardiosom, LLC v. United States, 2010 WL 
723790, at *4 (Fed. Cl. 2010) ("federal district courts consistently hold that the Tucker Act 
impliedly prohibits district courts from ordering specific performance by the United States on its 
alleged contractual obligations"); Logan Canyon Cattle Ass'n v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 165, 
168 ( 1995) (dismissing action seeking specific performance of contract because jurisdiction of 
the federal court of claims "encompasses only money claims against the United States"); 
Robbins v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management, 438 F.3d 1074, 1082 (lOth Cir. 2006) (holding 
that the federal Administrative Procedure Act does not waive sovereign immunity "for claims 
that arise out of a contract and that seek specific performance of the contract as relief'). 
In short, the Forest Service's administrative orders modifying the Shirts' grazing permits 
was an unforeseen circumstance that was not possible for IDFG to "block" because of federal 
supremacy principles and because federal law bars actions to enforce the terms of federal 
contracts. Since it was impossible for IDFG to stop the Forest Service from taking the action 
that is alleged to have caused harm to Plaintiffs, the Amended Complaint fails to state a cause of 
action against IDFG for failing to do so, and must be dismissed pursuant to LR.c'P. 12(b)(6). 
6. All claims for damages for violation of Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(S)(D) must be 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. 
a. The third cause of action in the Amended Complaint claims that Plaintiffs are 
entitled to money damages for the alleged violation of Idaho Code § 36-1 06(e)(5)(D) by IDFG. 
and the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.c, § 1346(a)(2) (federal district courts may hear breach of contract 
actions for damages under $10,000). 
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This cause of action must be dismissed because Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) had not yet been 
enacted at the time the 1997 Letter was executed. The 1997 Letter was executed on January 16, 
1997, and marked as received by the IWGA on March 11, 1997. Amended Complaint, Exhibit 
A. Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D)was not enacted until March 24,1997. 1997 Idaho Sess. L. 
867. Because Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) did not provide for retroactive application, it does 
not govern the terms of the 1997 Letter. See Woodland Furniture. LLC v. Larsen, 142 Idaho 
140, 146, 124 PJd 1016, 1022 (2005) ("[t]he law is well settled that, unless a contrary intention 
is clearly indicated, a new statute will not be given retroactive effect"). 
b. Moreover, even if the Court were to apply Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) 
retroactively, the Amended Complaint fails to identify any IDFG actions inconsistent with the 
plain terms of the statute. Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) requires only that IDFG and 
cooperating agencies provide grazing permittees "a written letter ... stating that the existing 
sheep or livestock operations in the area of any such bighorn sheep transplant are recognized and 
that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when the same 
invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted." Upon execution of the 1997 Letter, 
and its provision to affected grazing permittees, IDFG's statutory duties were fulfilled. Nothing 
in Idaho Code § 36-106( e )(5)(D) imposed any ongoing duties upon IDFG with regard to such 
letter. 
c. Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that Idaho Code § 36-1 06( e)( 5)(D) 
imposed a duty upon IDFG to block other parties from violating the terms of the 1997 Letter, and 
that IDFG violated such duty, Plaintiffs' claim: (1) must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 
since such claim was not brought within the time frame specified in Idaho Code § 67-5273, and 
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(2) must be dismissed because money damages cannot be awarded for agency violations of Idaho 
Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D). 
First, Idaho Code § 67-5270 provides that "[j]udicial review of agency action shall be 
governed by the provisions of this chapter [Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, Idaho Code §§ 
67 -5201 through 67 -5292] unless other provision of law is applicable to the particular matter." 
Idaho Code § 67-5273 provides that a "petition for judicial review of a final agency action other 
than a rule or order must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the agency action, except as 
provided by other provision oflaw. Here, the agency action that is at the crux of Plaintiffs' 
claims, i.e., IDFG's alleged decision to not block the Forest Service from modifying the Shirts' 
grazing permits, occurred in 2007. Amended Complaint ~ 25. Hence, Plaintiffs' claims are 
untimely and must be dismissed, because failure to file "a petition for judicial review within the 
time permitted by statute is jurisdictional." Erickson v. Idaho Bd. of Registration of Profl Eng'rs 
and Prof'1 Land Surveyors, 146 Idaho 852, 854,203 PJd 1251, 1253 (2009), quoting Horne v. 
Idaho State Univ., 138 Idaho 700, 703, 69 P.3d 120, 123 (2003). Failure to timely file a petition 
for judicial review "shall cause automatic dismissal of the petition for judicial review." Id., 
quoting Canyon County Bd. of Equalization v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., LLC, 143 Idaho 58, 62, 
137 P.3d 445, 449 (2006). 
Second, even if Plaintiffs were able to evade the jurisdictional time limit of Idaho Code 
§ 67-5273, the court could not award money damages for violation ofIDFG's alleged duties 
under Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D). Idaho Code § 67-5279 provides that if the Court, in 
reviewing an agency action, determines that the agency's action was in "violation of ... statutory 
provisions," the sole remedy is to set aside the agency action in whole or part, and remand for 
further proceedings as necessary. 
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As a general matter, therefore, agency violations of statutory duties may not be remedied 
by the award of money damages absent a statute explicitly authorizing the award of damages 
against the state. Nothing in the plan language ofIdaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) provides for 
IDFO to provide monetary reimbursement to sheep operators in the event one of the other 
signatories to such a letter takes action to restrict grazing for the purpose of protecting bighorn 
sheep. Rather, the subsection that requiring IDFO to provide grazing Permittees a letter has two 
operative elements: first, IDFO must "recognize" existing sheep operations in the area of the big 
horn transplant. The term "recognize" means to "perceive or show acceptance of the validity or 
reality" of the subject matter. American Heritage Dictionary 1460 (4th ed. 2000). Second, 
subsection (e)(5)(D) requires that the potential risk of disease transmission from domestic sheep 
to bighorn sheep will be "accepted" by IDFO. The plain meaning of such a requirement is that 
IDFO was required to verify that the risk of disease transmission was understood and that IDFG, 
by transplanting bighorns into areas with preexisting domestic sheep operations, voluntarily 
exposed the bighorns to such risk. 
Thus, the plain meaning of the terms of the subsection require IDFG to recognize and 
accept the validity of existing grazing privileges held by grazing permittees. As discussed 
previously in this memorandum, grazing privileges are licenses revocable at the will of the 
Forest Service. Nothing in the plain language of the terms "recognize" and "accept" confers 
additional rights upon grazing permittees or provides for reimbursement in the event of 
revocation or modification of the grazing permit by the Forest Service. 
In sum, the third cause of action, alleging violation ofldaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D), 
must be dismissed because (1) IDFG has complied with the plain term ofldaho Code § 36-
1 06( e )(5)(D), (2) the plain terms of Idaho Code § 36-1 06( e )(5)(D) do not obligate IDFG to 
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reimburse Plaintiffs for economic harms caused by the Forest Service's modification of the 
Shirts' grazing permits, (3) the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the cause of action 
alleging violation ofIdaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) because it was not timely filed, and (4) 
money damages may not be awarded for agency violations of statutory duties. 
7. IDFG must be awarded its attorney fees and other reasonable expenses. 
Idaho Code § 12-117(1) was amended during the 2010 legislative session to read as 
follows: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding or civil 
judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or political 
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as 
the case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, 
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/legislationl201 0/H0421.pdf The changes to Idaho Code § 12-
117 "shall apply to all cases filed and pending as of June 1, 2009." Id. Significantly, the 2010 
changes to Idaho Code § 12-117 removed the provision requiring that ajudgment be rendered as 
a prerequisite to the award of attorney fees. The legislature's clear intent was to authorize the 
award of attorney fees on orders that dispose of actions in favor of a prevailing party even if such 
orders do not result in entry of a "judgment." 
The Supreme Com1 has held that § 12-117 was intended to "provide a remedy for persons 
who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges." 
Bogner v. State Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859,693 P.2d 1056, 1061 
(1984).7 Section 12-117 is "not a discretionary statute; but it provides that the court shall award 
attorney fees" when the stated conditions are fulfilled. Rincover v. State, Dept. of Finance, 132 
7 Bogner was addressing the original version of § 12-117, which provided for awards of attorney fees to 
persons litigating against state agencies. Section 12-117 was later amended to also authorize the award of attorney 
fees to state agencies that prevail in actions. See 2000 Idaho Sess. L. 675. 
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Idaho 547,549,976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999). The "two predicate determinations for an award" 
(prevailing party and no reasonable basis in fact or law) do not require factual findings but are: 
more in the nature of legal conclusions, since the first one depends upon 
successfully achieving some form of favorable relief that properly can be granted 
by the court to the 'person,' and the other depends upon the assessment of the 
conduct of the other party to decide if that party's activities can be characterized as 
having been unreasonably premised or undertaken upon either a set of facts or 
under relevant legal principles applicable to the situation in which the parties were 
engaged. 
Id. at 549-50, 976 P.2d at 475-76. 
a. If the Court enters an order dismissing this action, IDFG is the prevailing 
party for purposes of awarding attorney fees. 
In the event the Court enters an order dismissing this action on any of the grounds stated 
herein, IDFG will have prevailed. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l) states that the 
prevailing party is to be determined by considering "the result of the action in relation to the 
relief sought." When a party obtains dismissal of an action, such party is a prevailing party. For 
example, in Sanders v. Lankford, 134 Idaho 322, 1 P Jd 823 (2000), defendant Lankford filed a 
motion to dismiss for failure to name the proper party in the lawsuit, and the motion was granted. 
The magistrate and district court held that Lankford was not a prevailing party and could not be 
awarded attorney fees. Id. at 324-25, 1 P.3d at 825-26. The Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that the "result obtained in this case was a dismissal of Sander's action-the most favorable 
outcome that could possibly be achieved by Lankford as defendant." Id. at 326, 1 P.3d at 827. 
Likewise, dismissal of this action on the grounds outlined in this memorandum would be 
the most favorable outcome IDFG could obtain as defendant, requiring the determination that 
IDFG has prevailed in this action. 
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b. The entry of an order dismissing this action for the reasons set forth herein 
necessarily includes the determination that there is no reasonable basis in law 
or fact for the causes of action set forth in the Amended Complaint. 
Idaho Code § 12-117 "considers the character of the losing paliy's case." Roe v. Harris, 
128 Idaho 569, 573, 917 P.2d 403, 407 (1996) overturned on other grounds, Rincover v. State, 
Dept. of Finance, 132 Idaho 547,976 P.2d 473 (1999). Here, dismissal of the Amended 
Compliant for failure to state a claim, failure to join an indispensable party, or lack of 
jurisdiction necessarily requires the decision that there is no reasonable basis in fact or law for 
proceeding with the causes of action in the Amended Complaint. For the reasons set forth 
herein, Plaintiffs' claims are without legal foundation and "unreasonably premised." Rincover, 
132 Idaho at 550, 976 P.2d at 476. IDFG has had to defend itself against baseless claims at 
considerable expense. Under such circumstances, the award of attorney fees under the terms of 
§ 12- I 17 is required. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint sets forth the following causes of action: 
• First cause of action: breach of contract; 
• Second cause of action: breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 
• Third cause of action: violation ofldaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D); 
• Fourth cause of action: promissory estoppel; 
• Fifth cause of action: equitable estoppel; 
• Sixth cause of action: quasi-estoppel. 
For the reasons set forth herein, all causes of action should be dismissed for failure to join 
the Forest Service as an indispensable party. 
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For the reasons set forth herein, all causes of action should be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim because the Plaintiffs suffered no damages recognizable at law because the Shirts' 
grazing permits were mere licenses subject to modification without compensation. 
Alternatively, causes of action 1,2,4, 5 and 6 must be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim because Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the claimed damages of lost profits were 
within the contemplation of the parties who signed the 1997 Letter. 
Alternatively, causes of action 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 must be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim because Plaintiffs have failed to identify any representation by IDFG obligating IDFG to 
block the Forest Service from modifying the grazing permits of the Shirts that is enforceable as a 
matter of contract or enforceable under the various estoppel theories asserted by Plaintiffs. 
Alternatively, causes of action 1,2,4,5 and 6 must be dismissed because any obligation 
by IDFG to block the Forest Service's modification oftheShirts' grazing permits was excused as 
a matter of law because it was impossible to perform. 
Alternatively, the third cause of action must be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
because the Amended Complaint fails to identify any action by IDFG that violates the terms of 
Idaho Code § 36-1 OG( e)( 5)(D) and because money damages may not be awarded for agency 
violation of statutory duties. 
Alternatively, the third cause of action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction because the Plaintiffs failed to file their claims within the jurisdictional time limit 
established by Idaho Code § 67-5273 for review of agency actions. 
Additionally, upon dismissal of this action, IDFG is entitled to the award of its attorney 
fees and other reasonable expenses incurred in defending this action. pursuant to the authority of 
Idaho Code § 12-117. 
~:l. 
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DATED this day of May 2010. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
CLIVE J. STRONG 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Natural Resources Div:ision 
·s 
Deputy Attorney General 
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Appendix 1 
Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) 
(As enacted in 1997 and in place until amended on May 7, 2009) 
(D) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 36-408, Idaho Code, to the contrary, on 
and after the effective date of this act, the director shall not expend any funds, or take any action, 
or authorize any employee or agent of the department or other person to take any action, to 
undertake actual transplants of bighorn sheep into areas they do not now inhabit or to augment 
the number of bighorn sheep in existing herds until: 
(i) The boards of county commissioners of the counties in which the release is proposed to 
take place have been given reasonable notice of the proposed release. 
(ii) The affected federal and state land grazing permittees and owners or leaseholders of 
private land in or contiguous to the proposed release site have been given reasonable notice 
of the proposed release. 
(iii) The president pro tempore of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives 
have received from the director a plan for the forthcoming year that details, to the best of the 
department's ability, the proposed transplants which shall include the estimated numbers of 
bighorn sheep to be transplanted and a description of the areas the proposed transplant or 
transplants are planned for. 
Upon request, the department shall grant one (1) hearing per transplant if any affected 
individual or entity expresses written concern within ten (10) days of notification regarding any 
transplants of bighorn sheep and shall take into consideration these concerns in approving, 
modifying or canceling any proposed bighorn sheep transplant. Any such hearing shall be held 
within thirty (30) days of the request. Upon any transplant of bighorn sheep into areas they do 
not now inhabit or a transplant to augment existing populations, the department shall provide for 
any affected federal or state land grazing permittees or owners or leaseholders of private land a 
written letter signed by all federal, state and private entities responsible for the transplant stating 
that the existing sheep or livestock operations in the area of any such bighorn sheep transplant 
are recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of bighorn 
sheep when the same invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted. 
l'c.6" 
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Samuel A. Diddle, ISB No. 4967 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS 
IDAHO WOOL GROWERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
individually and on behalf of its members; 
FRANK SHIRTS, JR., individually and as a 
member of the Idaho Wool Growers 
Association; RONALD W. SHIRTS, 
LESLIE SHIRTS and JOliN T. SHIRTS, 
individually and d/b/a SHIRTS BROTHERS 
SHEEP and as members of the Idaho Wool 
Growers Association, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH & 
GAME COMMISSION; IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF FISH & GAME; CAL 
GROEN, Director of Idaho Department of 
Fish and Game. 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' 
Case No. CV 2010-2567 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES - 1 
44561-11 00193781.000 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc., ("IWGA"), Frank 
Shirts, Jr., and Ronald W. Shilis and Leslie Shirts, husband and wife, and John T. Shirts d/b/a 
Shirts Brothers Sheep, by and through their attorneys of record, Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow 
& McKlveen, Chmiered, and submit this objection to Defendants' Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss and Request for Attorney's Fees. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
The argument of the Defendants, State of Idaho, Idaho Fish & Game Commission, Idaho 
Department of Fish & Game and Cal Groen, Director of Idaho Department of Fish and Game 
(hereinafter referred to as "IDFG") is well-researched, logically sound, and quite persuasive. 
The only problem with IDFG's argument is that it is directed at a claim not raised by Plaintiffs 
and is therefore quite irrelevant. It was a waste of state taxpayer monies to prepare it and a waste 
of the Court's time to consider. 
Plaintiffs concede that if their claim against IDFG were solely that IDFG failed to 
"block" the Forest Service from modifying the Shirts' grazing permits then their Complaint 
could be and should be dismissed. Plaintiffs concede that IDFG probably has no legal power to 
block the United States Forest Service from modifying federal grazing permits and that if this 
were their claim the United States Forest Service would be an indispensable party. However, as 
would be clear from a reading of the Complaint, this is not Plaintiffs' claim. 
Plaintiffs' claim, to the contrary, is this: the January 16, 1997 Letter Agreement signed by 
IDFG constitutes a contract with IWGA and its members by which IDFG agrees to indemnify 
the IWGA and its members from any harm or economic loss caused by the reintroduction of the 
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bighorn sheep into the Hells Canyon area. The Idaho Legislature recognized that contractual 
agreement, ratified the contract, and approved that Agreement through the enactment of Idaho 
Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) in the 1997 Idaho legislative session. 
The essence of Plaintiffs' Complaint is that IDFG brcached its contract and violated the 
statute by not protecting the Plaintiffs from the adverse economic impacts associated with the 
reintroduction of bighorn sheep, including the nullification and/or eradication of historic grazing 
permits. 
IDFG's brief does a good job of describing the factual background to this case. It 
neglects to note that the State of Idaho claims ownership of all wildlife in the state 1 , including the 
bighorn sheep that were reintroduced in the Hells Canyon area in 1997, but does accurately state 
the background of the reintroduction. That background is that various wildlife agencies 
including IDFG wished to initiate a bighorn reintroduction effort in 1996 or 1997, but were faced 
with opposition from various interests, including especially the Idaho Wool Growers, which 
recognized that the proposed reintroduction might have adverse effects on its members. The 
Idaho Wool Growers Association on behalf of its members, as well as the Shilis individually, 
prepared to oppose the reintroduction and started gathering support in the Idaho Legislature for 
legislation preventing the bighorn reintroduction into Idaho. Recognizing this powerful 
opposition and real threat to the reintroduction effort, IDFG and the other State wildlife agencies 
agreed to those certain terms in the 1997 Letter Agreement in consideration for Plaintiffs' 
agreement to drop their efforts to stop the reintroduction efforts. 
1 Idaho Code § 36-103(a) (HAil wildlife ... within the State ofIdaho, is hereby declared to be the property of the 
State of Idaho.") 
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It is Plaintiffs' position that that 1997 Letter Agreement constituted a contract by which 
IDFG agreed either to prevent interference with domestic sheep operations or provide monetary 
recompense to domestic sheep operators who did suffer economic damages as a result of the 
bighorn sheep reintroduction. All of the parties involved recognized that if the bighorns were 
brought into the Hells Canyon area this would affect domestic sheep operations. The parties 
recognized that historic domestic sheep grazing allotments might be modified or eliminated. 
IDFG through its Letter Agreement and the State through enactment of the 1997 statute therefore 
guaranteed that the Wool Growers members would be indemnified for any economic loss they 
suffered because of the reintroduction of the bighorns. 
The breach of that contractual and statutory promise is the essence of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. If Plaintiffs lost their grazing allotments, whether or not IDFG made any efforts to 
convince the United States Forest Service not to modify those grazing allotments, or if the 
Plaintiffs suffered any other economic harm arising from the introduction of the bighorn sheep, 
then IDFG is contractually, statutorily and ethically obligated to protect and indemnify Plaintiffs. 
This obligation could be satisfied by various means: providing alternative sources of feed; 
providing alternative grazing lands; or providing monetary compensation for the economic losses 
suffered by Plaintiffs. Since IDFG has not provided feed or land, the Plaintiffs are seeking 
monetary recompense. 
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II. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. The United States Forest Service is not an Indispensable Party 
IDFG claims that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed for failure to join an 
indispensible party, the U.S. Forest Service. "Whether or not a party is indispensible to an action 
depends largely upon the relief sought." Barlow v. International Harvester Company, 95 Idaho 
881,896,522 Pold 1102,1117 (1974). The "moving party has the burden to demonstrate the 
indispensability of [the absent party]." Ada County Highway District v. Total Success Invs, LLC, 
145 Idaho 360, 372, 179 P.3d 323, 335 (2008). A person is "indispensible" under Rule 19(a) (1), 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and must be joined only if: 
(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded 
among those already parties, or 
(2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the 
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the 
person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede 
the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of 
the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of the claimed interest. 
None of those provisions apply to the Forest Service. 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint does not assert that the Forest Service owes the Plaintiffs 
money under the 1997 Letter Agreement nor does it seek to enforce any contractual obligations 
against the Forest Service. As a matter of fact, Plaintiffs note that the Letter Agreement does not 
list the Forest Service, as it states: 
[T]he Idaho Department of Fish and Game, the Oregon Department 
ofFish and Wildlife, and the Washington Department of Wildlife 
will assume the responsibility for bighorn losses and further disease 
transmission in their respective states. The three Departments will 
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also take whatever action is necessary to reduce further losses of 
bighorn sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep 
operators. 
Thus, it is the IDFG which is agreeing to take whatever action is necessary in Idaho to 
prevent adverse economic impact among existing domestic sheep operators such as the Shirts. It 
is the IDFG that has breached the contract, not the United States Forest Service. Thus, the Forest 
Service is not a necessary or indispensable party because Plaintiffs are not seeking relief from 
the Forest Service. 
Complete relief can be accorded the Plaintiffs without the presence of the Forest Service 
since the Plaintiffs' argument is that IFDG failed to live up to its contractual and statutory 
obligations. Nowhere in the Complaint do Plaintiffs suggest that the "only injury alleged to be 
caused by Idaho is IDFG's failure 'to block the Forest Service from modifying the [Shirts'] 
grazing allotments.'" Defendants' Memorandum at 6. Instead, the Plaintiffs contend that 
because grazing allotments were modified, IDFG has a contractual and statutory obligation to 
make the Plaintiffs whole. Plaintiffs are not attempting to claim they had an agreement with the 
Forest Service or to claim that the Forest Service breached a contract, and thus whether or not the 
Forest Service must comply with the contract is irrelevant. 
Plaintiffs are not seeking to adjudicate the interest of the United States in a contract and 
thus IDFG's argument that somehow proceeding without the Forest Service as a party will 
impede its ability to protect its interest is specious. The jury's determination that IDFG breached 
its contract and therefore owes Plaintiffs monetary damages will have absolutely no effect on the 
United States' sovereign immunity. Furthermore, there is no risk of inconsistent obligations 
because the Plaintiffs' economic harm was not "solely the result of the Forest Service's 
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modification of the Shirts' Federal grazing permits" as claimed by IDFG but instead, according 
to the Plaintiffs' Complaint, was solely the result of IDFG not doing "whatever is necessary" to 
protect the Plaintiffs, as IDFG committed to do in the 1997 Agreement. Thus, the determination 
by the jury will be not whether the United States breached the 1997 Agreement, but whether 
IDFG had an obligation to protect Plaintiffs from economic harm caused by the reintroduction of 
the bighorn sheep. IDFG appears to misunderstand that the award of damages against IDFG 
would not be imposing liability for the Forest Service actions, but rather for the failure of IDFG 
to take action that it committed to in the 1997 Letter Agreement. 
The disposition of this case is not precluded by the absence of the United States Forest 
Service, and the disposition of this case would not impede the Forest Service's ability to protect 
its own interest or subject it to substantial risk, because the Plaintiffs are not claiming that the 
Forest Service breached the Agreement. Neither would the disposition of this case leave IDFG 
subject to risk of incurring inconsistent obligations because it is IDFG which contracted to 
protect the Plaintiffs, and it is IDFG which owes the duty to Plaintiffs. 
Accordingly, IDFG has failed to meet its burden to show the indispensability of the 
federal government. 
B. The Amended Complaint States a Claim Against IDFG Upon Which Relief 
May be Granted. 
"In reviewing a ruling in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted, the question is whether the non-movant has alleged sufficient facts in support of 
his claim, which if true, would entitle him to relief." Rincover v. Department of Finance, 128 
Idaho 653, 656, 917 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1996). The Court should make "every reasonable 
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intendment" in order to "sustain a complaint against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim." Idaho Commission on Human Rights v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 215,217,506 P.2d 112, 114 
(1973). 
When ruling on such a motion, the Court looks no further than the pleadings. Young v. 
City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 PJd 1157, 1159 (2002). The non-moving party is 
entitled to have all inferences from the record viewed in his favor and only then may the question 
be asked whether a claim for relief has been stated. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 
778 P.2d 757 (1989). 
IDFG asserts that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted 
because the only harm alleged by Plaintiffs "is the Forest Services' modification of the Shirts' 
grazing permits." Defendants' Memorandum at 15. Once again, IDFG has misread or 
misunderstood the gravamen of the Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs are not asserting a cause of 
action against IDFG because it failed to block the Forest Service from modifying the grazing 
allotments, they are asserting a cause of action against IDFG because it has not lived up to its 
contractual and statutory duties to Plaintiffs to remedy the economic harm caused to the 
Plaintiffs by, among other things, the modification of the grazing allotments relating to the 
reintroduction of the bighorn sheep population in Hells Canyon. Certainly these allegations state 
a claim upon which relief may be granted and are more than sufficient to defeat a 12(b)(6) 
motion. 
The Plaintiffs do not take issue with IDFG's statement that federal grazing permits are 
not contracts. The Plaintiffs recognize this fact today and recognized that fact in 1997, just as 
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did IDFG. That is why IDFG agreed to indemnify Plaintiffs for any modifications the Forest 
Service made to Plaintiffs' allotments. 
IDFG contends that the 1997 Letter Agreement merely recognized the "existing" 
domestic sheep operations and obligated IDFG simply to recognize the existing grazing 
privileges held by Plaintiffs at that time. IDFG states that nothing in the Letter Agreement or the 
statute "purported to confer additional grazing rights upon the Shirts." While Plaintiffs submit 
this is substantively incorrect and conflicts with the plain language of the Letter Agreement, it 
may be ajury argument for IDFG to make. But it is not appropriate in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss context. That argument deals with the interpretation of the contract and the statute, and 
requires consideration by the fact finder. 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint clearly states a cause of action against IDFG upon which 
relief can be granted to the Plaintiffs. The Amended Complaint asserts that the .1997 Letter 
Agreement and the contract and the statute require IDFG and the State to take "whatever action 
is necessary" to protect existing domestic sheep operators from adverse economic consequences 
flowing from reintroduction of bighorn sheep in the Hells Canyon area. Plaintiffs have alleged 
sufficient facts to entitle them to relief if the jury accepts those facts as correct. That is all that is 
required to defeat a 12(b)( 6) motion to dismiss. 
IDFG is also premature in arguing that Plaintiffs' claim for lost profits fails to state a 
claim. That issue, of course, is dependent upon evidence regarding the intention of the parties to 
the 1997 Letter Agreement. Again, that is not an issue for this Court to decide on a 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss. The Amended Complaint certainly sets out sufficient facts to support 
Plaintiffs' claimed damages as it recites that IDFG as the signatory to the 1997 Letter Agreement 
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agreed to take whatever action was necessary to prevent adverse economic impact among 
existing sheep operators. Allegations in the Amended Complaint certainly assert that such 
economic losses/lost profits were contemplated by the IDFG and the other parties; otherwise, 
there would have been little reason for the Letter Agreement in the first place. Accordingly, 
there is no basis for this Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, as the Amended 
Complaint alleges sufficient facts that will entitle Plaintiffs to relief. 
IDFG argues that certain causes of action must be dismissed because the Amended 
Complaint does not set forth any facts demonstrating any representations by IDFG that it would 
block the Forest Service from modifying the Shirts' grazing permits. Once again, the IDFG 
argument is based on an intentional or unintentional misreading of the Amended Complaint. 
Nowhere does the Amended Complaint assert that IDFG represented that it would block the 
Forest Service from modifying the grazing allotments. IDFG mayor may not have been 
obligated to at least make some efforts to convince the Forest Service that the Plaintiffs' grazing 
allotments should be maintained at the 1997 level, but certainly IDFG had an obligation under 
the 1997 Letter Agreement to take whatever action was necessary to prevent such modifications 
from adversely affecting the existing operators' economic well-being. The intent of the 
Agreement was not solely that the IDFG would take whatever action was necessary to protect 
bighorn sheep, but rather that IDFG would take whatever action was necessary to protect bighorn 
sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep operators. Those actions were not 
enumerated in the Agreement, but the parties contemplated "whatever" actions, which would 
include continuing existing grazing allotments, removing the bighorn sheep (which are owned by 
the State, see Idaho Code § 36-103), from the area to protect them from disease transmission, 
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providing feed to the Plaintiffs in lieu of grazing allotments, providing alternative allotments, 
and compensating the domestic sheep operators for the economic impacts caused by the 
reintroduction of the bighorn sheep. 
Trying to get around this reality, IDFG states that its view of the intent of the Agreement 
is that it only constitutes a "limitation on the scope of actions that IDFG may take to protect 
bighorns." Its interpretation is that IDFG "will refrain from taking actions that have adverse 
impacts on domestic sheep operators" but is not required to take affirmative action to protect 
domestic sheep operators if the Forest Service modifies the grazing allotments because of the 
impact domestic sheep might have on bighorn sheep reintroduction. While this interpretation, 
although strained, is certainly one that IDFG may argue to the jury if it can do so with a straight 
face, it is again irrelevant in the context of a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a 
Claim. 
The Amended Complaint alleges that IDFG, in return for the IWGA's and its members' 
agreement that they would not oppose the reintroduction of the bighorn sheep, agreed to 
indemnify sheep operators from adverse economic impact arising from the reintroduction. That 
allegation, in and of itself, is sufficient to state a claim for relief for breach of contract, breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel and promissory 
estoppel. The IDFG made a promise upon which Plaintiffs relied to their detriment, made a 
representation, and entered into a contract. It has not complied with its promise, its 
representations, nor its contract. The Plaintiffs have a right to obtain relief from this Court under 
one or all ofthe alternate theories they have asserted. 
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Similarly, while IDFG claims that it was "impossible" to override administrative orders 
of the Forest Service regarding use of grazing allotments or block the Forest Service's breach of 
the 1997 Letter Agreement, and therefore all causes of action must be dismissed based on the 
doctrine of impossibility, this argument suffers from the same fatal flaw as all of IDFG's other 
arguments: namely, IDFG's failure to perform is not its failure to block the Forest Service's 
actions but rather is its own failure to comply with its duty of indemnifying Plaintiffs from the 
adverse effects of the reintroduction of the bighorn sheep. The Amended Complaint does not 
allege that IDFG had either the authority or the duty to "block" the issuance of the Forest Service 
order. While Plaintiffs believe that the Forest Service's modification of their grazing allotments 
is legally and factually improper, and while Plaintiffs believe that IDFG should have taken a 
position in support of Plaintiffs' objections to the Forest Services' actions, this is not the basis of 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. Therefore, the "impossibility" argument is irrelevant. 
C. The Amended Complaint States a Claim Under Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(S)(D) 
Over Which this Court has Jurisdiction. 
Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) provides that it "is the policy of the state of Idaho that 
existing sheep or livestock operations in the area of any bighorn sheep transplant or relocation 
are recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of bighorn 
sheep when the same invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted." This provision 
is in the section creating the office of Director of the Department of Fish & Game and specifying 
the duties and powers of the director. The provision was enacted on March 24, 1997 and went 
into effect on that day as an emergency measure. Specifically, the amended portion provided: 
Upon any transplant of bighorn sheep into areas they do not now 
inhabit or a transplant to augment existing populations, the 
department shall provide for any affected federal or state land 
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grazing permittees or owners or leaseholders of private land a 
written letter signed by all federal, state and private entities 
responsible for the transplant stating that the existing sheep or 
livestock operations in the area of any such bighorn sheep 
transplant are recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of 
disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when the same 
invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted. 
It is also important to note that the contact listed for the 1997 bill was Stan Boyd of the Idaho 
Wool Growers Association. 
Furthermore, Section 36-106. was amended in 2009 to include a new subsection, 
(e)(5)(E), which requires the Department of Fish & Game to develop a State management plan 
to maintain the population of bighorn sheep "which shall consider as part of the plan the current 
federal or state domestic sheep grazing allotment(s) that currently have any bighorn sheep upon 
or in proximity to the allotment(s)," and also directed IDFG to "cooperatively develop best 
management practices with the permittee(s) on the allotment(s)." 
It is unclear what IDFG's objections to Plaintiffs' third cause of action for violation of 
this statute consists of. There is nothing in that third cause of action that relies upon a retroactive 
application of the statute prior to its March 24, 1997 effective date. Certainly it is no 
coincidence that the 1997 Letter Agreement was signed by IDFG at the same time as the 
provision was being debated and enacted by the legislature. But the statute that is relied upon for 
Plaintiffs' third cause of action is the statute that is in effect at the time of filing. 
It is Plaintiffs' contention, as supported by the legislative history, the context of the 
enactment and the plain language of the statute itself, that the Idaho legislature when recognizing 
the "policy in the State of Idaho" that domestic existing sheep operations shall not be harmed by 
the reintroduction of bighorn sheep, mandated IDFG to protect domestic sheep operators such as 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES - 13 
44561-1/00193781.000 
the Shirts from economic harm. It is apparent that IDFG has not done so. It is accordingly 
apparent that IDFG has not fulfilled its statutory duties as intended by the state legislature. It is 
clear that that breach of statutory duty is continuing even as of this date. This third cause of 
action seeks a remedy for that continuing breach of statutory duty. 
Again, Plaintiffs' third cause of action does not rest upon some failure oflDFG to block 
the Forest Service from modifying the Shirts' grazing allotments. Moreover, it is unclear what 
"agency action" IDFG is pointing to in regards to the decision not to take any action in regards to 
the modification of the grazing allotment(s). 
It is Plaintiffs' contention that Idaho Code § 36-106 should be read to authorize an award 
of damages against the State in the amount of the economic harm sustained by the Plaintiffs. 
That is the plain import of the provision enacted in 1997 when the initial bighorn reintroduction 
was about to commence. Certainly the legislature intended to protect the domestic sheep 
operators from all adverse consequences of that reintroduction effort. This interpretation will be 
verified by testimony of the relevant witnesses as well as the relevant legislative history. 
States and state agencies are liable for breaches of their contracts. Plaintiffs assert that 
IDFG entered to a contract in 1997 and that contract has been breached. Plaintiffs assert that the 
Legislature recognized that contract and approved that contract by enacting the statute. 
Furthermore, even if the Court determines that the statute does not explicitly authorize an 
award of monetary damages, the Court can still find that the statute was violated and can require 
IDFG to provide non-monetary remedies to the Shirts in the form of alternative grazing 
locations, feed for the domestic sheep or other arrangements which would protect the Plaintiffs' 
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operations. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' third cause of action is a viable claim and there is no 
lack of jurisdiction by this Court to hear tl1at claim. 
D. Plaintiffs are Entitled to Attornevs' Fees and Costs in Defending Against this 
Unjustified Motion. 
Plaintiffs agree that Idaho Code § 12-117 provides for an award of attorneys fees to the 
prevailing party when the court finds that the other party acted without a reasonable basis in fact 
or law. IDFG's motion to dismiss meets that standard: there is no reasonable basis in fact or in 
law for IDFG's argument. This motion is frivolous and appears to be really intended to cause the 
Plaintiffs to incur substantial unnecessary expenses in an attempt to intimidate Plaintiffs from 
continuing their action. Plaintiffs have already been substantially economically damaged by the 
failure of IDFG to protect them from the consequences of the reintroduction of the bighorn 
sheep, in direct contravention ofIDFG's promises and obligations in the 1997 Letter Agreement 
and Idaho Code § 36-106. IDFG does not want to allow the fact finder to determine if it 
breached its obligations and conclude that IDFG must remedy the losses suffered by Plaintiffs. 
Instead, its strategy appears to be to file 34 page frivolous motions requiring Plaintiffs to 
respond. This is exactly the case where attorneys fees and costs under § 12-117 should be 
awarded to Plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs submit that IDFG's motion to dismiss is unfounded and unjustified. The entire 
motion is based on a misunderstanding or misapprehension of the basis for the Amended 
Complaint. IDFG's entire argument is an incorrect assertion that the only injury alleged by 
Plaintiffs is IDFG's failure to block the Forest Service from modifying the Plaintiffs' grazing 
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allotments. This is not the Plaintiffs' allegation. The allegations stated in the Amended 
Complaint fairly state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to deny IDFG's motion to dismiss 
in its entirety and grant Plaintiffs their costs and attorneys fees for defending against this 
frivolous and unsupported motion. 
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PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW 
& McKL VEE1CHARTERE\<" . ft" /' I \ / II //1 /' /t/.... J 
/ ' .. //// .. By: ! ~ "1.( ! l~,// v 
amuel A. Diddle, of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES - 16 
44561-11 00193781.000 
<6\ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16 day of August, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
within and foregoing document was served as follows: 
State of Idaho, Office of the Attorney General 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General 
Clive J. Strong, Deputy Attorney General, 
Chief of Natural Resources Division 
Steven W. Strack, Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
\ 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' 
[ ] 
~] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile (208) 854-8071 
Overnight Mail 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES -17 
44561-11 00 193781.000 
H' ':J. ':)\::1. C:\::IJ.\::I ':;I. C:.:5HI'I J.U H I I Y l:>tJ'i, I'IH I r<t.~ 
ORIGINAL 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
CLlVE J. STRONG 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Natural Resources Division 
STEVEN W. STRACK (ISB # 3906) 
Deputy Attorney General 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 854-8072 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
NU. H:l':: t-'. c:: 
FILED 
AUG 3 0 2010 ID'. 3 D ~M.. 
SHERRY WARD, CijRK 
~~,~) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TmRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS 
IDAHO WOOL GROWERS ) 
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
individually and on behalf of its members; ) 
FRA.."N"K SHIRTS, JR., individually and as a ) 
member of the Idaho Wool Growers ) 
Association; RONALD W. SHIRTS, LESLIE ) 
SHIRTS and JOHN T. SHIRTS, individually ) 
and d/b/a! SHIR IS BROTHERS SHEEP and ) 
as members of the Idaho Wool Growers ) 
Association, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH & GAME 
COMMISSION; IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF FISH & GAME; CAL GROEN, Director 
of Idaho Department ofFish and Game, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-------------------------) 
Case No. CV·2010-2567 
DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF 
ERRATA AND SUBSTITUTE 
EXHIBIT 
<63 
DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF ERRATA AND SUBSTITUTE EXHIBIT Page 1 
.1.l.J r-tl 1 1 \,jc..ll, I'" I r;.c....:.J 
NOTICE 
After filing Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, the 
undersigned counsel discovered that the copy 0 f Senate Bill 1175 included in Exhibit 3 was the 
amended version of the Bill, and not the original version of the bill containing the "hold 
hannless» provision discussed at the top of page 9 of the Defendants' Reply Memorandum. 
Defendants therefore submit the attached Corrected Exhibit 3, which should be substituted for 
Exhibit 3 to the Defendants' Reply Memorandum. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is the policy of the state ofIdaho to recognize "existing sheep or livestock operations in 
the area of any bighom sheep transplant or relocation" and to accept "the potential risk, if any, of 
disease transmission and loss of big hom sheep." Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D). Defendants 
state of Idaho, Idaho Fish and Game Commission, Idaho Department of Fish and Game 
("IDFG"), and IDFG Director Cal Groen are committed to working cooperatively with sheep 
operators and to using their authorities to the fullest extent allowed by law to implement this 
policy. Defendants, however, find themselves at odds with Plaintiffs because of the Plaintiffs' 
unreasonable and unwarranted allegations seeking to impose liability upon the Defendants for 
economic losses arising from the cancellation of their federal grazing permits by the United 
States Forest Service, despite the fact that Defendants have no authority over, or responsibility 
for, the actions ofthe Forest Service, and despite Plaintiffs' concession that the cancellation of 
the grazing permits did not violate the terms ofthe 1997 Letter. 1 Moreover, as discussed in 
detail below, the Constitution and statutes of the state of Idaho forbid the Defendants from 
assuming such liability either by statute or contract. If anything, Plaintiffs' responses to the 
motion to dismiss affirm that all causes of action in the Complaint must be dismissed for failure 
to state a claim. 
ARGUMENT 
The Plaintiffs' response to the Motion to Dismiss demonstrates that the claims in the First 
Amended Complaint (hereinafter "Complaint") have no legal basis. First, in order to avoid a 
finding that the Forest Service is an indispensable party, the Plaintiffs assert in their Response 
I Nothing herein or in the State's opening brief should be construed to agree with, or defend, the recent 
actions of the United States Forest Service that resulted in modification of grazing permits held by Frank Shirts, Jr., 
Ronald W. Shirts, Leslie Shirts and John T. Shirts, individually and d/b/a Shirts Brothers Sheep (hereinafter 
collectively "Shirts"). 
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Brief that "the Plaintiffs are not claiming that the Forest Service breached the Agreement." 
Response Brief at 7. Yet, the Complaint plainly alleges that the 1997 Letter was an agreement 
and that the economic harm alleged by Plaintiffs is due solely to the Forest Service's breach of 
the Agreement. Relevant allegations include: 
24. In or around April of 2007, however, the Forest Service reneged on its 
commitment in the Letter Agreement and began to modify various grazing 
permits in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, including those of Shirts and Shirts 
Brothers. 
26. As the result of the prior and continuing grazing permit modifications, 
IWGA, Shirts and Shirts Brothers have suffered significant economic losses and 
will continue to suffer economic losses. 
Complaint at 5-6 (emphasis added). 
Second, in an apparent attempt to avoid dismissal, Plaintiffs assert that their Complaint 
makes the claim that "the January 16, 1997 Letter Agreement signed by IDFG constitutes a 
contract with IWGA [Idaho Wool Growers Association] and its members by which IDFG agrees 
to indemnify the IWGA and its members from any harm or economic loss caused by the 
reintroduction ofthe bighorn sheep into the Hells Canyon area." Response Brief at 2-3. The 
term "indemnify," however, does not appear anywhere in the Complaint or in the plain language 
of the 1997 Letter. It is only in the Response Brief that the Court and the Defendants learn that 
the Plaintiffs believe the 1997 Letter is an agreement to indemnify the Plaintiffs against 
economic loss. 
Plaintiffs should be held to the allegations in their Complaint. Nevertheless, for purposes 
of this Reply Brief, the Defendants will demonstrate that even if the Court accepts the Plaintiffs' 
new-found characterizations of their allegations and causes of action, dismissal is still warranted. 
Indeed, if anything, the new allegations in Plaintiffs' Response Brief compel the conclusion that 
Plaintiffs' Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim and that attorney fees must be 
'fill 
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awarded to Defendants due to the complete lack of factual or legal basis for Plaintiffs' causes of 
action. 
1. Any allegation that the 1997 Letter was an agreement to indemnify Plaintiffs for 
future economic losses must be dismissed because such an agreement is void as a 
matter of law. 
In response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs allege that the 1997 Letter signed by the 
Idaho Department ofFish and Game and other parties was in fact an agreement to indemnify the 
IWGA and its members from any harm or economic loss caused by the reintroduction of bighorn 
sheep into the Hells Canyon area. 
Plaintiffs then go further, and allege that such indemnification was intended to apply even 
if the economic loss is caused by actions that are not themselves a breach of the alleged 
agreement. As now conceded by Plaintiffs, nothing in the 1997 Letter prohibits the Forest 
Service from modifying grazing permits held by IWGA members. Response Brief at 5-6. 
Plaintiffs also concede that the grazing permits modified by the Forest Service were not 
contracts, Response Brief at 8, and do not contest the fact that the grazing permits were mere 
licenses cancellable by the Forest Service without any right of compensation. 
In short, the Plaintiffs make the extraordinary claim that IDFG, by means of a letter that 
does not contain any mention of indemnification, agreed to indemnify the Plaintiffs against any 
economic losses caused by the transplant of bighorn sheep into Hells Canyon, even if the federal 
action that caused such losses was not itself a breach of the alleged agreement, and even if the 
alleged loss of grazing rights was not compensable under the federal laws creating those rights. 
Such an extraordinary commitment of state resources would have to be stated explicitly. 
"The language imposing indemnity must be clear, unequivocal, and certain [and] the losses to be 
indemnified must be clearly stated and the intent of the indemnitor's obligation to indemnify 
against them must be expressed in clear and unequivocal terms and to such an extent that no 
q,\ 
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other meaning can be ascribed." 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indemnity § 7 (2010). Yet, Plaintiffs' 
complaint fails to identify any clear and unequivocal indcmnification language in thc 1997 
Letter. 
Defendants will not dwell on the lack of indemnification language, however, for even if 
the 1997 Letter is assumed, for purposes of argument, to set forth an intent to indemnify 
Plaintiffs for economic losses, such an agreement would be void as a matteroflaw. Idaho Code 
§ 59-1015 provides: 
No officer, employee or state board of the state of Idaho, or board of regents or 
board of trustees of any state institution, or any member, employee or agent 
thereof, shall enter, or attempt to offer to enter into any contract or agreement 
creating any expense, or incurring any liability, moral, legal or otherwise, or at all, 
in excess of the appropriation made by law for the specific purpose or purposes 
for which such expenditure is to be made, or liability incurred, except in the case 
of insurrection, epidemic, invasion, riots, floods or fires. 
Idaho Code § 59-1016 provides that any contract attempting to create indebtedness "in violation 
of the provisions of this chapter ... shall be void." Both statutes implement the provisions of 
Idaho Constitution Article 7, section 13, which prohibits the withdrawal ofmoncy from the state 
treasury "but in pursuance of appropriations made by law." In State ex reI. Hansen v. Parsons, 
57 Idaho 775, 69 P.2d 788 (1937), the Court, in applying the predecessors to §§ 59-1015 and 59-
1016,2 held that the "prohibitions of the statutes and the Constitution against creating any 
expense or incurring any liability against the state, in excess of existing appropriations therefor, 
apply to the time of incurring the expense or liability rather than to the time the particular bill or 
claim is presented for payment." Id. at 790, 69 P.2d at 794.3 
2 The predecessor statutes, 57-1015 and 57-1016, were, except for numbering, identical to the 
current versions ofIdaho Code §§ 59-1015 and 59-1016. 
3 Hansen was partially overruled, on other grounds, in State ex reI. Williams v. Musgrave, 84 
Idaho 77, 87, 370 P .2d 778, 784 (1962) (holding that money in state insurance fund does not belong to 
state and is not subject to art. 7, § 13, of the Constitution). 
9D 
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Thus, the Idaho Code plainly prohibits, and declares void, any contract purporting to 
create a liability that is not covered by appropriations existing at the time of contracting. 
Because the Complaint alleges that the 1997 Letter was an agreement to indemnify Plaintiffs for 
any future economic losses suffered by Plaintiffs due to the reintroduction of big hom sheep, such 
allegation fails to state a claim and must be dismissed, since such an agreement is void as a 
matter oflaw. 
2. Neither the plain language or legislative history ofldaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(E) 
support Plaintiffs' assertion that the Legislature intended to authorize 
compensation to Plaintiffs for economic losses resulting from transplant of bighorn 
sheep. 
Plaintiffs assert that "Idaho Code § 36-106 should be read to authorize an award of 
damages against the State in the amount ofthe economic harm sustained by Plaintiffs." 
Response Brief at 14. Such assertion must be dismissed out of hand, since Plaintiffs fail to 
identify any language in Idaho Code § 36-106 authorizing such compensation. Plaintiffs assert, 
mistakenly, that they can avoid responding to the motion to dismiss by simply asserting that 
legislative intent is a factual issue that will be "verified by testimony of the relevant witnesses." 
Response Brief at 14. Idaho law, however, generally prohibits introduction of the testimony of 
individual legislators or other participants in the legislative process. For example, in Gillihan v. 
Gump, 140 Idaho 264, 92 P.3d 514 (2004), the Court held that it would not consider an "affidavit 
of a member of the House of Representatives as support for [appellant's] interpretation of the 
statute." Id. at 268, 92 P .3d at 518. The Court reasoned that: 
First, post-enactment statements oflegislators are not part of the record of the 
Legislative Assembly that are considered the contemporaneous "history" that is 
appropriate for courts to consult. .,. Second, a post-enactment statement of an 
individual legislator represents the views--or, perhaps more accurately, the 
recollections--of a single participant in the legislative process. Even when the 
statements of individual legislators are offered during the enactment process, they 
are commonly viewed cautiously as evidence of the intentions of the entire 
assembly .. " Courts are all the more loath to determine the intentions of the 
q, 
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institution as a whole on the basis of isolated statements that are generated after 
enactment, without any evidence that the other members of the legislative body 
even were aware of them, much less that they agreed with them. 
Id. at 268-69,92 P.3d at 518-19, quoting Salem Keizer Ass'n of Classified Employees v. Salem 
Keizer Sch. Dist., 61 P.3d 970 (Or. App. 2003).4 See also In re Mexico Money Transfer 
Litigation, 267 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that affidavits oflegislators setting forth 
their understanding of a statute's intent, "offered away from the legislative halls and long after 
the law's enactment, are worthless"). 
Thus, Plaintiffs' assertions that they intend to demonstrate their interpretation of the 
statute by post-enactment testimony of participants in the legislative process is not sufficient 
grounds to deny the motion to dismiss, since such testimony is inadmissible, and even if 
admitted cannot be used to demonstrate intent counter to the plain language of the statute. 
Here, the plain language ofthe statute requires dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims. The 2009 
amendments to Idaho Code § 36-106 inserted a new subsection, (e)( 5)(E) 5, which sets forth the 
exclusive duty owed to Plaintiffs in the event that bighorn sheep transplants create conflicts with 
grazing on federal or state grazing allotments. In the event of such conflicts, IDFG is to 
"cooperatively develop best management practices with the permittee(s)." Idaho Code § 36-
106(e)(5)(E). Then, upon implementation of the best management practices, IDFG is to "certify 
that the risk of disease transmission, if any, between bighorn and domestic sheep is acceptable 
for the viability of the bighorn sheep." Id. Nothing in the plain language of the statutes requires 
4 Gillihan was overturned on other grounds in Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 231 PJd 524 
(2009). . 
5 Plaintiffs assert that "the statute that is relied upon for Plaintiffs' third cause of action is the 
statute that is in effect at the time of filing [of the Complaint]." Response Brief at 13. For purposes of 
replying to Plaintiffs' arguments, the Defendants will assume that the current version of § 36-106 is 
applicable to the Plaintiffs' claims. 
~~ 
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or authorizes IDFG to compensate holders of federal grazing allotments in the event such 
allotments are cancelled by federal agencies. 
As opposed to the post-enactment testimony by legislators, which is generally 
inadmissible, the Court may take "judicial notice of public and private acts of the legislature and 
the journals of the legislative bodies for the purpose of ascertaining what was done by the 
legislature." Idaho State Tax Comm'n v. Haener Bros., Inc., 121 Idaho 741, 743, 828 P.2d 304, 
306 (1992), quoting Knight v. Employment Sec. Agency, 88 Idaho 262, 266, 398 P.2d 643, 645 
(1965). The pre-enactment legislative history of the 2009 amendments to Idaho Code § 36-
106(e)(5)(E) confirms that the legislature did not intend to authorize compensation to Plaintiffs 
for economic harm. The relevant language in Idaho Code § 36-106 was adopted in 2009 as part 
of Senate Bill 1232 in response to the Forest Service's modification of the Shirts' grazing rights.6 
The minutes of the House Resources and Conservation Committee for April 20, 2009, indicate 
that the Shirts' attorney was involved in negotiating the language of Senate Bill 1232, and that 
the issue of "grazing on the Payette National Forest lands ... is addressed in this legislation 
[S.B. 1232]" and that the bill was intended to give "clear direction ... to the Forest Service, to 
the Executive Branch, and to the Fish & Game Commission." 7 
Ifthe legislature had intended to authorize the award of monetary compensation to 
holders of grazing allotments adversely impacted by bighorn sheep it would have stated such 
intent explicitly. The Legislature, however, chose not to authorize such awards. Indeed, the 
same legislative session that amended Idaho Code § 36-106 to provide for cooperative 
preparation of best management practices also rejected proposed legislation that would have 
provided that any domestic sheep operation "adversely impacted from any past, present, or future 
6 A copy of Senate Bill 1232 is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
7 A copy of the minutes of the House Resources and Conservation Committee are attached hereto 
as Exhibit 2. 
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transplant or relocation of bighorn sheep" would be "held harmless from adverse impacts by the 
state ofIdaho." Sen. Bill 1175, p. 3, 11. 28-31 (2009) (copy attached hereto as Exhibit 3). Senate 
Bill 1175 was amended on the Senate floor for the purpose of removing the "hold harmless" 
provision. See Exhibit 4.8 The Legislature's rejection of "hold harmless" language can only be 
interpreted as an intent to avoid any suggestion that the state was responsible for financial losses 
suffered by sheep operators.9 
3. Any allegation that Idaho Code § 36-106 indemnifies Plaintiffs from future 
economic harm must be dismissed because any such provision is void as a matter of 
law. 
Even if it were possible to construe the 2009 amendments to Idaho Code § 36-106 as 
assuming an obligation to reimburse Plaintiffs for "economic harm" resulting from bighorn 
sheep transplants, such claim must be dismissed, since any such interpretation of the statute 
would violate article VIII, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution.· Article VIII, § 1 provides that the 
"legislature shall not in any manner create any debt or debts, liability or liabilities" unless said 
law provides ways and means for repayment of the debt or liability within twenty years and is 
approved by popular vote at the next general election. The prohibition on creation of financial 
liabilities is absolute: it matters not whether the debt or liability is quantified or inchoate. 
Plaintiffs' assertion that Idaho Code § 36-106 created an obligation on the part ofthe 
State of Idaho to reimburse Plaintiffs for any financial losses caused by the transplant of big hom 
sheep cannot be reconciled with the prohibitions of article VIII, § 1. In Idaho Water Resource 
Bd. v. Kramer, 97 Idaho 535,548 P.2d 35, (1976), the Court noted that: "'Liability' as used 
within our constitution, has been afforded a broader and more comprehensive definition [than 
8 Exhibit 4 is an excerpt from the 2009 Senate Journal indicating that lines 28 through 31 of page 
3 of Sen. Bill 1175 [which set forth the "hold harmless" language] were to be deleted. 
9 Even after removal of the hold harmless provision, Senate Bill 1175 was ultimately vetoed. 
The history of Senate Bill 1175 is set forth on the first two pages of Exhibit 3. 
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'debf]. It refers to an obligation one is bound in law or justice to perforn1." Id. at 556,548 P.2d 
at 56. The authorities cited in Kramer likewise hold that the teml "liability" is "sweeping and 
comprehensive." 10 Hanson v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512,514,446 P.2d 634,636 (1968), 
quoting Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32,129 P. 643 (1912). In Feil, the Court held 
that the term "liability" means "the state of being bound or obligated in law or justice to do, pay, 
or make good something." 23 Idaho at 50, 129 P. at 649. Notably, the Court also cited the 
dictionary definition of "liability" to mean "[t]he condition of being responsible for a possible or 
actual loss, penalty, evil, expense or burden." Id. 
In short, the Idaho Constitution's prohibition on creation of "liability" prohibits the 
legislature from assuming responsibility for possible or actual financial losses by sheep operators 
or others without contemporaneously providing ways or means for payment of such liability as it 
falls due. Idaho Constitution art. VIII, § 1. The Plaintiffs' allegations that the Legislature 
"mandated IDFG to protect domestic sheep operators such as the Shirts from economic harm" 
must be dismissed as a matter of law. 
4. The sole non-monetary remedy available to Plaintiffs is the cooperative development 
of best management practices that will allow continuation of grazing on federal 
grazing allotments. 
Plaintiffs assert that even ifthe Legislature could not require IDFG to cover Plaintiffs' 
alleged financial losses, this Court could "still find that the statute was violated and can require 
IDFG to provide non-monetary remedies to the Shirts in the fonn of alternative grazing 
locations, feed for the domestic sheep or other arrangements which would protect the plaintiffs' 
operations." Response Brief at 14-15. 
10 In footnote 36 ofthe Kramer decision the Court, in defining the term "liability" as used in 
article VIII, § 1, cited as authority Hanson v. City ofIdaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 446 P.2d 634 (1968) "and 
cases cited therein," which construe the term "liability" as used in the closely-related article VIII, § 3. 
q;-
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As explained in Defendants' opening brief, however, the Court may not simply craft 
equitable remedies for alleged agency violations of statutory duties. Because Plaintiffs do not 
seek a writ of mandate, the remedy for the alleged violation of statutory duty is limited by Idaho 
Code § 67-5279(2) to setting aside the agency action in whole or part. Even if the Complaint 
could be construed as seeking a writ of mandate, the Court is limited to "compel[ling] the 
performance of an act which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or 
station." Idaho Code § 7.:.302. As explained at length above, the sole duty imposed on IDFG in 
the event of conflict between federal agencies and holders of federal grazing permits is the 
preparation and implementation of best management practices to maintain separation of domestic 
sheep and bighorn sheep, and the certification that the risk of disease transmission between 
bighorn sheep and domestic sheep is acceptable for the viability ofthe bighorn sheep. Idaho 
Code § 36-106(e)(5)(E). Plaintiffs do not allege that IDFG has failed in this duty, and indeed, 
IDFG has made every effort to cooperatively develop best management practices upon request of 
domestic sheep operators. 
5. As to the remaining grounds for dismissal identified in Defendants' opening brief, 
Plaintiffs either expressly or impliedly concede that dismissal is warranted. 
Plaintiffs concede that to the extent their cause of action is predicated on a finding that 
the Forest Service breached the terms of the alleged 1997 Letter agreement, the Forest Service is 
an indispensable party. Thus, Defendants reiterate their argument that the allegations on the face 
of the Complaint, asserting that the harm to Plaintiffs resulted from the Forest Service's alleged 
breach of commitments made in the 1997 Letter, compel the conclusion that the Forest Service is 
an indispensable party to this action, and the action must be dismissed in the Forest Service's 
absence. 
'1&' 
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Likewise, Defendants reiterate their argument, not responded to by Plaintiffs, that the 
Defendants fulfilled all statutory duties imposed by that version of Idaho Code § 36-106 adopted 
by the Legislature on March 24, 1997. Plaintiffs' only response to such arguments is to simply 
assert that the latest version of the statute controls, but it is plain that the 1997 legislation, 
adopted shortly after execution of the 1997 Letter, is the best indicator of legislative intent with 
regard to the effect of the 1997 Letter. Since the 1997 legislation required only that IDFG and 
other parties provide a "letter" to affected grazing permittees, the plain and unambiguous 
language of the 1997 legislation demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend the 1997 Letter 
to be construed as an agreement. 
Plaintiffs also fail to respond to those portions of Defendants' motion moving for 
dismissal ofthose claims in the Complaint based on equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, 
promissory estoppel and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiffs' failure 
to respond is sufficient grounds for dismissing such claims. Additionally, all such claims must 
be dismissed for the same reasons that Plaintiffs' claims alleging the existence of an agreement 
to indemnify Plaintiffs must be dismissed: Idaho Code §§ 59-1015 and 59-1016 declare void any 
attempt by a state agency or state officer to "attempt to offer" to incur any "liability, moral, legal 
or otherwise" in excess of appropriations existing for such purpose at the time of the offer. The 
statutory prohibition on assumption of liability is absolute, and makes no exception for offers 
relied upon by the offerees. Hence, to the extent that the Complaint alleges that state agencies or 
officers represented to Plaintiffs that the state would assume liability for economic losses 
resulting from transplant of big hom sheep, such allegation fails to state a claim, for any such 
offer or representation would have been void as a matter oflaw and any reliance upon such offer 
by Plaintiffs cannot alter the terms ofIdaho Code §§ 59-1015 and 59-1016. 
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6. Idaho Code § 12-117 requires that the Court award Defendants the attorney fees 
incurred in defending this action. 
Plaintiffs' response in this action affinns that the Complaint was "without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law." Idaho Code § 12-117. In order to avoid the motion to dismiss for failure to 
join an indispensable pmty, Plaintiffs disavow the plain allegations in their Complaint that the 
Forest Service's modification of the Shirts' grazing permits was a breach of the 1997 Letter 
"Agreement." To avoid dismissal, Plaintiffs now assert, contrary to the plain terms of the 1997 
Letter and the allegations in the Complaint, that the 1997 Letter "constituted a contract by which 
IDFG agreed to ... provide monetary recompense to domestic sheep operators who did suffer 
economic damage as a result of bighorn sheep reintroduction." 
Such reversals by Plaintiffs demonstrate that the Complaint did not have a reasonable 
basis in law or fact. Moreover, Plaintiffs' new-found allegations that the Defendants intended to 
indemnify Plaintiffs from economic hann are in plain violation of the Idaho Constitution and 
Idaho Code, a fact that could have been revealed with a minimum oflegal research. Yet, 
Defendants have been forced, at considerable expense, to defend against this unfounded action. 
In such circumstances, the mandatory language of Idaho Code § 12-117 provides that the Court 
"shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees." 
DATED this ~ 7 tb day of August 2010. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
CLIVE J. STRONG 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Natural Resources Division 
STEVEN W. STRACK 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby celiify that on this ;;>"7t~day of August 201 0, I caused to be served a true and 
COlTect copy of the foregoing, DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Samuel A. Diddle 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Tumbow & McKlveen, Chtd. 
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 
Post Office Box 1368 . 
Boise, ID 83701-1368 
STEVEN W. STRACK 
Deputy Attorney General 
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Exhibit 1· 
Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Idaho Wool Growers Association et al. v. State of Idaho et al., 
Case No. CV-2010-2567 
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Bill Status: S1232 
SENATE BILL 1232 
Fu \I Bill Information 
Individual links: 
B.W Text 
Amendment 
~ngI.o.$sOJgnLl - amendment(s) incorporated 
Statement of Purpose / Fiscal Note 
Page 1 of2 
S 1232aa ....................................................................................... by STATE AFFAIRS COMMIITEE 
FISH AND GAME - Amends existing law relating to fish and game to provide that 
the department shall take specified action relating to the relocation of bighorn 
sheep, to state a policy of the state of Idaho, to provide for the development of a 
state management plan, to provide for the development of best management 
practices with certain permittees, to provide for certain certification by the Director 
of the Department of Fish and Game; and to delete reference to provisions relating 
to the employment of certain veterinarians by the Department of Agriculture. 
04/24 Senate intro - 1st rdg - to printing 
Rpt prt - to St Aff 
Rpt out - rec dip - to 2nd rdg 
04/27 To 14th Ord 
04/28 Rpt out amen - to engros 
Rpt engros - 1st rdg - to 2nd rdg as amen 
Ris susp - PASSED - 26-8-1 
AYES--Bair, Brackett, Broadsword, Cameron, Coiner, Corder, 
Darrington, Davis, Fulcher, Geddes(Geddes), Goedde, Hammond, 
Heinrich, Hill, Jorgenson, Keough, Lodge, McGee, McKague, McKenzie, 
Mortimer, Pearce, Siddoway, Smyser, Stegner, Winder 
NAYS--Andreason, Bilyeu, Herzfeld(Bock), Kelly, LeFavour, Sagness 
(Malepeai), Schroeder, Werk 
Absent and excused--Thorson(Stennett) 
Floor Sponsor - Siddoway 
Title apvd - to House 
04/29 House intro - 1st rdg - to Res/Con 
Rpt out - rec dIp - to 2nd rdg 
Ris susp - PASSED - 47-20-3 
AYES -- Anderson, Andrus, Barrett, Bayer, Bedke, Bell, Bilbao, Black, 
Block, Bolz, Boyle, Chadderdon, Collins, Crane, Eskridge, Gibbs, 
Hagedorn, Hart, Hartgen, Harwood, Henderson, Jarvis, Kren, Labrador, 
Lake, Loertscher, Luker, Marriott, Mathews, Moyle, Nielsen, Nonini, 
\ D I 
o I') "'! I') f\ 1 f\ 
'"Bill Status: Sl232 Page 2 of2 
Palmer, Raybould, Roberts, Schaefer, Shepherd(02), Shepherd(08), 
Shirley, Simpson, Stevenson, Takasugi, Thayn, Thompson, Wills, Wood 
(27), Mr. Speaker 
NAYS -- Boe, Burgoyne, Chavez, Chew, Cronin, Durst, Higgins, 
Jaquet, Killen, King, Pasley-Stuart, Pence, Ringo, Ruchti, Rusche, 
Sayler, Smith(30), Smith(24), Trail, Wood(35) 
Absent and excused -- Clark, McGeachin, Patrick 
Floor Sponsor - Wood(27) 
Title apvd - to Senate 
04/30 To enrol 
05/01 Rpt enrol - Pres signed 
Sp signed 
To Governor 
05/07 Governor signed 
Session Law Chapter 314 
Effective: 05/07/09 
ID~ 
REVISED REVISED REVISED REVISED REVISED 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS19058 
REVISED 
S 1232 sets policy for the state of Idaho for acceptance of disease transmission in transpanted 
or relocated bighorn sheep. It also directs the Department of Fish and Game to develop certain 
practices and enter into agreements with domestic sheep owners or permittees. It eliminates the 
dual veterinarian of the Idaho Department ofFish and Game and the Department of Agriculture. 
FISCAL NOTE 
No fiscal impact. 
Contact: 
Name: Senator Jeff C. Siddoway 
Office: 
Phone: (208) 332-1000 
Statement of Purpose / Fiscal Note 
REVISED REVISED REVISED REVISED 
S 1232 
REVISED REVISED 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Sixtieth Legislature First Regular Session - 2009 
IN THE SENATE 
SENATE BILL NO. 1232, As Amended 
BY STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
1 mAcr 
2 RELATING TO FISH AND GAME; AMENDING SECTION 36-106, IDAHO CODE, TO 
3 CLARIFY APPLICATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS, TO STRIKE ARCHAIC 
4 VERBIAGE,TO REVISE CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS, TO PROVIDE THAT THE 
5 DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME SHALL TAKE SPECIFIED ACTION 
6 RELATING TO THE RELOCATION OF BIGHORN SHEEP, TO STATE A POLICY OF 
7 THE STATE OF IDAHO, TO PROVIDE FOR CERTAIN WRITTEN AGREEMENTS 
8 PRIOR TO SPECIFIED TRANSPLANT OR RELOCATION OF BIGHORN SHEEP, 
9 TO PROVIDE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A STATE MANAGEMENT PLAN 
10 BY THE DEPARTMENT, TO PROVIDE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF BEST 
11 MANAGEMENT PRACTICES WITH CERTAIN PERMITTEES, TO PROVIDE FOR 
12 CERTAIN CERTIFICATION BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FISH 
13 AND GAME AND TO DELETE REFERENCE TO PROVISIONS RELATING TO 
14 THE EMPLOYMENT OF CERTAIN VETERINARIANS BY THE DEPARTMENT 
15 OF AGRICULTURE; AMENDING SECTION 36-408, IDAHO CODE, TO DELETE 
16 REFERENCE TO A CERTAIN VETERINARIAN PROGRAM AND TO MAKE 
17 TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS; AND DECLARING AN EMERGENCY. 
18 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
19 SECTION 1. That Section 36-106, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended to 
20 read as follows: 
21 36-106. DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME. (a) Office of Director 
22 Created. The commission shall appoint a director of the department of fish and game, 
23 hereinafter referred to as the director, who shall be a person with knowledge of, and experience 
24 in, the requirements for the protection, conservation, restoration, and management of the 
25 wildlife resources of the state. The director shall not hold any other public office, nor any 
26 office in any political party organization, and shall devote his entire time to the service of the 
27 state in the discharge of his official duties, under the direction of the commission. 
28 (b) Secretary to Commission. The director or his designee shall serve as secretary to the 
29 commIssion. 
30 (c) Compensation and Expenses. The director shall receive such compensation as the 
31 commission, with the concurrence and approval of the governor, may determine and shall 
32 be reimbursed at the rate provided by law for state employees for all actual and necessary 
33 traveling and other expenses incurred by him in the discharge of his official duties. 
34 (d) Oath and Bond. Before entering upon the duties of his office, the director shall take 
35 and subscribe to the official oath of office, as provided by section 59-401, Idaho Code, and 
36 shall, in addition thereto, swear and affirm that he holds no other public office, nor any position 
37 under any political committee or party. Such oath, or affirmation, shall be signed in the office 
38 of the secretary of state. 
\D~ 
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1 The director shall be bonded to the state of Idaho in the time, form and manner prescribed 
2 by chapter 8, title 59, Idaho Code. 
3 (e) Duties and Powers of Director. 
4 l. The director shall have general supervision and control of all activities, functions, and 
5 employees of the department of fish and game, under the supervision and direction of the 
6 commission, and shall enforce all the provisions of the laws of the state, and rules and 
7 proclamations of the commission relating to wild animals, birds, and fish and, further, 
8 shall perform all the duties prescribed by section 67-2405, Idaho Code, and other laws of 
9 the state not inconsistent with this act, and shall exercise all necessary powers incident 
10 thereto not specifically conferred on the commission. 
11 2. The director is hereby authorized to appoint as many classified employees as the 
12 commission may deem necessary to perform administrative duties, to enforce the laws 
13 and to properly implement management, propagation, and protection programs established 
14 for carrying out the purposes of the Idaho fish and game code. 
15 3. The appointment of such employees shall be made by the director in accordance with 
16 chapter 53, title 67, Idaho Code, and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and they shall be 
17 compensated as provided therein. Said employees shall be bonded to the state of Idaho in 
18 the time, form, and manner prescribed by chapter 8, title 59, Idaho Code. 
19 4. The director is hereby authorized to establish and maintain fish hatcheries for the 
20 purpose of hatching, propagating, and distributing all kinds of fish. 
21 5. (A) The director,or any person appointed by him in writing to do so, may take 
22 wildlife of any kind, dead or alive, or import the same, subject to such conditions, 
23 restrictions and rules as he may provide, for the purpose of inspection, cultivation, 
24 propagation, distribution, scientific or other purposes deemed by him to be of 
25 interest to the fish and game resources of the state. 
26 (B) The director shall have supervision over all of the matters pertaining to 
27 the inspection, cultivation, propagation and distribution of the wildlife propagated 
28 under the provisions of title 36, Idaho Code. He shall also have the power and 
29 authority to obtain, by purchase or otherwise, wildlife of any kind or variety which 
30 he may deem most suitable for distribution in the state and may have the same 
31 properly cared for and distributed throughout the state of Idaho as he may deem 
32 necessary. 
33 (C) The director is hereby authorized to issue a license/tag/permit to a nonresident 
34 landowner who resides in a contiguous state for the purpose of taking one (I) 
35 animal during an emergency depredation hunt which includes the landowner's 
36 Idaho property subject to such conditions, restrictions or rules as the director may 
37 provide. The fee for this license/tag/permit shall be equal to the costs of a resident 
38 hunting license, a resident tag fee and a resident depredation permit. 
39 (D) Unless relocation is required pursuant to subparagraph (E) herein, 
40 QNotwithstanding the provisions of section 36-408, Idaho Code, to the contrary, 
41 on and after the effeetive date of this aet, the director shall not expend any funds, 
42 or take any action, or authorize any employee or agent of the department or other 
43 person to take any action, to undertake actual transplants of bighorn sheep into 
44 areas they do not now inhabit or to augment the nUffiber of bighorn sheep in 
45 mtisting herds for the purpose of augmenting existing populations until: 
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(i) The boards of county commissioners of the counties in which the 
release is proposed to take place have been given reasonable notice of the 
proposed release. 
(ii) The affected federal and state land grazing permittees and owners or 
leaseholders of private land in or contiguous to the proposed release site 
have been given reasonable notice of the proposed release. 
(iii) The president pro tempore of the senate and the speaker of the 
house of representatives have received from the director a plan for the 
forthcoming year that details, to the best of the department's ability, the 
proposed transplants which shall include the estimated numbers of bighorn 
sheep to be transplanted and a description of the areas the proposed 
transplant or transplants are planned for. 
Upon request, the department shall grant one (I) hearing per transplant or 
relocation if any affected individual or entity expresses written concern within 
ten (10) days of notification regarding any transplants or relocations of bighorn 
sheep and shall take into consideration these concerns in approving, modifying or 
canceling any proposed bighorn sheep transplant or relocation. Any such hearing 
shall be held within thirty (30) days of the request. ~ It is the policy of the 
state of Idaho that existing sheep or livestock operations in the area of any bighorn 
sheep transplant or relocation are recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of 
disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when the same invade domestic 
livestock or sheep operations is accepted. Prior to any transplant or relocation 
of bighorn sheep into areas they do not now inhabit or a transplant or relocation 
to augment for the purpose of augmenting existing populations, the department 
shall provide for any affected federal or state land grazing permittees or owners 
or leaseholders of private land a written ffittef agreement signed by all federal, 
state and private entities responsible for the transplant or relocation stating that 
the existing sheep or livestock operations in the area of any such bighorn sheep 
transplant or relocation are recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of disease 
transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when the same invade domestic livestock 
or sheep operations is accepted. 
@ The Idaho department of fish and game: (1) shall develop a state management 
plan to maintain a viable, self-sustaining population of bighorn sheep in Idaho 
which shall consider as part of the plan the current federal or state domestic sheep 
grazing allotment(s) that currently have any bighorn sheep upon or in proximity 
to the allotment(s); (2) within ninety (90) days of the effective date of this act 
will cooperatively develop best management practices with the permittee(s) on the 
allotment(s). Upon commencement of the implementation of best management 
practices, the director shall certify that the risk of disease transmission, if 
any, between bighorn and domestic sheep is acceptable for the viability of the 
bighorn sheep. The director's certification shall continue for as long as the best 
management practices are implemented. The director may also certify that the risk 
of disease transmission, if any, between bighorn and domestic sheeR is acceptable 
for the viability of the bighorn sheep based upon a finding that other factors exist, 
including but not limited to previous eXRosure to pathogens that make separation 
between bighorn and domestic sheep unnecessary. 
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1 6. (A) The director shall have the power, at any time when it is desired to introduce any 
2 new species, or if at any time any species of wildlife of the state of Idaho shall 
3 be threatened with excessive shooting, trapping, or angling or otherwise, to close 
4 any open season or to reduce the bag limit or possession limit for such species 
5 for such time as he may designate; in the event an emergency is declared to exist 
6 such closure shall become effective forthwith upon written order of the director; in 
7 all other cases upon publication and posting as provided in section 36-105, Idaho 
8 Code. 
9 (B) In order to protect property from damage by wildlife, the fish and game 
10 commission may delegate to the director or his designee the authority to declare an 
11 open season upon that particular species of wildlife to reduce its population. The 
12 director or his designee shall make an order embodying his findings in respect to 
13 when, under what circumstances, in which localities, by what means, and in what 
14 amounts, numbers and sex the wildlife subject to the hunt may be taken. In the 
15 event an emergency is declared to exist such open season shall become effective 
16 forthwith upon written order of the director.or his designee; in all other cases upon 
17 publication and posting as provided in section 36-105, Idaho Code. 
18 (C) Any season closure order issued under authority hereof shall be published in 
19 at least one (\) newspaper of general circulation in the area affected by the order 
20 for at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks, and such order shall be 
21 posted in public places in each county as the director may direct. 
22 (D) During the closure of any open season or the opening of any special 
23 depredation season by the director all provisions of laws relating to the closed 
24 season or the special depredation season on such wildlife shall be in force and 
25 whoever violates any of the provisions shall be subject to the penalties prescribed 
26 therefor. 
27 (E) Prior to the opening of any special depredation hunt, the director or his 
28 designee shall be authorized to provide up to a maximum of fifty percent (50%) 
29 of the available permits for such big game to the landholder(s) of privately 
30 owned land within the hunt area or his designees. If the landholder(s) chooses 
31 to designate hunters, he must provide a written list of the names of designated 
32 individuals to the department. If the landholder(s) fails to designate licensed 
33 hunters, then the department will issue the total available permits in the manner 
34 set by rule. All hunters must have a current hunting license and shall have equal 
35 access to both public and private lands within the hunt boundaries. It shall be 
36 unlawful for any landholder(s) to receive any f0l111 of compensation from a person 
37 who obtains or uses a depredation controlled hunt permit. 
38 7. The director shall make an annual report to the governor, the legislature, and the 
39 secretary of state, of the doings and conditions of his office, which report shaH be made in 
40 accordance with section 67-2509, Idaho Code. 
41 8. The director may sell or cause to be sold publications and materials in accordance 
42 with section 59-1012, Idaho Code. 
43 9. Any deer, elk, antelope, moose, bighorn sheep or bison imported or transported by 
44 the department of fish and game shall be tested for the presence of certain communicable 
45 diseases that can be transmitted to domestic livestock. Those communicable diseases to 
46 be tested for shaH be arrived at by mutual agreement between the department of fish and 
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1 game and the department of agriculture. Any moneys expended by the department of fish 
2 and game on wildlife disease research shall be mutually agreed upon by the department of 
3 fish and game and the department of agriculture. 
4 In addition, a comprehensive animal health program for all deer, elk, antelope, moose, 
5 bighorn sheep, or bison imported into, transported, or resident within the state of Idaho 
6 shall be implemented after said program is mutuaIly agreed upon by the department of 
7 fish and game and the department of agriculture. 
8 In order to enhance and protect the health of wildlife within the state, as ' • .,.ell as 
9 safegl:Jard the health of livestool( resources, the director of the department of agriel:lltl:lre 
10 shall employ at least one (l) veterinarial1 licenscd in Idaho \\'hose dl:lties shall iHclude, eut 
11 Hot be limited to, addressing wildlife disease issues and ceerdiHating disease prevention 
, ~-~ work bet\.,.cen the department of fish and game aHd the deJ3srtment of agricl:lltl:lre. The 
1':j. • employing of said veteriH!lFian shall be by mutual agrecmeHt of the direetor of the 
14 department of fish and game and of the director of the deflurtmeHt of agrieultl:lfe. The 
15 veteriHarian shall be on the staff of the division of anilflal inclustries, departm!:Wlt of 
16 agrieultl:lfe. The salary or eompensation to bc paid said veterinarian or veterinarians 
17 shall be divided equally between the departmeHt of fish anti game and the department of 
18 agriculture, and the department of fish and game's portion shall be dcposited directl)' into 
19 the liyestoclc disease control account. Thc vcteriHariaH shall be erHployed 01'1 aAd after 
20 July 1, 1989. 
21 10. In order to monitor and evaluate the disease status of wildlife and to protect 
22 Idaho's livestock resources, any suspicion by fish and game personnel of a potential 
23 communicable disease process in wildlife shall be reported within twenty-four (24) hours 
24 to the department of agriculture. All samples collected for disease monitoring or disease 
25 evaluation of wildlife shall be submitted to the division of animal industries, department 
26 of agriculture. 
27 11. (A) The director is authorized to enter into an agreement with an independent 
28 contractor for the purpose of providing a telephone order and credit card payment 
29 service for controlled hunt permits, licenses, tags, and permits. 
30 (B) The contractor may collect a fee for its service in an amount to be set by 
31 contract. 
32 (C) All moneys collected for the telephone orders of such licenses, tags, and 
33 permits shall be and remain the property of the state, and such moneys shaIl be 
34 directly deposited by the contractor into the state treasurer's account in accordance 
35 with the provisions of section 59-1014, Idaho Code. The contractor shall furnish 
36 a good and sufficient surety bond to the state of Idaho in an amount sufficient to 
37 cover the amount of the telephone orders and potential refunds. 
38 (D) The refund of moneys for unsuccessful controlled hunt permit applications 
39 and licenses, tags, and pelmits approved by the department may be made by the 
40 contractor crediting the applicant's or licensee's credit card account. 
41 12. The director may define activities or facilities that primarily provide a benefit: to the 
42 department; to a person; for personal use; to a commercial enterprise; or for a commercial 
43 purpose. 
44 SECTION 2. That Section 36-408, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended to 
45 read as follows: 
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36-408. COMMISSION'S AUTHORITY - TAGS - PERMITS - NONRESIDENTS 
2 LIMITED - OUTFITTERS SET-ASIDE. (I) Tags and Permits - Method of Use. The 
3 commission is hereby authorized to prescribe the number and kind of wildlife that may be 
4 taken under authority of the several types of tags and permits provided for in this title, and the 
5 manner in which said tags and permits shall be used and validated. 
6 (2) Limit - Licenses, Tags or Permits - Controlled Hunts. The commission is hereby 
7 authorized to establish a limit annually as to the number of each kind and class of licenses, 
8 tags, or permits to be sold or issued and is further authorized to limit the number or prohibit 
9 entirely, the participation by nonresidents in controlled hunts. 
10 (3) . Outfitters Set-aside. When the commission establishes a limit as to the number 
11 of nonresident deer tags and nonresident elk tags, it shall set aside annually a maximum of 
12 twenty-five percent (25%) of the nonresident deer tag and nonresident elk tag limit. The 
13 set-aside tags shall be sold pursuant to commission rule, only to persons that have entered 
14 into an agreement for that year to utilize the services of an outfitter licensed pursuant to chapter 
15 21, title 36, Idaho Code. 
16 In order for a person to purchase any set-aside nonresident deer tag or nonresident elk 
17 tag, that person's outfitter must submit an application with the proper fees as required by 
18 the director. If any nonresident deer tags or nonresident elk tags set aside pursuant to this 
19 subsection are unsold by July 1 of the year in which they were set aside, they may be sold by 
20 the department to the general public who are nonresidents. The commission may promulgate 
21 all necessary rules to implement the provisions of this subsection. 
22 (4) Deer and Elk Tag Allocation. If the commission limits the number of deer or elk tags 
23 available for use in any game management area, unit or zone, the commission may allocate by 
24 rule a number of deer or elk tags for use by hunters that have entered into an agreement for that 
25 year to utilize the services of an outfitter licensed pursuant to chapter 21, title 36, Idaho Code. 
26 (5) Special Game Tags. The commission is hereby authorized to issue two (2) special 
27 bighorn sheep tags per year. 
28 (a) Auction bighorn sheep tag. One ill special bighorn sheep tag shall be auctioned 
29 off by an incorporated nonprofit organization dedicated to wildlife conservation, selected 
30 by the commission. The tag shall be issued by the department of fish and game to the 
31 highest eligible bidder. No more than five percent (5%) of all proceeds for the tag may 
32 be retained by the organization. The tag to be issued pursuant to this subsection shall be 
33 taken from the nonresident bighorn sheep tag quota. The net proceeds shall be forwarded 
34 to the director for deposit in the fish and game expendable trust account and shall be 
35 used for bighorn sheep research and management purposes. Moneys raised pursuant to 
36 this subsection may not be used to transplant additional bighorn sheep into that portion 
37 of southwest Idaho south of the Snake River and west of U.S. highway no. 93, nor for 
38 litigation or environmental impact statements involving bighorn sheep. No transplants of 
39 bighorn sheep accomplished with moneys raised pursuant to this subsection shall occur in 
40 any area until hearings are conducted in the area. 
41 (b) Lottery bighorn sheep tag. The commission is also authorized to issue one (1) 
42 special bighorn sheep tag which will be disposed of by lottery. The lottery permit can 
43 be marketed by the department of fish and game or a nonprofit organization dedicated 
44 to wildlife conservation selected by the commission. The tag will be issued by the 
45 department of fish and game to an eligible person drawn from the lottery provided in this 
46 subsection. No more than twenty-five percent (25%) of gross revenue can be retained 
\b~ 
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1 for administrative costs by the organization. All net proceeds for the tag disposed of by 
2 lottery pursuant to this subsection shall be remitted to the department and deposited in the 
3 fish and game expendable trust account. Moneys in the account from the lottery bighorn 
4 sheep tag shall be utilized by the department in solving problems between bighorn 
5 sheep and domestic sheep, solving problems between wildlife and domestic animals or 
6 improving relationships between sportsmen and private landowners by beiRg utilized iR 
7 the veteriRariaR prograffi established iR subseetioA (e)9. of seetiol'l 36 106, Idaho Code. 
8 (6) Issuance of free permit or tag to minor children with life:threatening medical 
9 conditions. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the commission may issue free big 
10 game pennits or tags to minor children who have Iife:threatening medical conditions that 
11 have been certified eligible by a qualified organization. The commission may prescribe by 
12 rule the manner and conditions of issuing and using the penn its or tags authorized under 
13 this subsection (6). For purposes of this subsection (6) a "qualified organization" means a 
14 nonprofit organization that is qualified under section 501 (c )(3) of the Internal Revenue Code 
15 and that affords opportunities and experiences to minor children with life:threatening medical 
16 conditions. 
17 (7) Special Wolf Tags. The commission is hereby authorized to issue up to ten (10) 
18 special auction or lottery tags for hunting wolves. Special wolf tags will be auctioned off 
19 or made available through lottery by incorporated nonprofit organizations dedicated to wildlife 
20 conservation and selected by the director. No more than five percent (5%) of all proceeds for 
21 each tag may be retained by the nonprofit organization for administrative costs involved. Each 
22 wolf tag shall be issued by the department of fish and game and awarded to the highest eligible 
23 bidder or winner of a lottery. Each tag will be good for the harvest of one (1) wolf pursuant to 
24 commission rule. The proceeds from each tag wiII be sent to the director to be placed in the 
25 department general license fund. 
26 SECTION 3. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby declared to 
27 exist, this act shall be in fulI force and effect on and after its passage and approval. 
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DATE: 
TIME: 
PLACE: 
MEMBERS: 
ABSENTI 
EXCUSED: 
GUESTS: 
S 1232a 
MINUTES 
HOUSE RESOURCES & CONSERVATION COMMITTEE 
April 29, 2009 
Upon Recess of the House 
Room 148 
Chairman Stevenson, Vice Chairman Shepherd, Representatives Wood, 
Bell, Barrett, Moyle, Eskridge, Raybould, Bedke, Andrus, Wood (27), Boyle, 
Hagedorn, Harwood, Sayler, Chavez, King, Pence . 
Reps. Bedke, Moyle 
Benjamin Davenport, Risch Pisca 
Chairman Stevenson called the meeting to order at 2:50 p.m. 
Chairman Stevenson reminded committee members that they had already 
considered and passed S 1175 and that Governor Otter had vetoed that bill. 
He said the bill before the committee today, S 1232a, is a replacement that 
had originated in the Senate and was subsequently amended and passed 
by them. Chairman Stevenson said Rep. Boyle would explain the 
amendments to the original S 1232 since she had been involved in their 
discussion. 
Rep. Boyle explained that the original replacement bill, S 1232, was found 
to be problematic by the Attorney General's office and was therefore 
amended to meet those concerns. She acknowledged that the resulting 
S 1232a is still not perfect, but it is probably the best compromise legislation 
acceptable to all parties. 
During committee discussion, Rep. Boyle said the stricken language on 
page 7, regarding the veterinarian program, is the same language that was 
stricken in the original S 1175. She stated that the term "agreement" is 
SUbstituted for the term "letter" on page 3, line 26, because the document 
actually is an agreement, although it has taken the form of a letter in recent 
years. 
Asked whether Governor Otter is supporting this legislation, Rep. Boyle said 
the language in the bill is his language. She said it is her understanding that 
the bill is also acceptable to the Governor's task force, to the Forest Service, 
and to other parties. Chairman Stevenson said David Hensley from the 
Governor's office had been involved in the discussions over the past couple 
of days and had indicated this was the agreement the Senate thought they 
could achieve. He also noted that he had talked to the Fish & Game 
Commission and they are aware of the language in the bill. 
\ \ A 
Asked about the requirement in S 1232a that the state shall develop a 
MOTION: 
management plan, Rep. Boyle said Fish & Game does have a management 
plan for bighorn sheep, but it has not been updated since 1995. She said 
Fish & Game began discussing an update to the plan in May 2008 and 
planned to have an updated version ready for presentation to the public by 
January 2009. According to Mr. Hensley, however, that plan is still being 
refined. 
Rep. Boyle was asked about how this legislation will impact the Payette 
National Forest's plan. She responded that the Payette National Forest is 
developing an environmental impact statement (EIS), but this is different 
from the state's plan which will say how Idaho will manage its bighorn 
population. She noted that all wildlife belongs to the state and the state 
bears the responsibility for managing the animals. The federal government 
has to abide by the state's management plan. This is especially important 
in the case of large animals such as the bighorn because such animals 
travel back and forth across federal land, state land, and private land. Rep. 
Boyle said the Forest Service has to take all these factors into account as 
they develop their environmental impact statement. 
Responding to further committee questions, Rep. Boyle said Mr. Hensley 
has not indicated who is developing the management plan forthe state. She 
noted that the working group is made up of a wide variety of interested 
parties, but that it has no authority and is only an advisory group. The final 
plan will still need to go to Fish & Game and the Governor's office. Fish & 
Game is ultimately responsible for developing the final plan for managing 
and hunting bighorn sheep. 
A concern was expressed over the time frame of the plan and the fact that 
if it takes too long to develop and implement a plan, the sheep grazers may 
be gone from the state of Idaho before it becomes effective. A question was 
also raised about the Statement of Purpose's fiscal note, which states that 
there will be no fiscal impact as a result of this bill. Since the management 
plan will have to be developed by someone, probably a state employee, the 
real cost of that person's time is not accurately reflected in the fiscal note. 
Chairman Stevenson expressed gratitude to Rep. Boyle for handling the 
presentation and explanation of S 1232a, saying she was the only person 
available who was familiar with the changes made and the work done on the 
bill during the last couple of days. 
Rep. Eskridge moved to send S 1232a to the floor with a DO PASS 
recommendation. 
Rep. Hagedorn stated his belief that the Fish & Game Commission has 
lagged behind in its responsibility to manage the bighorn sheep population, 
and this legislation will be a clear signal to them that they need to perform 
this function in a timely manner. Chairman Stevenson again noted that, 
although S 1232a is not a perfect bill, it is the one that has been negotiated 
and agreed upon by the Governor's office, the Senate, and the Shirts ~ 
family's attorney. Although no one got the bill they wanted, all agreed this 
would have the best chance of passage by the Senate and House. 
Rep. Wood (27) noted that the 1997 agreement dealt with risk but had 
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nothing to do with a management plan. He said there will be two 
management plans. One will originate with the Fish & Game Commission 
and will deal strictly with managing wild sheep and hunting them. The other J 
plan is associated with grazing on the Payette National Forest lands, and is -E-
addressed in this legislation. This plan is what the Forest Service, the State 
of Idaho, and the Shirts family have come to agreement on. He said Fish & 
Game may have some input but they won't be drawing it up. S 1232a will 
allow the state to develop this plan without conflicting with federal rules. 
Asked whether any plan will be developed in time to have any good effect in 
Idaho, Rep. Wood pointed out that the bill does have an emergency clause, 
which will allow development of the plan to start immediately. Rep. Andrus 
noted that the legislation contains a gO-day time limit for such a plan to be 
developed. He also said that legal counsel for the Shirts family had 
requested a 30-day time limit, but that very short time frame was not 
acceptable to the Governor, who thought it would be impossible for the Fish 
& Game Commission to come up with a plan in only 30 days. 
Rep. Harwood indicated that, in his opinion, this bill does not seem to 
contain timely enough help for the farmers or sheepherders, and he asked 
whether an override of the Governor's veto of S 1175 was feasible. 
Chairman Stevenson said the Senate has already indicated it will not 
entertain an override effort. 
Rep. Hagedorn reminded committee members that Idaho's bighorn sheep 
belong to the state and it is Idaho's responsibility to develop a management 
plan. He said there needs to be clear direction given to the Forest Service, L-
to the Executive branch, and to the Fish & Game Commission. If the ~ 
Legislature takes no action, Rep. Hagedorn said, the situation will default to 
the old 1990 plan. He acknowledged that this bill may not be perfect, but the 
Governor has already indicated his position by vetoing the previous bill. 
Rep. Boyle stated that she supports S 1232a, although reluctantly. Her 
support is based on two sections of the bill that remain from the previous 
S 1175, namely, the elimination of the dual veterinarians, which will help with 
budget concerns, and the language on lines 18-22, page 3 of the bill, which 
explicitly states the policy of the State of Idaho. 
Chairman Stevenson called for a vote on the motion to send S 1232a to the 
floor with a DO PASS recommendation. A roll call vote was requested. 
Motion passed, 12-4-2. Voting in favor of the motion: Reps. Shepherd, 
Bell, Barrett, Eskridge, Raybould, Andrus, Wood (27), Boyle, Hagedorn, 
Harwood, Sayler, and Chairman Stevenson. Voting in opposition to the 
motion: Reps. Wood (35), Chavez, King, and Pence. Reps. Bedke and 
Moyle were absent and excused. Rep. Wood (27) will sponsor the bill on 
the floor. 
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ADJOURN: There being no further business to come before the committee, the meeting 
was adjourned at 3: 25 p.m. 
Representative John A. Stevenson 
Chairman 
\ \ s-
Marylou Molitor 
Secretary 
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DATE: 
TIME: 
PLACE: 
MEMBERS: 
ABSENTI 
EXCUSED: 
GUESTS: 
MOTION: 
ADJOURN: 
MINUTES 
HOUSE RESOURCES & CONSERVATION COMMITTEE 
May 5,2009 
Upon Adjournment of the House 
Room 145 
Chairman Stevenson, Vice Chairman Shepherd, Representatives Wood (35), 
Bell, Barrett, Moyle, Eskridge, Raybould, Bedke, Andrus, Wood (27), Boyle, 
Hagedorn, Harwood, Sayler, Chavez, King, Pence 
Reps. Shepherd, Wood (35), Barrett, Moyle, Eskridge, Bedke, Boyle, Sayler 
None 
Chairman Stevenson called the meeting to order at 2:03 p.m. 
Rep. Pence moved to approve the minutes of April 29, 2009 as written; 
motion carried on voice vote. 
There being no further business to come before the committee, the meeting 
was adjourned at 2:05 p.m. 
Representative John A. Stevenson 
Chairman 
Marylou Molitor 
Secretary 
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Corrected Exhibit 3 
Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Idaho Wool Growers Association et al. v. State of Idaho et al.I 
Case No. CV-2010-2567 
\ \ 1 
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SENATE BILL 1175 
FulUillJ .. Information 
Individual links: 
12IH .Is;>;t. 
Am,~.!.ld.m,~nt 
fD.flr.Q,~s.me.D..Ll. - amendment(s) incorporated 
Sta!ern.~to.f.E.IJ.!l2QS~.Llli.~~.Q.t~ 
NO. 102 P.6 
Page 1 of2 
51175aa ....................................................................................... by STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
FISH AND GAME - Amends existing law relating to fish and game to provide that 
the department shall take specified action relating to the relocation of bighorn 
sheep, to state a policy of the state of Idaho, to provide for the relocation or 
control of certain bighorn sheep by the Director of the Department of Fish and 
Game and to delete reference to provisions relating to the employment of certain 
veterinarians by the Department of Agriculture. 
03/31 Senate intro - 1st rdg - to printing 
04/01 Rpt prt - to Res/Env 
04/07 Rpt out - to 14th Ord 
Rpt out amen - to engros 
04/08 Rpt engros - 1st rdg - to 2nd rdg as amen 
04/09 2nd rdg - to 3rd rdg as amen 
'Rls susp - PASSED ... 27-1-1 
AYES--Andreason, Bair, Brackett, Broadsword, Cameron, Coiner, 
Corder, Darrington, Davis, Fulcher, Geddes, Goedde, Hammond, 
Heinrich, Hill, Jorgenson, Keough, Lodge, McKague, McKenzie, 
Mortimer, Pearce, Schroeder, Siddoway, Smyser, Stegner, Winder 
NAVS--Bilyeu, Bock, Kelly, LeFavour, Sagness(Malepeai), Thorson 
(Stennett), Werk 
Absent and excused .... McGee 
Floor Sponsor .. Siddoway 
Title apvd - to House 
04/10 House intro - 1st rdg - to Res/Con 
04/14 Rpt out - rec dIp - to 2nd rdg 
04/15 2nd rdg - to 3rd rdg 
04/16 3rd rdg .. PASSED .. 51-17-2 
AYES -- Anderson, Andrus, Barrett, Bayer, Bedke, Bell, Bilbao, Block, 
Bolz, Boyle, Chadderdon, Collins, Crane, Eskridge, Gibbs, Hagedorn, 
Hart, Hartgenl Harwood, Henderson, Jarvisl Kren, Labrador, Lake, 
Loertscher, Luker, Marriott, Mathews, McGeachin, Moyle, Nielsen, 
R?\) \\t-.eMD \ \~ 
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Bill Status: S 1175 Page 2 of2 
Nonini, Palmer, Patrick, Raybould, Roberts, Sayler, Schaefer, Shepherd 
.(02), Shepherd(08), Shirley, Simpson, Smith(24), Stevenson, 
Takasugi, Thayn, Thompson, Wills, Wood(27L Wood(35), Mr. Speaker 
NAYS -- Boe, Burgoyne, Chavez, Chew, Cronin, Durst, Higgins, 
Jaquet, Killen, King, Pasley-Stuart, Pence, Ringo, Ruchti, Rusche, 
Smith(30), Trail 
Absent and excused -- Black, Clark 
Floor Sponsor - Boyle 
Title apvd - to Senate 
To enrol 
04/17 Rpt enrol - Pres signed 
04/20 Sp signed 
To Governor 
04/27 Governor VETOED on 04/25/09 
Ret'd to Res/Env 
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS18882 
NO. 102 P.B 
The stated purpose of this bill j~ to make three changes in Section 36·106, Idaho Code, to clarify 
actions that shall take place before the transplant or relocation may take place. It provides for 
certain agreements, provides that domestic sheep and livestock operators will be heJd harmless 
from adverse impacts by the State ofIdaho, provides for control of certain bighorn by the Director, 
and that the shared veterinarian program between IDA and IDFO be dissolved. This bill also deletes 
a reference to that veterinarian in Section 36408. 
FISCAL NOTE 
There should be no fiscal impact to the General Fund. There will be an expected impact to the 
Department of Fish and Game; however, because of the unknowns as to if and when any actions 
may be required the amount is unknown at this time. 
Contact: 
Name: Senator Jeff C. Siddoway 
Office: 
Phone: (208) 332-1000 
Statement of Purpose / Fiscal Note 
~?\I ~~'k~ \ ~D 
S 1175 
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LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Six.1ieth Legi;;Iature First Regular Session - 2009 
IN THE SENATE 
SENATE BILL NO. 1175 
BY STATE AFFAIRS COMMITfEE 
1 AN ACT 
2 RELATING TO FISH AND GAME; AMENDING SECTION 36-106, IDAHO CODE, TO 
3 CLARIFY APPLICATION OF CERTAIN PROVIsrONS, TO STRlKE ARCHAIC 
4 VERBIAGE, TO PROVIDE THAT THE DEPARTMENT SHALL TAKE SPECIFIED 
5 ACTION RELATING TO THE RELOCATION OF BIGHORN SHEEP, TO PROVIDE 
6 FOR CERTAIN WRITTEN AGREEMENTS PRIOR TO TRANSPLANT OR 
7 RELOCATION OF BIGHORN SHEEP, TO PROVIDE THAT SPECIFIED DOMESTIC 
e SHEEP AND LIVESTOCK OPERATIONS SHALL BE HELD HAR..M:LESS FROM 
1) ADVERSE IMPACTS BY THE STATE OF IDAHO, TO .PROVIDE FOR THE 
10 RELOCATION OR CONTROL OF CERTAIN BIGHORN SHEEP BY THE 
11 DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME, TO PROVIDE AN 
12 EXCEPTION, TO PROVIDE FOR THE BASIS OF CERTIFICATION AND TO 
13 DELETE REFERENCE TO PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE EMPLOYMENT 
14 OF CERTAIN VETERINARIANS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; 
15 AMENDING SECTION 36-408, IDAHO CODE, TO DELETE REFERENCE 
18 TO A CERTAIN VETERINARlAN PROGRAM AND TO MAKE TECHNICAL 
17 . CORRECTIONS; A1\TD DECLARING AN EMERGENCY. 
1a Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
19 SECTION 1. That Section 36-106, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended to 
20 read as follows: 
21 36-106. DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME. (a) Office of Director 
22 Created. The commission shall appoint a director of the department of fish and game, 
23 hereinafter referred to as the director, who shall be a person with knowledge of, and experience 
24 in, the requirements for the protection, conservation, restoration, and management of the 
25 wildlife resources of the state. TIle director shall not hold any other public office, nor any 
2/5 office in any political party organization, and shall devote his entire time to the service of the 
27 state in the discharge of his official duties, under the direction of the commission. 
28 (b) Secretary to Commission. The director or his designee shall serve as secretary to the 
29 commission. 
30 (c) Compensation and Expenses. The director shall receive such compensation as the 
31 commission, with the concurrence and approval of the governor, may determine and shall 
32 be reimbursed at the rate provided by law for state employees for all actual and necessary 
33 traveling and other expenses incurred by him in the discharge of his official duties. 
34 (d) Oath and Bond. Before entering upon the duties of his office, the director shall take 
35 and subscribe to the official oath of office, as provided by section 59-401, Idaho Code, and 
36 shall, in addition thereto, swear and affirm that he holds no other public office, nor any position 
37 under any political committee or party. Such oath, or affirmation, shall be signed in the office 
38 of the secretary of state. 
\ ?- \ 
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1 The director shall be bonded to the state of Idaho in the time) form and manner prescribed 
2 by chapter 8, title 59, Idaho Code. 
3 (e) Duties and Powers of Director. 
4 1. The director shall have general supervision and control of all activities, functions, and 
5 employees of the department of fish and game, under the supervision and direction of the 
6 commission, and shall enforce all the provisions of the laws of the state, and rules and 
7 proclamations of the commission relating to wild animals, birds, and fish and, further, 
e shall perform all the duties prescribed by section 67-2405, Idaho Code, and other laws of 
9 the state not inconsistent with this act, and shall exercise all necessary powers incident 
10 thereto not specifically conferred on the commission. 
11 2. The director is hereby authorized to appoint as many classified employees as the 
12 commission may deem necessary to perfom1 administrative duties, to enforce the laws 
13 and to properly implement management, propagation, and protection programs established 
14 for carrying out the purposes of the Idaho fish and game code. 
1S 3. The appointment of such employees shall be made by the director in accordance with 
16 chapter 53, title 67, Idaho Code, and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and they shall be 
17 compensated as provided therein. Said employees shall be bonded to the state of Idaho in 
18 the time, form, and manner prescribed by chapter 8, title 59, Idaho Code. 
19 4. The director is hereby authorized to establish and maintain fish batcheries for the 
20 purpose of hatching, propagating, and distributing all kinds of fish. 
Z1 5. (A) The director, or any person appointed by him in writing to do so, may take 
22 wildlife of any kind, dead or alive, or import the same, subject to such conditions, 
23 restrictions and rules as he may provide, for the purpose of inspection, cultivation, 
24 propagation, distribution, scientific or other purposes deemed by him to be of 
25 interest to the 'fish and game resources of the state. 
26 (B) The director shall have supervision over all of the matters pertaining to 
27 the inspection, cultivation, propagation and distribution of the wildlife prop/lgated 
28 . under the provisions of title 36, Idaho Code. He shall also have the power and 
29 authority to obtain, by purchase or otbelWise, wildlife of any kind or variety which 
30 he may deem most suitable for distribution in the state and may have the same 
31 properly cared for and distributed throughout the state of Idaho as he may deem 
32 necessary . 
.33 (C) The director is hereby authorized to issue a license/tag/penn it to a nonresident 
.'34 landowner who resides in a contiguous state for the purpose of taking one (l) 
36 animal during an emergency depredation hunt which includes the landowner's 
36 Idaho property subject to such conditions, restrictions or roles as the director may 
37 provide. The fee for this license/tag/pennit shall be equaJ to the costs of a resident 
38 hunting license, a resident tag fee and a resident depredation pelmit. 
39 (D) Unless relocation is reguired Eursuant to subparagraph (F) herein, 
40 gNotwithstanding the provisions of section 36·408, Idaho Code, to the contrary, 
41 eff-tl.fl<l-aftoF th~ffeeti",~ {)f this eet, the director shall not expend any funds, 
42 or take any action, or authorize any employee or agent of the department or other 
43 person to take any action, to undertake actual transplants of bighorn sheep into 
44 areas they do not now inhabit or to augment the number of bighorn sheep in 
4S existing herds until: 
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(i) The boards of county commissioners of the counties in which the 
release is proposed to take place have been given reasonable notice of the 
proposed release. 
(ii) The affected federal and state land grazing permittees and owners or 
leaseholders of private land in or contiguous to the proposed release site 
.. have been given reasonable notice of the proposed release. 
(iii) The president pro tempore of the senate and tbe speaker of the 
house of representatives have received from the director a plan for the 
forthcoming year that details, to the best of the department's ability, the 
proposed transplants which shall include tne estimated numbers of bighorn 
sheep to be transplanted and a description of the areas the proposed 
transplant or transplants are planned for. 
Upon request, the department shall grant one (1) hearing per transplant .Q! 
relocation if any affected individual or entity expresses written concern within 
ten (10) days of notification regarding any n-ansplants or relocations of bighorn 
sheep and shall take into consideration these concerns in approving, modifying or 
canceling any proposed bighorn sheep transplant or relpcation. Any such hearing 
shall be held within thirty (30) days of the request. ~ Prior to any transplant 
or relocation of bighorn sheep into areas they do not now inhabit or a transplant 
or relocation to augment existing populations, the department shall provide for 
any affected federal or state land grazing permIttees or owners or leaseholders 
of private land a written ~ a,greement signed by all federal, state and private 
entities responsible for the transplant or relocation stating that the existing sheep Or 
livestock operations in the area of any such bighorn sheep transplant or relocation 
are recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss 
of bighorn sheep when the same invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is 
accepted. 
@ If anv domestic sheep or livestock operation i§ .... or has been. adversely 
imeacted from any past. present or future transplant or relocation of bighorn sheep. 
the domestic sheep or livestock operation shall be held hannless from adverse 
ime.acts by the state of Idaho. 
ru Should any bighorn sheep graze. stray or~drift upon. or in close proximity to. 
any private, state or federal 1ands that have any domestic .2J1e,ep use, or have any 
domestic sheee allotments administered bv the bureau of land management, the 
U.S. forest service or the Idaho detwrtment of lands. the director shall relocate 
or control the bighorn sheep to ensure that appropriate separation between the 
bighorn sheep and the domestic sheep is maintained. unless the director certifies 
that the risk of disease transmission,.if anYl between the bighorn sheep and t~ 
domestic sheep is acceptable. This certification may be based upon: 
.ill An agreement regarding a separation strategy between the bighorn 
sh~ee and the domestic sheep entered into b:t the owners of the domestic 
sheep and the dir'yctor or his designee; or 
@ A finding by the director that the bighorn sheep have alreadv been 
exposed to certain pathogens that makes separation betws:~n the bighorn 
sheep and the domestic sheep unwarrant~ 
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6. (A) The director shall have the power, at any time when it is desired to introduce any 
2 new species, or if at any time any species of wildlife of the state of Idaho shall 
3 be threatened with excessive shooting, trapping, Dr angling Or otherwise. to close 
4 any open season or to ,educe the bag limit or possession limit for such species 
5 for such time as he may designate; in the event an emergency is declared to exist 
6 such closure shall become effective forthwith upon wriqen order of the director; in 
7 all other cases upon pubJication and posting as provided in section 36-10S, Idaho 
B Code. 
9 (B) In order to protect property from damage by wildlife, tbe fish and game 
10 commission may delegate to the director or his designee the authority to declare an 
11 . open season upon that particular species of wildlife to reduce its population. The 
12 director or his designee shall make an order embodying his findings in respect to 
13 when, under what circumstances, in which localities) by what means, and in what 
14 amounts, numbers and sex the wildlife subject to the hunt may be taken. In the 
15 event an emergency is declared to exist such open season shall become effective 
1$ forthwith upon written order of tho director or his designee; in all other cases upon 
77 publication and posting as provided in section 36·105, Idaho Code. 
ra (C) Any season closure order issued under authority hereof shall be published in 
19 at least one (1) newspaper of genera) circulation in the area affected by the order 
20 for at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks, and such order shall be 
21 posted in public places in each county as the director may direct. 
22 (D) During the closure of any open season or the opening of any special 
23 depredation season by the director all provisions of laws relating to the closed 
24 season or the special depredation season on such wildlife shall be in force and 
25 whoever violates any of the provisions shall be subject to the penalties prescribed 
26 therefor. 
27 (E) Prior to the opening of any special depredation hunt, the director or his 
28 designee shall be authorized to provide up to a ma.ximurn of fifty percent (50%) 
29 of the available permits for such big game to the landholder(s) of privately 
30 owned land within the hunt area or his designees. If the landholder(s) chooses 
31 to designate hunters, he must provide a written list of the names of designated 
32 individuals to the department. If the landholder(s) fails to designate licensed 
33 hunters, then the department will issue the total available penn its in the manner 
34 set by rule. 'All hunters must have a current hunting license and shall bave equal 
35 access to both public and private lands within the hunt boundaries. It shall be 
36 unlawful for any landholder(s) to receive any fom of compensation from a person 
37 who obtains or lfses a depredation controlled hunt pennit. 
38 7. The director shall make an annual report to the governor, the legislature, and the 
3~ secretary of state, of the doings and conditions of his office, which report shall be made in 
40 accordance with section 67-2509, Idaho Code. 
41 8. The director may sell or cause to be sold publications and materials in accordance 
42 with section 59-1012, Idaho Code. 
43 9. Any deer, elk, antelope, moose, bighorn sheep or bison imported or transported by 
44 the department of fish and game shall be tested for the presence of certain communicable 
45 diseases that can be transmitted to domestic livestock. Those communicable diseases to 
46 be tested for shall be arrived at by mutual agreement between the department of fish and 
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1 game and the department of agriculture. Any moneys expended by the department of fish 
2 and game on wildlife disease research shall be mutually agreed upon by the department of 
3 fish and game and the department of agriculture. 
4 In addition, a comprehensive animal health program for all deer, elk, antelope, moose, 
5 bighorn sheep, or bison imported into, transported, or resident within the state of Idaho 
(J shall be implemented after said program is mutually agreed upon by the department of 
7 fish and game and the department of agriculture. 
8 In ol'Elel' t&'t>uh£lHee- ooEl flroteet tlte-fiooltft-.of wilalifo witffin ... tl~tate, as weB as 
9 safeguard the·heEHfu~f live9toek t'esotll'ees,-tRHj~etef of the OOpartffiont of agrieulturo 
10 shall em~o;r-atleast efte (1) VOtOftnaHen-lieeRsed iA Idaho wkese-OOties shall ineltl6e,....em 
11 not bo-Iffl.rit-eE! to, addfe99ing 't't'ildHf.e-disoaso issues aBe eeOro1;"t&tiag disease pro'lemioo 
12 weFk·between the depal:tfl'lent <>f..fl'Sl:r-QAd game &l't6 the d~tlftm:eflt of agyiettltl:tl't> ... =I=he 
13 offlpleyitl'g-&Hatd veterinarian 9)tftH-be· by fFlIHual agroen'teltt-of tae diFe~el' of the 
14 d~fit'trFtent-e-f-:Rsh SAd game f1Hdoo()~ir:eetor of tHe eet>ai'tfnent-of agfietllffiHl. Tl'te 
1S l,'eteriflM'tftl'l shaU-eo-on the Staff of the- <ii¥isieR <>f B:ftiftlal jndl:l5tt=4e9,~artffieFlt of 
16 agrieultl:il'o. The -sa:lftFy-<>r ooAlpen9f1tion to be Pfth:l-sakl veterinarian ol'-¥eteflnarians 
17 shall be di ..... ided equal~ eetweefl the deflEtt1mel'lt~ itell-tffid game fttld the dopat'BMRt of 
18 &grietllttlFe, 8.fl:6 the depaPl'mellt-Of fish aAG gaffio's )361~eIHlRan be Elt~flosited dtl'eetly-inffi 
19 . the li'.estQok disease-eeRtroI aee<)1::!f1:t. The .... oteriHer1efl-15Jlall ee emplo,'oq Oll-OOtl-aft&f 
20 ltd), 1: 1989. 
21 10. In order to monitor and evaluate the disease status of wildlife and to protect 
22 Idaho's livestock resources, any suspicion by fish and game personnel of a potential 
23 communicable disease process in wildlife shall be reported within twenty-four (24) hours 
24 to the department of agriculture. All samples collected for disease monitoring or disease 
25 evaluation of wildlife shall be submitted to the division of animal industries, department 
2C of agricultUre. 
27 11. (A) The director is authorized to enter into an agreement with an independent 
28 contractor for the purpose of providing a telephone order and credit card payment 
29 service for controlled hunt permits, licenses, tags, and permits. 
30 (B) The contractor may collect a fee for its service in an amount to be set by 
31 contract. 
32 (C) All moneys collected for the telephone orders of such licenses, tags, and 
33 pennits shall be and remain the property of the state, and such moneys shall be 
34 directly deposited by the contractor into the state treasurer's account in accordance 
.3S with the provisions of section 59-1014, Idaho Code. The contractor shall furnish 
36 a good and sufficient surety bond to the state of Idaho in an amount sufficient to 
37 cover the amount of the telephone orders and potential refunds . 
.38 (D) The refund of moneys for unsuccessful controlled hunt permit applications 
39 and licenses, tags, and pennits approved by the department may be made by the 
40 contractor crediting the applicant's or licensee's credit card account. 
41 12. The director may define activities or facilities that primarily provide a benefit: to the 
42 department; to a person; for personal use; to a commercial enterprise; or for a commercial 
43 purpose. 
44 SECTION 2. That Section 36-408, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended to 
46 read as follows: 
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1 36-408. COMMISSION'S AUTHORITY - TAGS - PERMITS - NONRESIDENTS 
2 LIMITED - OUTFITTERS SET-ASIDE. (1) Tags and Permits - Method of Use. The 
3 commission is hereby authorized to prescribe the number and kind of wildlife that may be 
4 taken under authority of the several types of tags and permits provided for in this title, and the 
5 manner in which said tags and permits shall be used and validated. 
6 (2) Limit ~ Licenses, Tags or Permits - Controlled Hunts. The commission is hereby 
7 authorized to establish a limit annually as to the number of each kind and class of licenses, 
e tags, or pennits to be sold or issued and is further authorized to limit the number or prohibit 
9 entirely, the participation by nonresidents in controlled hunts, 
10 (3) Outfitters Set-aside, When the commission establishes a limit as to the number 
11 of nonresident deer tags and nonresident elk tags, it shall set aside annually a maximum of 
12 twenty-five percent (25%) of the nonresident deer tag and nonresident elk tag limit. The 
13 set-aside tags shall be sold pursuant to commission rule, only to persons that have entered 
14 into an agreement for that year to utilize the services of an outfitter licensed pursuant to chapter 
1S 21, title 36, Idaho Code. 
16 In order for a person to purchase any set-aside nonresident deer tag or nonresident elk 
17 tag, that person's outfitter must submit an application with the proper fees as required by 
18 the director. If any nonresident deer tags or nonresident elk tags set aside pursuant to this 
19 subsection are unsold by July 1 of the year in which they were set aside, they may be sold by 
20 the department to the general public who are nonresidents. The commission may promulgate 
21 all necessary rules to implement the provisions of this subsection. 
22 (4) Deer and Elk. Tag Allocation. If the commission limits the number of deer or elk tags 
23 available for use in any game management area, unit or zone, the commission may allocate by 
2-1 rule a number of deer or elk tags for use by hunters that have entered into an agreement for that 
25 year to utilize the services of an outfitter licensed pursuant to chapter 21, title 36, Idaho Code. 
26 (5) Special Game Tags. The commission is hereby authorized to issue two (2) special 
27 bighorn sheep tags per year. 
28 (a) Auction bighorn sheep tag. One ill special bighorn sheep tag shall be auctioned 
21) off by an incorporated nonprofit organization dedicated to wildlife conservation) selected 
30 by the commission. The tag shall be issued by the department of fish and game to the 
31 highest eligible bidder. No more than five percent (5%) of all proceeds for the tag may 
32 . be retained by the organization. The tag to be issued pursuant to this subsection shall be 
JJ taken from the nonresident bighorn sheep tag quota. The net proceeds shall be forwarded 
34 to the director for deposit in the fish and game expendable trust account and shall be 
35 used for bighorn sheep research and management purposes. Moneys raised pursuant to 
36 this subsection may not be used to transplant additional bighorn sheep into that portion 
,37 of southwest Idaho south of the Snake River and west of U.S. highway no. 93, nor for 
38 litigation or environmental impact statements involving bighorn sheep. No transplants of 
,39 bighorn sheep accomplished with moneys raised pursuant to this subsection shall occur in 
40 any area until hearings are conducted in the area. 
41 (b) Lottery bighorn sheep tag. The commission is also authorized to issue one (1) 
42 special bighorn sheep tag which will be disposed of by lottery. The lottery permit can 
43 ' be marketed by the department of fish and game or a nonprofit organization dedicated 
44 to wildlife conservation selected by the commission. The tag will be issued by the 
45 department of fish and game to an e1igible person drawn from the lottery provided in this 
46 subsection. No more man twenty-five percent (25%) of gross revenue can be retained 
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for administrative costs by the organization. All net proceeds for the tag disposed of by 
2 lottery pursuant to this subsection shall be remitted to the department and deposited in the 
3 fish and game expendable trust account. Moneys in the account from the lottery bighorn 
4 sheep tag shall be utilized by the department in solving problems between bighorn 
5 sheep and domestic sheep, solving problems between \vildJife and domestic animals or 
6 impr~ving relationships between sportsmen and private landowners by Being utiJize6 ~fI 
7 the 't'erel'lltflt-ian 1'I'og!'tltfl-es-tabH9hed tTl roSuegeet~ (e)9. of seetioft 36 10e, Idahe Cede. 
s (6) Issuance of free permit or tag to minor children with lifc:threatening medical 
9 conditions. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the commission may issue free big 
10 game permits or tags to minor children who have life:threatening medical conditions that 
11 have been certified eligible by a qualified organization. The commission may prescribe by 
12 rule tbe manner and conditions of issuing and using the permits or tags authorized under 
13 this subsection (6). For purposes of this subsection (6) a "qualified organization" means a 
14 nonprofit organization that is qualified under section SOl(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code 
15 and that affords opportunities and experiences to minor children with life.:threatening medical 
18 conditions. 
1" (7) Special Wolf Tags. The commission is hereby authorized to issue up to ten (10) 
18 special auction or lottery tags for hunting wolves. Special wolf tags will be auctioned off 
19 or made available through lottery by incorporated nonprofit organizations dedicated to wildlife 
20 conservation and selected by the director. No more than five percent (5%) of all proceeds for 
21 each tag may be retained by the nonprofit organization for administrative costs involved. Each 
22 wolf tag shall be issued by the department of fish and game and awarded to the highest eligible 
23 bidder or winner of a lottery. Each tag will be good for the harvest of one (1) wolf pursuant to 
24 commission rule. The proceeds from each tag will be sent to the director to be placed in the 
25 department general license fund. 
25 SECTION 3. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby declared to 
27 exist, this act shall be in fu1l force and effect on and after its passage and approval. 
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of the 
STATE SENATE 
ORGANIZATIONAL SESSION 
and 
FIRST REGULAR SESSION 
of the 
SIXTIETH LEGISLATURE 
of the 
STATE OF IDAHO 
2009 
[r\pril 7, 2009 SENATE JOURNAL 197 
CORRECTION TO TITLE 
On page I, in line 2, following "SCHOOLS" insert: 
"AND TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT"; delete lines 3 and 
4, and insert: "TO PROVIDE THAT THE ONLY MILES 
FROM WIlICH COSTS MAY BE REIMBURSED SHALL BE 
MILES DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSPORTING 
STUDENTS FOR CERTAIN PURPOSES, TO PROVIDE 
FOR CERTAIN ALLOWABLE COSTS ON AND AFTER 
JULY I, 2010"; in line 5, delete "FOR CERTAIN COSTS"; 
following line 11, insert: "AMENDING CHAPTER 10, 
TITLE 33, IDAHO CODE, BY THE ADDITION OF A 
NEW SECTION 33- 1006A, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE 
THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SHALL 
AUDIT CERTAIN TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS, TO 
PROVIDE FOR RECOMMENDATIONS, TO PROVIDE FOR 
CERTAIN REDUCTIONS IN REIMBURSEMENT;"; and in 
line 15, foHowing "COSTS" insert: "; AND DECLARING AN 
EMERGENCY". 
SENATE AMENDMENT TO S 1175 
AMENDMENT TO SECTION I 
On page 2 of the printed bill, in line 39, delete "ill" and 
insert: "ru"; on page 3, in line 18, fo1\owing "tI-peft" insert: 
"It is the policy of the state of Idaho that existing sheep or 
livestock operations in the area of any bighorn sheep transplant 
or relocation are recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of 
disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when the same 
invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted."; 
delete lines 28 through 31; and in line 32, delete "ill" and insert: 
Hill"· 
CORRECTIONS TO TITLE 
On page I, in line 5, following "SHEEP," insert: "TO STATE 
A POLICY OF THE STATE OF IDAHO"; and delete lines 7 
through 9, and insert: "RELOCATION OF BIGHORN SHEEP, 
TO PROVIDE FOR THE". 
The Committee also has S 1055, S 1092, S 1095, S 1147, 
II 187, and S 1182 under consideration, reports progress, and begs 
leave to sit again. 
STEGNER, Chairman 
On motion by Senator Stegner, seconded by Senator Werk, 
the report was adopted by voice vote. 
S 1140, as amended, and S 1175, as amended, were referred 
to the Judiciary and Rules Committee for engrossing and the 
amendments thereto were referred to the Judiciary and Rules 
Committee for printing. 
II 256, as amended in the Senate, was filed for first reading 
as amended, and the amendments thereto were referred to the 
Judiciary and Rules Committee for printing. 
On request by Senator Davis, granted by unanimous consent, 
the Senate returned to the Sixth Order of Business. 
Reports of Standing Committees 
On motion by Senator Davis, seconded by Senator Kelly, by 
voice vote the Senate recessed at I: 16 p.m. until the hour of 3:30 
p.m. of this day. 
\3D 
RECESS 
Af'TERNOON SESSION 
The Senate reconvened at 3:30 a.m., pursuant to recess, 
President Little presiding. 
Roll call showed all mem bers presen t except Senator 
McKaguc, absent and formally excused by the Chair; and 
Senators Andreason, Brackett, Cameron, Coiner, Keough, 
Lodge, McKenzie, and Stegner, absent and excused. 
Prior to recess the Senate was at the Sixth Order of Business, 
Reports of Standing Committees. 
April 7, 2009 
The JUDICIARY AND RULES Committee reports that 
S lI92, S 1193, S I194, S 1195, S 1197, and S 1198 have been 
correctly printed. 
DARRlNGTON, Chairman 
S 1192, S 1193, S 1194, S 1195, S 1197, and S 1198 were 
referred to the Finance Committee. 
April 7, 2009 
The FINANCE Committee reports out S 1192, S 1193, 
S 1194, S 1195, S 1197, and S 1198 with the recommendation 
that they do pass. 
CAMERON, Chairman 
S 1192, S 1193, S 1194, S 1195, S 1197, and S 1198 were 
filed for second reading. 
April 7, 2009 
The FINANCE Committee reports out 11272,11273. H 274, 
H 277, and H 280 with the recommendation that they do pass. 
CAMERON, Chairman 
II 272, 11273, 11274, H 277, and H 280 were filed for second 
reading. 
On request by Senator Davis, granted by unanimous consent, 
the Senate advanced to the Thirteenth Order of Business. 
Third Reading of Bills 
Senators Andreason, Brackett, Cameron, Coiner, Keough, 
Lodge, McKenzie, and Stegner were recorded present at this 
order 0 f business. 
H 232, as amended in the Senate, was read the third time at 
length, section by section, and placed before the Senate for final 
consideration. Senator Hill arose as sponsor of the bill and opened 
the debate. The question being, "Shall the bill pass?" 
Roll call resulted as follows: 
AYES-Andreason, Bair, Bilyeu, Bock, Brackett, 
Broadsword, Cameron, Coiner, Corder, Darrington. Davis, 
Fulcher, Geddes, Goedde, Hammond, Heinrich, Hill, Jorgenson, 
Kelly, Keough, LeFavour, Lodge, McGee, McKenzie, Mortimer, 
Pearce, Sagness (Malepeai), Schroeder, Siddoway, Smyser, 
Stegner, Thorson (Stennett), Werk, Winder. Total - 34. 
NAYS-None. 
Absent and excused-McKague. Total - 1. 
Total - 35. 
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COME NOW Plaintiffs, Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc ("IWGA"), Frank Shirts, 
Jr, and Ronald W. Shirts and Leslie Shilis, husband and wife, and John T. Shirts d/b/a Shirts 
Brothers Sheep, by and through their attomeys of record, Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Tumbow & 
McKlveen, Chartered, and submit this Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss and Request for Attomey's Fees. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
IWGA is a non-profit association consisting of most of the remaining wool 
growers/sheep ranchers left in the State of Idaho. Those few include the other Plaintiffs, the 
Shirts, who have grazed sheep in the Payette National Forest for more than three decades. In late 
1996, IWGA and the Shirts became aware that various federal agencies, other state agencies and 
the Idaho Department of Fish & Game ("IDFG") wished to reintroduce bighom sheep to the 
Hells Canyon area. Presciently aware that the proposed reintroduction might have deleterious 
effects on wool growers, as had occurred in Oregon, IWGA and the Shirts prepared to oppose 
this plan in the Idaho Legislature, as the State of Idaho owns all wildlife in the state and can 
control such wildlife. Idaho Code Section 36-103. 
Recognizing the fonnidable political power possessed by IWGA and recognizing the 
significant economic benefits from hunting and tourism which reintroduction of bighom sheep 
would give the State, IDFG and the other states executed a Letter Agreement on January 16, 
1997. That Letter Agreement memorialized the "deal" IDFG had reached with the Wool 
Growers: the Wool Growers would drop their objections to the reintroduction of the bighom 
sheep and in retum IDFG promised that it would protect the Wool Growers from economic hann 
arising from the reintroduction. The legislature of the State of Idaho gave its stamp of approval 
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to this agreement two months later through enactment of Idaho Code § 36-106( e )(5)(D). The 
Wool Growers complied with this agreement and withdrew their objections to the reintroduction 
of the bighoms and cooperated with IDFG. For several years IDFG lived up to its obligations 
under the Letter Agreement as well but now that the United States Forest Service has taken steps 
which have resulted in the economic harm which the Wool Growers feared and which the Letter 
Agreement agreed to protect them against, IDFG is apparently taking the position that it does not 
have to comply with contractual obligations since its written promises are worth less than the 
paper on which they were written. IDFG's arguments are wrong as a matter of law and a matter 
of equity. This Court should protect the citizens of this state, protect the sanctity of contracts and 
require the State of Idaho acting in its commercial and proprietary capacity to comply with its 
contractual obligations. 
II. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In the letter dated January 16, 1997 but not fully executed until March 4, 1997, the Hells 
Canyon Bighorn Sheep Restoration Committee, consisting of the U.S. Forest Service and Bureau 
of Land Management, the Idaho, Oregon and Washington Fish & Game Departments and the 
Foundation for North American Sheep, specified that it was "interested in having the support of 
the woolgrowers industry for this effort to repopulate parts of Hells Canyon with bighom sheep." 
To obtain this support, the Committee and its members made certain promises. More 
specifically, the three state departments pledged to assume responsibility for bighorn losses in 
their state and pledged to "take whatever action is necessary to reduce further losses of bighorn 
sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep operators." Letter of January 16, 
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1997, attached as Exhibit A to Complaint. The Idaho Legislature gave its imprimatur to the 
Agreement through enactment of the March 24, 1997 revision to Idaho Code Section 36-106(e). 
While the United States Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management had been 
signatories to the Letter Agreement, they, unlike IDFG, had not agreed to assume the 
responsibility to take whatever action was necessary to reduce further loss of bighorn sheep 
without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep operators. The Forest Service, beginning in 
2007, began to modify the Shirts' grazing allotments. The Shirts suffered severe economic harm 
from these modifications of grazing permits designed to introduce losses of bighorn sheep based 
on alleged scientific information. The 'Wool Growers asked IDFG to comply with its contractual 
obligations but IDFG took no action to remedy the economic harm suffered by the Shirts. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs filed with this lawsuit. 
Defendants then filed a Motion to Dismiss based on their mistaken impression that the 
Complaint sought damages solely because IDFG failed to block the Forest Service from 
modifying the Shirts' grazing permits. IDFG's entire Motion to Dismiss rested on this mistaken 
assumption; it argued that the State had no authority to stop the Forest Service from modifying 
the permits. The Plaintiffs responded, pointing to the Complaint which alleged breach of 
contract and other causes of action arising from IDFG's failure not to block the Forest Service 
but rather its failure to protect the Shirts from economic harm arising from the reintroduction of 
the bighorn sheep/modification of the grazing permits. In reply, Defendants did not attempt to 
defend their original Motion to Dismiss but instead came up with an entirely new argument. The 
parties agreed, subject to the Court's approval, that Plaintiffs could respond to these new 
arguments by Defendants. 
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LEGAL ARGUMENT 
Rule 8(a)(1) requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief." The Complaint need only contain a concise statement of the facts constituting 
the cause of action and a demand for relief. Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802,221 P.3d 
1164 (2010). The Idaho Supreme Court noted that "under notice pleading, a party is no longer 
slavishly bound to stating particular theories in its pleading." !d. at 807, 229 P.3d at 1169 
(quoting Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. North Pacific Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241, 246, 178 P.3d 606, 
611 (2008». The complaint must merely state claims upon which relief may be granted, and 
pleadings should be liberally construed in the interest of securing "a just, speedy and inexpensive 
resolution of the case." Id. "The technical rules of pleading have long been abandoned in Idaho, 
and the 'general policy behind the current rules of civil procedure is to provide every litigant 
with his or her day in court.' Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 325,715 P.2d 993,995 (1986)." Id. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint satisfies these requirements. It sets out the background of this dispute and 
the claim that the Letter Agreement is valid and was breached. It alleges that the Shirts have 
suffered economic damages and are entitled to relief. Plaintiffs need do no more. 
It is important to remember that this is a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 
12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Apparently the claims 
under 12(b)(1) and 12(b )(7), lack of subject manner jurisdiction and failure to join an 
indispensable party, have been waived by the Defendants in their most recent brief. 
Accordingly, this motion must be considered under the standard for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. The Idaho Supreme Court recently stated the standard under Rule 
12(b)(6): 
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After reviewing all facts and inferences from the record in favor of 
the non-moving party, the court will ask whether a claim for relicf 
has been stated. The issue is not whether the plaintiff will 
ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer 
evidence to support the claims. 
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670,672-73, 183 P.3d 758, 760-61 (2008). 
Questions of fact or questions of credibility are not to be decided at this time. The Court 
must look no further than the pleadings. It must conclude that it is beyond doubt that the 
Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim which would entitle them to relief 
before granting such motion. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960,895 P.2d 561 (1995). 
This is not the situation in the present case and the Court accordingly must deny Defendants' 
motion. 
A. Idaho Code §§ 59-1015 or 59-1016 Do Not Prohibit This Claim. 
Idaho Code § 59-1015 prohibits state employees or boards from entering into contracts or 
agreements creating expense or incurring any liability in excess of the appropriation made by 
law. Section 59-1 ° 16 says that any "indebtedness" attempted to be created in violation of the 
provisions of this Chapter are void. Defendants suggest that both of these statutes implement the 
provisions of Idaho Constitution, Article 7, § 13 which prohibits the withdrawal of money from 
the State Treasury except in pursuance of appropriations made by law. 
First of all, in this early stage of litigation and on a motion to dismiss, there is no proof 
that the Idaho Legislature in its appropriations to the Department of Fish & Game in 1996 and 
1997 did not provide monies to the Department to aid in bighorn sheep restoration. The 
appropriation power and these statutes apply only to money in the State Treasury. Article VII § 
13. For example, special custodial funds held in trust by the State are not subject to 
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appropriation. State v. Musgrove, 84 Idaho 77, 84-87, 370 P.2d 778 (1962). Moneys received 
by the agency from a federal source may not be subject to appropriation. 1982 Idaho Attorney 
General Opinion 97,1912 WL156267 (Idaho A.G.). Idaho Code § 36-108 provides for a Fish 
and Game Expendable Account which may be used by IDFG in the public interest and in 
accordance with the policies set forth in the Fish & Game Code. See also § 36-111 (Set Aside 
Account), § 36-112 (Animal Damage Control Fund), and § 36-115 (Big Game Depredation 
Fund), as well as § 36-110 (Federal Account). 
Next, it could be that there was no expectation that an appropriation be made in 1997 
because in 1997 there was no way to know whether or not the introduction of the bighorn sheep 
would cause economic damages to the Shirts or the extent of those damages. The 1996-1997 
Legislature need not have appropriated money at that time. l Nor did the Letter Agreement 
necessarily obligate IDFG to withdraw money from the State Treasury as there are other options 
to protect the Shirts from economic harnl other than merely a monetary payout. IDFG could 
have raised money through licensing, etc., sufficient to fund the amounts needed to protect the 
Wool Growers without taking funds from the State Treasury or IDFG could provide alternative 
grazing on State land. 
If the statutes apply to invalidate the contractual obligations contained in the Letter 
Agreement, as contended by Defendants, then those statutes as applied violate the United States 
and Idaho Constitutions. Amendment 14 of the U.S. Constitution proscribes deprivation of 
property rights without due process. Article 1, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution denies states the 
power to impair contracts. The Idaho Constitution forbids the deprivation of property rights 
1 Moreover, § 59-1015 has an exception for cases of epidemic. As IDFG and the Forest Selvice claim that domestic 
sheep cause an epidemic among bighorn sheep (through some mechanism not yet identified), then perhaps this 
exception comes into play to take the matter out of the scope of the statute. 
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without due process oflaw, Article I, § 13, and in Article I, § 16 provides that no law "impairing 
the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed." 
Furthennore, the case law interpreting Idaho Constitution Article VII, § 13 notes that no 
set fornl of words is necessary to make appropriation by the Legislature and if an appropriation is 
made payable from a specific fund (e.g., the IDFG budget), it is not necessary to appropriate a 
specific sum. Herrick v. Gallet, 35 Idaho 13,204 P. 477 (1922); State ex rei. Hansen v. Parsons, 
57 Idaho 775, 69 P.2d 788 (1937). 
Finally, Defendants failed to mention the Section following Sections 59-1015 and 1016. 
It provides that any person violating the provisions of those sections shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor and disqualified from holding state office or being employed by the state. If the 
1997 Letter Agreement violated the statute, then presumably the Attorney General's office 
should have prosecuted the person -signing the Agreement on behalf of the Idaho Department of 
Fish & Game. There is no evidence of this in the record and thus no indication of any violations 
of Sections 1015 or 1016. 
B. The Court Cannot Take Notice of Any Document Outside of the Pleadings. 
A 12(b)(6) motion looks only at the pleadings to detennine 
whether a claim for relief has been stated. 
Youngv. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104,44P.3d 1157, 1159(2002). 
In Hellickson v. Jenkins, the Idaho Court of Appeals discussed judicial notice in the 
context of a 12(b) motion to dismiss, stating: 
The only facts which a court may properly consider on a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim are those appearing in the 
complaint, supplemented by such facts as the court may properly 
judicially notice. Cohen v. United States, 129 F.2d 733 (8th 
Cir.1942). However, a trial court, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss, has no right to hear evidence; and since judicial 
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notice is merely a substitute for the conventional method of taking 
evidence to establish facts, the court has no right to take judicial 
notice of anything, with the possible exception offacts of common 
knowledge which controvert averments of the complaint. 
118 Idaho 273, 276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Ct.App. 1990) (emphasis in original). See also Fleming 
v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 922 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1990) (comparing a 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 
56 motion and finding "the one fundamental difference between the two motions lies in the scope 
of the court's consideration. The grounds for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal comprise only the 
pleadings and no more") (cited with approval by the Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor v. 
McNichols, 2010 WL 3448851 (September 3,2010)). 
C. Plaintiffs Have Stated a Claim Under Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(S). 
The last signature on the 1997 Letter Agreement was obtained on March 4, 1997. 
Twenty days later, on March 24, 1997, the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code § 36-
106(e)(5)(D) defining the policy of the State ofIdaho as recognizing existing sheep or livestock 
operations in the area of any bighorn sheep transport or relocation "and accepting the potential 
risk of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when they invade domestic livestock or 
sheep operations." What does that statute mean? Does it mean, as the Wool Growers assert, that 
the Legislature approved IDFG's promise that it would protect the Wool Growers against 
economic harm? The legislative history which will be developed during the course of the 
lawsuit will be instructive. Certainly the Wool Growers should have the opportunity to develop 
the evidence. 
Idaho Code § 36-1 06( e)( 5)(E) was recent! y enacted and goes beyond subsection D. It 
requires the Department to develop a state management plan for bighorn sheep which "considers 
as part of the plan" the current domestic sheep grazing allotments. Does the statute in 
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conjunction with the preceding subsection require IDFG to take action to protect the Wool 
Growers? Certainly it seems to and certainly Plaintiffs' allegations in their Complaint entitle 
them to assert the statutory claim. 
Defendants make an unfounded claim that Plaintiffs assert that they can avoid responding 
to the Motion to Dismiss by simply arguing that legislative intent is a factual issue that will be 
verified by testimony of the relevant witnesses. (Defendants' Reply Memorandum at 6.) While 
all that issue is in reality moot at least on this Motion to Dismiss, the Court should note that this 
is not what Plaintiffs assert at all. They assert that the statute, as enacted and as amended, 
requires IDFG to protect domestic sheep operations from economic harm caused by the 
introduction of bighorn sheep. They should have the right to attempt to prove that claim by such 
means as looking at the legislative history. They have no obligation to prove their claim on a 
motion to dismiss. Defendants are obviously afraid to allow Plaintiffs to obtain evidence on the 
intent of the Legislature regarding IDFG's statutory responsibilities, but they cannot foreclose 
Plaintiffs from doing so merely by asserting their own interpretation of the statute. 
The Department of Fish & Game is authorized to sell licenses and tags and sell 
pUblications and materials and raise money to fund programs and repay obligations. See, e.g., 
Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(8). Section 36-106(e)(5)(E) requires the Department ofFish & Game to 
develop a "self-sustaining" population of bighorn sheep in Idaho and requires the Defendant to 
consider as part of that plan the sheep grazing allotments. Self-sustaining means that the plan for 
the bighorn sheep, considering Plaintiffs' grazing allotments, must require the Department to 
consider the Plaintiffs' rights. While Plaintiffs continue their assertion that documents outside 
of the pleadings should not be considered by this Court, if the Court does consider any of the 
legislative materials submitted by Defendants, it should note that under the Statement of 
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Purpose/Fiscal Note for Senate Bill 1175 that the sponsors stated that while "there wiII be an 
expected impact to the Department of Fish & Game, however, because of the unknowns as to if 
and when any actions may be required the amount is unknown at this time." CeI1ainly this 
statement, if it could be considered, strongly suggests that the Legislature intended the 
Department to expend monies from its budget to accomplish the purposes set out in the 
legislation, including protecting the Plaintiffs from economic harm caused by bighorn sheep 
reintroduction and later modification of grazing leases. 
Plaintiffs are not asking the Court to simply craft equitable remedies for IDFG's 
violations. They are asking the Court to enforce contractual and statutory rights. In the 
alternative, they are asking the Court to require IDFG to comply with the statute; since IDFG has 
taken no action the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act do not apply. But under 
Idaho Code § 7-303, the Court may require IDFG to act if there is no "plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," if IDFG refuses to comply with its obligations 
under the Letter Agreement and the statute. Plaintiffs assert that § 36-106(e) requires IDFG to 
do more than develop "best management practices" and they should be allowed to convince the 
fact finder of this. 
D. The Cause of Action for Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Remains Viable. 
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to all contracts. Lettunich v. Key 
Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362,368, 109 P.3d 1104, 1110 (2005). 
Any action by either party which violates, nullifies or significantly 
impairs any benefit of the ... contract is a violation of the implied-
in-law covenant. 
Metcalfv. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 627, 778 P.2d 744, 749 (1989). 
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The covenant requires the parties to perfonn, in good faith, the 
obligations contained in their agreement, and a violation occurs 
when either patiy violates, qualifies, or significantly impairs any 
benefit or right of the other party under the contract - whether 
express or implied. 
Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 243, 108 PJd 380, 390 (2005). All that 
Plaintiffs are asking is that IDFG act in good faith to live up to the 1997 promises. 
In Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 399, 111 P.3d 73, 84 
(2005), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that "the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
exists in all contracts in Idaho." Plaintiffs have not been able to find a case which excludes the 
State or State entities from this sweeping holding. See also Huyett v. Idaho State University, 140 
Idaho 904, 104 P.3d 946 (2004)(applying the implied covenant to Idaho State University, a State 
institution). 
Defendants do not appear to contest that the 1997 Letter Agreement is a contract. There 
was an offer, acceptance and consideration. The Wool Growers perfonned their obligation by 
withdrawing their objections to the re-introduction of the bighorn sheep. IDFG and the State are 
now attempting to nullify the benefit of the contract by asserting they have no ability or 
obligation to protect the Wool Growers. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing obligates 
the parties to a contract to cooperate with each other and to perform the obligations imposed by 
their agreements. Huyett, 140 Idaho at 909, 104 P.3d at 951. IDFG has refused to cooperate 
with the \Vool Growers to protect them from the negative effects caused by the reintroduction of 
bighorn sheep. They are refusing to perfonn the obligations imposed by that Letter Agreement. 
Thus they have violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and this cause of 
action remains viable. 
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E. The Estoppel Claims Remain Viable. 
First of all, Plaintiffs never expressly or impliedly conceded in their original Response 
Brief that dismissal of any claims were warranted. Instead, Plaintiffs noted that the primary 
basis that Defendants had suggested for dismissal of the estoppel and breach of the covenant and 
good faith and fair dealing causes of action was the fact that IDFG had not represented that it 
would block the Forest Service from modifying the Shirts' grazing permits. As noted in that 
Response Brief, Plaintiffs asserted that their allegations in the Complaint regarding the 
agreement made by IDFG were sufficient to state a claim for relief for the causes of action listed 
in the Complaint. Plaintiffs noted that IDFG had made a promise upon which Plaintiffs had 
relied to their detriment and did not fulfill the obligations of the contract. This was sufficient to 
preclude dismissal of these causes of action. Defendants have now come back to argue that 
despite the Letter Agreement and the 1997 statutory enactment, there really was no enforceable 
agreement after all. This assertion has already been responded to earlier in this brief and 
Plaintiffs will not repeat that argument. 
The other argument suggested by Defendants in their Reply Brief was that protection of 
the Wool Growers against economic harm was not within the contemplation of the parties 
signing the Letter. By definition, this assertion defeats Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as the 
question what was in the contemplation of the parties is a question of fact to be decided by the 
fact finder upon consideration of the testimony and the evidence. A motion to dismiss is not the 
proper procedure for deciding that issue. 
The real issue is whether estoppel applies in this situation. Generally estoppel cannot be 
applied to a governmental agency acting in its sovereign capacity. State v. Adams, 90 Idaho 195, 
201, 409 P.2d 415, 419 (1965). Estoppel, however, may be applied to a governmental agency 
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acting in its proprietary or commercial capacity. See Curry v. Ada County Highway Dist., 103 
Idaho 818, 654 P.2d 911 (1982) (applying equitable estoppel to a highway district due to its 
proprietary nature); Dalton Highway Dist. of Kootenai County v. Sowder, 88 Idaho 556,401 P.2d 
813 (1965) (same). See also Sagewillow v. Idaho Dept. of Water Res., 138 Idaho 831, 70 P.3d 
669 (2003) (while noting that equitable estoppel may not ordinarily be invoked against a 
government agency functioning in a sovereign capacity, nevertheless considering the elements of 
equitable estoppel as applied to the Department of the Water Resources). Justice McQuade 
noted in Dalton Highway District that the reluctance to invoke the doctrine of estoppel against a 
public officer "is more especially true with reference to their acts and conduct in governmental 
and purely municipal affairs. It has never been held with the same strictness in reference to 
purely business and proprietary matters and transactions." 88 Idaho 556,561,401 P.2d 813, 815 
(quoting concurrence in Boise City v. Wilkinson, 16 Idaho 150, 102 P. 148 (1909». 
Plaintiffs submit that IDFG was acting in a proprietary or commercial capacity when it 
was negotiating with the Wool Growers about the reintroduction of bighorn sheep. IDFG was 
interested in bringing back bighorn sheep in the Hells Canyon area for tourism and hunting 
purposes and was willing and anxious to cut a deal with the Wool Growers to convince the Wool 
Growers to withdraw their opposition. The Wool Growers made a business decision as well, 
agreeing to withdraw their opposition in return for a guarantee they would be protected 
economically by the IDFG. If IDFG was acting in a sovereign/governmental capacity, it would 
have had no reason or necessity to cut a deal with individual commercial interests such as 
IWGA. If a State agency is acting in its sovereign capacity, it does not cut deals with those 
affected by its decisionmaking. Only when a State agency acts outside of its sovereign capacity 
must it strike deals with affected commercial interests. Thus, estoppel does apply here as IDFG 
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was acting in a business and proprietary manner. See also Kelso & Invin, PA v. State Ins. Fund, 
134 Idaho 130, 138, 997 P.2d 591, 599 (2000) ("therefore, because the SIF is undisputedly a 
public agency acting in a proprietary capacity, the doctrine of equitable estoppel would nonnally 
be applicable to the SIF"). 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit and the Idaho Court of Appeals have each suggested or held 
that estoppel may be applied against the government even in its sovereign capacity under certain 
limited circumstances. In Brandt v. State of Idaho, 126 Idaho 101,878 P.2d 800 (Ct.App. 1994), 
Judge Lansing writing for a unanimous court noted that the control of penal institutions and 
parole are functions of the state as a sovereign and a claim of estoppel would ordinarily be 
precluded. She went on, however: 
Brandt contends, however, that in some circumstances the 
government's conduct is such that estoppel does apply even when 
the government is acting as a sovereign. He refers us to Johnson v. 
Williford, 682 F.2d 868 (9th Cir.1982), where a convicted felon, 
sentenced to a tenn of ten years without possibility of parole, was 
mistakenly granted parole and lived at large for fifteen months. 
Despite his ineligibility, the prisoner in Johnson, was considered 
for parole on eight separate occasions and was eventually released 
on parole after a full hearing. When the mistake was discovered 
fifteen months later, the parole was revoked. The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the interests of justice and fair play 
required that the government be estopped from then denying the 
inmate's parole eligibility, stating: 
'[W]here justice and fair play require it' estoppel will be applied 
against the government, even when the government acts in its 
sovereign capacity if the effects of estoppel do not unduly damage 
the public interest. 
Id. at 871 citing United States v. Lazy Fe Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 
989 (9th Cir.l973). See also United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 
406 (9th Cir.1975). 
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We note that in addition to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
numerous other jurisdictions have allowed estoppel to be applied 
against the govemment in its sovereign capacity under limited 
circumstances. However, whatever merit there may be in this 
argument for application of estoppel against the govemment, we 
may not address it here, for Brandt did not present this issue to the 
magistrate. 
Plaintiffs are raising the issue here and estoppel should be applied to IDFG. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also suggested that equitable estoppel may be applied to 
prevent injustice: "This Court has held that the doctrine of estoppel may be used against a 
highway district to prevent it from taking a position inconsistent with previous actions, in order 
to prevent manifest injustice. Murtaugh Highway Dist. v. Twin Falls Highway Dis!., 65 Idaho 
260, 268, 142 P.2d 579-82 (1943)." City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Ind. Hwy. Dis!., 126 Idaho 
145, 151,879 P.2d 1078, 1084 (1994). 
Here, we have exactly that situation: IDFG is attempting to take a position inconsistent 
with its previous actions in promising the Wool Growers certain protections in return for the 
Wool Growers withdrawing their opposition to the reintroduction of the bighorns. Now that the 
bighorns are back in Idaho, IDFG wishes to conveniently forget its promises. This is the very 
definition of manifest injustice, and estoppel should be applied against the IDFG to prevent such 
manifest injustice. Accordingly, this would be an appropriate time to apply estoppel against a 
State entity. 
Equitable estoppel operates to bar the assertion of a defense. Peters v. Gilead Sciences, 
Inc., 533 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 2008). The Wool Growers have pleaded equitable estoppel to 
bar the State from asserting a defense to their duty to comply with the clear promises in the 1997 
Letter Agreement. Equitable estoppel requires a concealment or misrepresentation of fact; that 
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the party asserting estoppel not have knowledge of the true facts; and that the misrepresentation 
must be relied on to the party's detriment. Tommerup v. Albertson's, Inc., 101 Idaho 1,5,607 
P.2d 1055, 1059 (1980); Ogden v. Griffith, 2010 WL2560045 (June 28,2010). Those elements 
are met here: IDFG misrepresented facts to the Wool Growers in 1997. The Wool Growers did 
not and could not know the truth - that IDFG would asseli the Agreement was void. The Wool 
Growers relied on the misrepresentation by IDFG to their detriment as they withdrew their 
opposition to the reintroduction of the bighorns and allowed the reintroduction to occur. 
Defendants also suggest that the Wool Growers are attempting to use equitable estoppel 
as a "sword" to recover money damages rather than a "shield." Again, Defendants are mistaken 
or are trying to distract the Court from the real issue. The Wool Growers are not using equitable 
estoppel as an independent basis for a damage claim, they are asserting that Defendants should 
be equitably estopped from denying their obligations under the 1997 Letter Agreement. Just as 
in Odgen v. Griffith, where the Idaho Supreme Court found equitable estoppel was an 
appropriate ground for avoidance of the statute of frauds in a settlement agreement dealing with 
a conveyance of an interest in real estate, 2010 WL2J60045 at *6, equitable estoppel is an 
appropriate ground in this case for avoidance of any post hoc technical defenses to enforcement 
of the Letter Agreement. As in Ogden v. Griffith, IDFG's actions were intended to and did 
convey the impression to the Wool Growers that they had an agreement. It is uncontroverted 
that the Wool Growers did not know IDFG could not enter into such an agreement (allegedly), 
and IDFG concealed this fact. It is also uncontroverted that the Wool Growers reasonably relied 
on IDFG's representations to its prejudice. 
Accordingly, IDFG should be estopped from raising a defense that it need not comply 
with its contractual agreements. 
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Quasi estoppel "precludes a party from asserting to another's disadvantage, a right 
inconsistent with a position previously taken by him." Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 
Idaho 352, 357, 48 P.3d 1241, 1246 (2002). IDFG previously took the position that the Wool 
Growers could rely on IDFG's promise to protect them from economic harm arising from the 
reintroduction of bighorn sheep. IDFG now should be precluded from asserting a contrary 
position where it would be unconscionable to do so. Id. 
The doctrine of quasi estoppel requires that IDFG must have gained some advantage or 
caused a disadvantage to the Wool Growers; induced the Wool Growers to change their position 
to their detriment; and, it must be unconscionable to allow IDFG to maintain a position which is 
inconsistent from a position from which it has already derived a benefit. See, e.g., Tommerup, 
supra; Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 138 P.3d 310 (2006). To prevail on a quasi estoppel 
theory, the claimant must show: 
(1) the offending party took a different position than his or her 
original position, and 
(2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a 
disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was 
induced to change positions; or (c) it would be 
unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an 
inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a 
benefit or acquiesced in. 
Terrazas v. Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193, 200 n.3, 207 P.3d 169, 176 n.3 (2009). To prove 
quasi estoppel, it is not necessary to show detrimental reliance; instead, there must be evidence 
that it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to assert a contrary position. 
Arkoosh, supra. IDFG represented to the Wool Growers that it would protect them against 
economic harm in 1997; it is unconscionable for IDFG to take a contrary position now that the 
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Wool Growers changed their position on opposing the bighorn reintroduction and economic 
harm has occurred. 
Finally, Plaintiffs have asserted a promissory estoppel claim against the Defendants. 
In order to demonstrate promissory estoppel, three elements must be met "(1) the detriment 
suffered in reliance was substantial in an economic sense; (2) substantial loss to the promisee 
acting in reliance was or should have been foreseeable by the promisor; and (3) the promisee 
must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise as made." Gillespie v. 
Mountain Park Estates, LLC, 138 Idaho 27, 29,56 P.3d 1277, 1279 (2002). 
In the Gillespie case, the Court upheld a claim for promissory estoppel where the 
Complaint contained allegations that (1) sellers had induced the Gillespies to sign a contract by 
promising to repurchase the lot without a penalty if the Gillespies decided not to build; (2) sellers 
broke this promise to repurchase; and (3) as a result, the Gillespies were forced to sell the lot at a 
$5,000 loss. Gillespie, 138 Idaho at 30, 56 P.3d at 1280. The Court held that these facts 
sufficiently alleged the three-part test for promissory estoppel. In our case, the Wool Growers 
have alleged that IDFG induced the Wool Growers to withdraw their opposition to the bighorn 
reintroduction by promising to protect the Wool Growers from economic harm; IDFG broke this 
promise; as a result the Wool Growers have suffered economic damages. 
The Wool Growers therefore have asserted that there was an underlying promise between 
IDFG and the Wool Growers. There is thus no claim that promissory estoppel serves as a 
substitute for an agreement. Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass 'n, 141 Idaho 362, 367, 109 P .3d 
1104, 1109 (2005); Grover v. Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 205 P Jd 1196 (2009). 
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F. The 'Wool Growers Are Entitled to Fees Under Idaho Code § 12-117. 
The Wool Growers contend that they are entitled to an award of fees for defending 
against the original Motion to Dismiss as that motion and memorandum were not well-grounded 
in law or fact. 
They recognize that IDFG's new arguments are more legitimate and are not sanctionable. 
Similarly, it is beyond cavil that the Wool Growers have a reasonable basis in law and fact for 
their Complaint and for their defense against Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The issues raised 
by the Wool Growers, even if the Court does not find in their favor, are certainly complicated 
and involve close questions of law. In such circumstances, the Idaho Supreme Court has refused 
to allow attorney fees under § 12-117. See, e.g., KGF Development, LLC v. City of Ketchum, 
2010 WL2927175 (July 28,2010). The Supreme Court has noted that the requirement ofIdaho 
Code § 12-117 that the party acted without a reasonable basis is similar to the requirement of 
Idaho Code § 12-121 that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably 
or without foundation. See Total Success Investments, LLC v. Ada County Highway Dist., 148 
Idaho 688, 704, 227 P.3d 942, 949 (Ct.App. 2010) (quoting Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total 
Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 372, 179 P.3d 323,335 (2008». The Wool Growers' 
suit is not frivolous or without foundation. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to deny Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. They 
request that the Court grant them attorneys' fees under I.e. § 12-117 for time spent defending 
against Defendants' original Motion to Dismiss arguments. They also request that, if the Court 
determines to grant some or all of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Court allow them leave to 
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amend their Complaint to set out in greater detail any causes of action which the Court believes 
need to be modified. 
DATED this 13 th day of September, 2010. 
Ti, KADING, TURNBOW 
, CHARTERED 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1997 the Idaho Department ofFish and Game ("IDFG"), along with several other 
public and private entities, sent a letter to the Idaho Wool Growers Association ("IWGA"). The 
letter was printed on the letterhead of the United States Forest Service ("Forest Service"). The 
signatories to the Letter recognized existing domestic sheep operations in or adjacent to Hells 
Canyon and accepted the potential risk of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep. In 
addition, the Letter states IDFG and the other state wildlife agencies will "take whatever action is 
necessary to reduce further losses of bighorn sheep without adversely impacting existing 
domestic sheep operators." 
For purposes of the present motion to dismiss, the State ofIdaho, Idaho Fish and Game 
Commission, IDFG, and IDFG Director Cal Groen (collectively "IDFG") have assumed the truth 
of the Plaintiffs' allegation that the Letter was an agreement. By making such assumption for 
purposes of the present motion, however, IDFG does not waive the right "to contest that the 1997 
Letter Agreement is a contract." PIs.' Supp. Resp. at 12.1 
In its original memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, IDFG demonstrated, as a 
matter oflaw, that if the Letter is an agreement then the Forest Service is an indispensable party 
to determination of the Plaintiffs' allegations that: (1) the Forest Service, by modifying certain 
grazing permits belonging to Plaintiffs, "reneged on its commitment in the Letter Agreement," 
and (2) that IDFG is legally liable for economic losses arising from such modifications because it 
"took no action to block the Forest Service from modifying the grazing allotments ... and took 
insufficient action to prevent [the Plaintiffs] from being harmed from these decisions." 
1 References to the "Plaintiffs Supplemental Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss" appear herein 
as "Pis.' Supp. Resp.," while references to "Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Request for 
Attorney Fees" appear herein as "Pis.' Resp." 
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Amended Complaint ~~ 24-25. Contrary to the assertions in Plaintiffs' supplemental response, 
IDFG has not waived its argument that the Forest Service is an indispensable party. On its face, 
the Complaint claims that the Letter is a contract and that Plaintiffs' alleged harm was caused by 
the Forest Service's breach of the contract. Given those allegations, IDFG maintains that the 
Forest Service is an indispensable party for the resolution of Plaintiffs' claims. 
In their response brief, Plaintiffs disavowed any allegation that the "Letter Agreement" 
was intended to prohibit the Forest Service from cancelling grazing permits. Rather, Plaintiffs 
asserted that the 1997 Letter was an indemnification agreement obligating IDFG to reimburse the 
Plaintiffs for economic harm arising from the Forest Service's modification of the grazing 
permits, even though such modification was not itself a breach of the 1997 Letter. IDFG replied 
that such allegations must be dismissed as a matter of law, since such an agreement would 
violate Idaho constitutional and statutory provisions prohibiting the state from assuming 
unfunded liabilities. 
Plaintiffs now assert that IDFG's reply brief raised "an entirely new argument" and 
Plaintiffs have filed a supplemental response. IDFG does not agree that supplemental briefing is 
necessary, especially since Plaintiffs' supplemental brief is not confined to the allegedly-new 
issues raised in IDFG's reply. Nonetheless, IDFG is compelled to reply to the Plaintiffs' 
supplemental brief. 
For purposes of this brief, IDFG continues to assume, for purposes of argument only, that 
the 1997 Letter is an enforceable agreement, and demonstrates that, even with such assumption 
in place, all claims based on the 1997 Letter must be dismissed. Given such assumptions, it is 
unnecessary to reply in detail to Plaintiffs' estoppel theories: for the reasons explained in IDFG's 
opening brief, all claims based on equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, promissory estoppel, and 
ISS-
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breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be dismissed for the same 
reasons that claims based on the 1997 "Letter Agreement" must be dismissed. For the reasons 
stated herein, claims asserting that Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5) requires IDFG to reimburse 
Plaintiffs for economic losses must also be dismissed. 
Given the briefing that has already occurred, IDFG will reply as succinctly as possible, 
and herein adopts by reference its earlier briefing to clarify that IDFG does not waive any of its 
earlier-asserted bases for dismissal. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Plaintiffs have failed to identify any contractual provision obligating IDFG to 
compensate Plaintiffs for economic losses arising from the independent actions of 
the Forest Service. 
Plaintiffs make the extraordinary claim that the State ofIdaho, by signing the 1997 
Letter, "agreed to indemnify Plaintiffs for any modifications the Forest Service made to 
Plaintiffs' allotments," PIs. Resp. at 9, despite the fact that the Forest Service's action was not 
prohibited by the terms of the Letter,2 and despite Plaintiffs' concession that the grazing leases 
were neither contracts nor property rights, but only grazing privileges revocable at the discretion 
of the Forest Service. Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d 712, 719 (9th Cir. 1983) (grazing permit may 
be withdrawn at any time without payment of compensation).3 
Given the extraordinary nature ofthe Plaintiffs' claims, they were obligated to identify 
"language imposing indemnity [that is] clear [and] unequivocal." 41 Am Jur 2d Indemnity § 7 
2 See PIs.' Resp. at 7 ("Plaintiffs are not claiming that the Forest Service breached the Agreement"). 
3 The nature of the economic damage alleged by Plaintiffs remains elusive for other reasons as well. Prior 
to the cancellation of the grazing leases, the Plaintiffs were obliged to purchase their forage from the Forest Service 
at fair market value. 36 C.F.R. § 222.50. Yet, Plaintiffs contend that upon cancellation of the grazing leases IDFG 
became contractually obligated to "provid( e] feed to the Plaintiffs in lieu of grazing allotments .... " PIs.' Resp. at 
11. Plaintiffs fail to explain why IDFG would enter into an agreement obligating IDFG to assume the cost of 
providing forage for Plaintiffs' sheep when, prior to cancellation of the grazing permits, such expense was borne by 
the Plaintiffs. 
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(2010). Yet, the Amended Complaint does not identify any unequivocal indemnification 
language in the 1997 Letter, but instead cites only the following provision: "[IDFG] will also 
take whatever action is necessary to reduce further losses of bighorn sheep without adversely 
impacting existing domestic sheep operators." Amended Complaint ~ 19. Plaintiffs allege that 
the intent of such provision was that IDFG "would take whatever action was necessary so that 
domestic sheep operations and operators would not be harmed as a result of the reintroduction of 
Bighorn Sheep in Hells Canyon." Amended Complaint ~ 20. 
Plaintiffs assert that the above allegation is sufficient because it "sets out the background 
of this dispute and the claim that the Letter Agreement is valid and was breached ... Plaintiffs 
need do no more." PIs.' Supp. Resp. at 5. While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual 
allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 
accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).4 "[T]he tenet that a court must 
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. 
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 
statements, do not suffice." Id. "[O]n a motion to dismiss, courts 'are not bound to accept as 
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. 550 
u.s. 544,555 (2007), quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,286 (1986). 
Here, Plaintiffs' assertion that the intent of the "take whatever action is necessary" 
language was to require indemnification for economic losses is a bald legal conclusion with no 
factual support. It is undisputed that the 1997 Letter does not set forth clear and unequivocal 
indemnification language, and the Amended Complaint fails to set forth any facts suggesting the 
4 The cited Supreme Court rulings were interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which is identical to 
subparagraph (2) ofIRCP 8(a)(1). In applying the IRCP, Idaho courts may refer to authorities construing identical 
federal rules for guidance. Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674, 678, 201 P.3d 647,651 (2009). 
)57 
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existence of another agreement that includes indemnification language. "A claim has facial 
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 
(emphasis added). "[W]here the well-pleadedfacts do not pennit the cOUlt to infer more than the 
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not 'show[n)'-'that the 
pleader is entitled to relief. ,,, Id. at 1950 (emphasis added). Here, the facts set forth in the 
Amended Complaint do not support the inference that IDFG agreed to indemnify the Plaintiffs 
against economic loss, particularly losses caused solely by the actions of a third party outside the 
controlofIDFG. The 1997 Letter's complete lack of indemnification language can be 
determined on a motion to dismiss, because "[ w ]hen the terms of a contract are unambiguous, 
interpretation of the contract and its legal effect are questions oflaw." Iron Eagle Development, 
LLC v: Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 491, 65 PJd 509, 513 (2003). 
2. Assuming for purposes of argument only that the 1997 Letter was an 
indemnification contract, it would be void as a matteroflaw. 
Even if the Court were to conclude that the "whatever action" language applied to 
domestic sheep operators, and that such language was intended to obligate IDFG to indemnify 
the Plaintiffs' against financial loss, the Court must still dismiss the Amended Complaint 
because under Idaho law any contract signed by a state officer that imposes a financial liability in 
"excess of the appropriation made by law for the specific purpose or purposes for which such 
expenditure is to be made" must be declared void. Idaho Code § 59-1015. An "appropriation" 
requires "authority from the legislature expressly given in legal form, to the proper officers, to 
pay from the public moneys a specified sum, and no more, for a specified purpose, and no 
other." Herrick v. Gallet, 35 Idaho 13, 17,204 P. 477, 478 (1922), quoting Epperson v. Howell, 
28 Idaho 338, 343, 154 P. 621, 623 (1916). 
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Plaintiffs do not deny that agreements by state officers purporting to create financial 
liability without an accompanying appropriation are void pursuant to Idaho Constitution Article 
VII, § 13 and Idaho Code §§ 59-1015 and 59-1016.5 Instead, Plaintiffs seek to create a factual 
issue by asserting (1) "there is no proof that the Idaho Legislature in its appropriations to [IDFG] 
in 1996 and 1997 did not provide monies to the Department to aid in bighorn sheep restoration," 
and (2) that IDFG may possess "special custodial funds" that are not subject to appropriation. 
PIs.' Supp. Resp. at 6-7. Both issues raised by Plaintiffs are easily resolvable as a matter oflaw 
without further factual inquiry.6 
With few exceptions, money is appropriated by the Legislature only for the immediately 
following fiscal year. The IDFG appropriation bill for 1996 appropriated specified amounts to 
IDFG "to be expended for the designated programs ... from the listed funds for the period July 
1, 1996, through June 30, 1997." 1996 Idaho Sess. L. 473. Likewise, the 1997 appropriation bill 
provided that all appropriated funds were to be expended "from the listed funds for the period 
July 1, 1997, through June 30, 1998." 1997 Idaho Sess. L. 868. Thus, as a matter oflaw, any 
money appropriated in 1996 and 1997 had be expended in the corresponding fiscal years, and 
would not be available to pay the current contractual liabilities alleged by Plaintiffs. 
As for the various funds available to IDFG, all are subject to annual appropriation; IDFG 
does not possess any custodial funds exempt from appropriation. Money from sale of licenses 
5 Plaintiffs allege that the Attorney General's failure to prosecute the officer signing the 1997 Letter 
suggests that the Attorney General recognizes the Letter as a valid agreement. Quite the contrary: the lack of 
prosecution simply means: (1) the Attorney General does not consider the Letter to be a contract, and (2) nothing in 
the Letter indicates an intent to assume liability for financial losses by sheep operators. 
6 Plaintiffs also assert that the "Legislature need not have appropriated money" in 1997 because "in 1997 
there was no way to know whether or not the introduction ofthe bighorn sheep would cause economic damages to 
the Shirts or the extent of those damages." Pis. SUpp. Resp. at 7. This assertion is directly contrary to the Supreme 
Court's holding that the language in Idaho Code § 59-10 15 requiring liabilities to be covered by an "existing" 
appropriation must "apply to the time of incurring the expense of liability rather than to the time the particular bill or 
claim is presented for payment." State ex reI. Hansen v. Parsons, 57 Idaho 775, 790, 69 P.2d 788, 794 (1937), 
partially overruled on other grounds, State ex reI. Williams v. Margrave, 84 Idaho 77,87,370 P.2d 778, 784 (1962). 
\ 5,\ 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PAGE 7 
and permits is deposited in the fish and game account, which is "appropriated in the state 
treasury," Idaho Code § 36-107, making it subject to Idaho Constitution Article VII, § 13 ("[ n]o 
money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations made by law"). The 
same is true for all other accounts in the state treasury held for the benefit of fish and game. See 
Idaho Code § 36-108 (money in fish and game expendable trust account "may be appropriated to 
carry out the terms or conditions of such donation, bequest, devise, or grant"); § 36-109 
(principal from donations, bequests, devises and grants in fish and game nonexpendable" trust 
account "are not subject to appropriation" but "[i]nterest earned on investment of moneys in the 
account are subject to appropriation"); § 36-110 ("[m]oneys in the fish and game federal account 
are subject to appropriation"); § 36-111. ("[m]oneys in the fish and game set-aside account and 
the feeding account ... are subject to appropriation"); § 36-112 (moneys in the "animal damage 
control fund ... are subj ect to appropriation"); § 36-115 ("principal amount in the 
[nonexpendable big game depredation] fund shall not be appropriated, but only the interest 
earned on investment of the moneys in the fund shall be available for appropriation"). 
In sum, at the time IDFG signed the 1997 Letter, there was no corresponding 
appropriation of funds to pay the future and inchoate liabilities allegedly assumed by IDFG. 
Even if Plaintiffs were successful in proving that the 1997 Letter was intended to function as an 
indemnification agreement, the Court could not enforce such agreement since it would be void 
under the terms ofIdaho Constitution Article VII, § 13 and Idaho Code §§ 59-1015 and 59-1016. 
Thus, there is no set of facts under which Plaintiffs may prevail, and dismissal of all claims 
based on the 1997 Letter is warranted. 
Such a result does not, as Plaintiffs assert, violate due process or constitutional provisions 
prohibiting impairment of contractual obligations. PIs.' Supp. Resp. at 7-8 (citing u.s. Const. 
\~o 
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art. I, § 10 and Idaho Const. art. I, §§ l3, 16). Plaintiffs cite no authorities in support of this 
proposition, and for good reason: constitutional prohibitions against impairment of contracts 
protect only those contractual obligations already in existence atthe time the disputed law is 
enacted. Lindstrom v. Dist. Bd. of Health, 109 Idaho 956, 961,712 P2d 657, 662 (Ct. App. 
1985). Here, the provisions ofIdaho Constitution Article VII, § 13 and Idaho Code §§ 59-1015 
and 59-1016 predate the 1997 Letter Agreement by decades and must be enforced by this Court. 
3. Plaintiffs have failed to identify any statutory provision obligating IDFG to 
compensate Plaintiffs for economic losses arising from the independent actions of 
the Forest Service. 
Plaintiffs have failed to identify any Idaho Code provision requiring IDFG to indemnify 
Plaintiffs against economic harm arising from the Forest Service's cancellation of grazing 
permits. Plaintiffs assert that "[ t ]hey have no ob ligation to prove their [ statutory] claim on a 
motion to dismiss" because they are entitled "to obtain evidence on the intent of the Legislature" . 
and "should be allowed to convince the fact finder" of the intent behind § 36-106(e)(5). PIs.' 
Supp. Resp. at 10, 11. 
Legislative intent is not a question of fact for the jury: the "interpretation and application 
of a statute ... are pure questions oflaw." Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841, 847, 216 P.3d 130, 
136 (2009). Pure questions oflaw are properly raised in a motion to dismiss, since further 
factual development is irrelevant to determination of the issue. Statutory interpretation "begins 
with the literal words of a statute, which are the best guide to determining legislative intent." 
KGF Development, LLC v. City of Ketchum, 236 P.3d 1284,1288 (Idaho 2010). Here, 
Plaintiffs have failed to identify any statutory provision explicitly obligating IDFG to indemnify 
the Plaintiffs against economic losses. Instead, they allege that the 1997 Letter embodies such 
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intent, and that the legislature "gave its stamp of approval" to the 1997 Letter "through 
enactment ofIdaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D). PIs.' Supp. Resp. at 2-3. 
Nothing in the plain language ofIdaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) suggests that the 
Legislature understood the 1997 Letter to be an agreement indemnifying domestic sheep 
operators for economic losses arising from reintroduction of bighorn sheep. First, the original 
version of § 36-106(e)(5)(D), as adopted in 1997, provided that agencies desiring to transplant 
bighorns must provide a "written letter" recognizing existing domestic sheep operators and 
stating that "the potential risk if any, of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when the 
same invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted." 1997 Idaho Sess. L. 863,865. 
If the legislature had intended to require IDFG to reimburse domestic sheep operators for 
financial losses, it would have done more then require the sending of a "letter." 
Second, § 36-1 06( e)( 5)(D), as adopted in 1997, did not ratify the "whatever action" 
language that Plaintiffs allege is the source of the obligation to reimburse Plaintiffs for financial 
losses. Rather, it only required that the letter recognize existing sheep operations and accept the 
risk of disease transmission to transplanted bighorn sheep. Id. Plaintiffs have not alleged that 
the acceptance of risk language in the 1997 Letter created an obligation to reimburse Plaintiffs 
for financial loss - indeed, any such allegation would be inconsistent with the Plaintiffs' 
assertion that the Forest Service did not breach the 1997 Letter, since the "acceptance of risk" 
language applied to all signatories. Any allegation by Plaintiffs that the Legislature's ratification 
of the acceptance of risk language "approved IDFG's promise that it would protect the Wool 
Growers against economic hann," PIs.' Supp. Resp. at 9, cannot be reconciled with its allegation 
that the Forest Service's modification of the grazing pennits was not a breach of this same 
proVISIon. 
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Third, if the 1997 Letter was an agreement to indemnify Plaintiffs, then such agreement 
was void under the terms ofIdaho Code §§ 56-1015 and 56-1016 (see supra and IDFG reply 
brief), and the legislative ratification would be ineffective, for Idaho Constitution Article III, 
§ 19, prohibits any "local or special laws ... [IJegalizing as against the state the unauthorized act 
or invalid act of any officer." See State ex reI. Hansen, 57 Idaho at 788,69 P.2d at 793 (if claim 
is incurred in violation of56-1015 or Article VII, § 3 ofthe Constitution, "any subsequent 
attempt of the Legislature to pay [the claim] was unconstitutional';). 
Fourth, the Statement of Purpose/Fiscal Note for § 36-106(e)(5)(D), as adopted in 1997, 
states there would be "[n]o fiscal impact." The statement of no fiscal impact cannot be 
reconciled with Plaintiffs' assertions that the Legislature understood itself to be ratifying an 
indemnification agreement. 7 
Likewise, the fiscal note accompanying Senate Bill 1232, the 2009 amendment of § 36-
106(e)(5), indicated that there would be "[n]o fiscal impact." Defs.' Reply Mem., Ex. 1. As 
Plaintiffs note, the fiscal note for Senate Bill 1175, which proposed that domestic sheep "shall be 
held harmless form adverse impacts by the state of Idaho," did indicate unknown fiscal impacts 
to IDFG. Defs.' Reply Mem., Ex. 3.8 The "hold harmless" language, however, was later 
removed from Senate Bill 1175 by amendment on the Senate floor, Defs.' Reply Mem., Ex. 4, 
and the entire bill was ultimately vetoed. Defs.' Reply Mem., Ex. 3. Given that history, 
Plaintiffs are plainly wrong when they assert that the legislative history of Senate Bill 1175 
"strongly suggests the Legislature intended the Department to expend monies from its budget to 
7 A copy of the Statement of Purpose and Fiscal Note for House Bill 337 (1997) is attached to this 
memorandum as Exhibit. 1. Plaintiffs previously cited the Court to this Statement of Purpose for the purpose of 
demonstrating that "the contact listed for the bill was Stan Boyd of the Idaho Wool Growers Association.," Pis.' 
Resp. at 13, but failed to provide a copy to the Court. 
8 References herein to Exhibit 3 are to the Corrected Exhibit 3 that was filed with the Notice of Errata on 
August 30,2010. 
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· .. protect[] the Plaintiffs from economic harm." PIs.' Supp. Resp. at 11. Rather, the legislative 
history of Senate Bills 1175 and 1232 confirm that the Legislature avoided imposing any 
obligation upon IDFG to indemnify Plaintiffs. 
4. In interpreting legislative intent in the context of a motion to dismiss, the Court may 
take judicial notice of legislative history. 
Plaintiffs assert that in considering legislative intent, it would be error for the Court to 
consider the copies ofthe relevant legislative history provided by IDFG. While the Idaho 
Supreme Court recently confirmed that a court may not take judicial notice of adjudicative facts 
from an underlying case in considering a motion to dismiss, Taylor v. McNichols, 2010 WL 
3448851, at *4 (Idaho 2010), the Court has employed legislative history in considering motions 
to dismiss. 
For example, in Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989), the 
Court considered an order of the district court dismissing the case for failure to state a claim 
pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(6). In interpreting the contested statute, the concurring opinion made a 
"careful reading of the legislative history," id. at 650, 778 P.2d at 772 (Bistline, J., concurring). 
Likewise, in Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 148 Idaho 427, 224 P.3d 494 (2009), the 
trial court had denied a motion to dismiss based on its reading of the legislative history of the 
statute establishing the statute of limitations. Id. at 429-30, 224 P.3d at 496-97. On appeal, the 
Supreme Court, while reversing the district court, confirmed that in deciding a motion to dismiss 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that can be determined, in part, by reference to "its 
legislative history." Id. at 430,224 P.3d at 497. 
Federal courts, applying rules of evidence and procedure similar to Idaho, also hold that it 
is proper to refer to legislative history in deciding a motion to dismiss. In one particularly apt 
quote, the federal court of claims held: 
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Contrary to plaintiffs claim, it is well-established that a court need not accept as 
true allegations contained in a complaint that are contradicted by matters on 
which the court may take judicial notice, such as legislative facts embodied in 
legislative history. See SA Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 1363, at 464-65 (2d ed.1990) (citing cases). Plaintiff 
also is flatly wrong in arguing that judicial notice of such legislative facts is 
precluded by Federal Rule of Evidence 201, which instead deals only with 
adjudicative facts. 
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. U.S., 46 Fed. Cl. 158, 160 n.3 (Fed. Cl. 2000). Here, as in 
Commonwealth Edison, Plaintiffs allege that the Court must accept as true their allegations of 
legislative intent, despite the fact that the legislative history of Idaho Code § 36-1 06( e )(5), 
including its amendment in 2009 and the concurrent rejection ofa proposed "hold harmless" 
provision, clearly demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to indemnify domestic sheep 
operators against economic harm arising from the transplant of bighorn sheep. Plaintiffs' failure 
to refute the clear intent demonstrated by the legislative history compels the dismissal of any 
claims based on Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5). 
5. The claims based on equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, promissory estoppel, and 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be dismissed. 
In its opening brief, IDFG provided points and authorities compelling the conclusion that 
Plaintiffs' claims based on the doctrines of equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, promissory 
estoppel, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be dismissed for 
the same reasons compelling dismissal of the claims based on the 1997 Letter. Such arguments 
need not be repeated here, other than to state that if the Court concludes that claims based on the 
1997 Letter must be dismissed despite the assumption that it is an enforceable agreement, then 
the claims based on the various theories of estoppel must also fail. 
One point may need clarification, however, and that is the assertion that equitable 
estoppel can be applied against the state because, in Plaintiffs' view, IDFG, in managing bighorn 
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sheep, is acting in a proprietary capacity, not a sovereign capacity. It has long been the law in 
Idaho that the "state's control over fish and game within its limits ... is within the police power 
of the Legislature" and that the "'wild game and fish within a state belong to the people in their 
collective sovereign capacity.'" Sherwood v. Stephens, 13 Idaho 399,403,90 P. 345, 346 
(1907), quoting Ex parte Maier, 37 P. 402 (Ca. 1894). See also Walbridge v. Robinson, 22 Idaho 
236,243, 125 P. 812, 814 (1912) ("wild animals [are] subject to the regulation and control ofthe 
state in its sovereign capacity"). 
In short, IDFG gained no proprietary or commercial advantage from the reintroduction of 
bighorn sheep, but rather was carrying out its sovereign responsibility to manage wildlife in trust 
for the people of Idaho, so any suggestion that the 1997 Letter was a commercial arrangement 
with Plaintiffs is unfounded. The Letter was simply an expression ofIDFG's intent to carry out 
its sovereign responsibilities to protect and foster wildlife while avoiding adverse impacts on 
domestic sheep operators. IDFG has carried out the terms ofthe letter and has fulfilled its 
statutory duties toward Plaintiffs by recognizing the rights of domestic sheep operators to 
continue grazing sheep in or near Hells Canyon despite the risk of disease transmission to 
bighorn sheep. All harm alleged by Plaintiffs results solely from the independent action of the 
Forest Service. If Plaintiffs believe they have been harmed by the actions of the Forest Service, 
they should seek reimbursement from the federal government in the proper forum, rather than 
seek to make IDFG liable based on the thinnest of allegations. 
CONCLUSION 
IDFG respectfully submits that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed in its 
entirety, and IDFG be awarded its attorney fees and other reasonable expenses incurred in 
defending this action pursuant to the authority ofIdaho Code § 12-117. 
I ~ /p 
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DATED this ~ '3 J day of September 2010. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
CLIVE J. STRONG 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Natural Resources Division 
STEVEN W. STRACK 
Deputy Attorney General 
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Exhibit 1 
to: 
Defendants' Supplemental Reply BriefRe: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Idaho Wool Growers Association et at v. State ofIdaho, et aI., 
Case No. CV-2010-2567 
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Fiscal Note for House Bill 337 (1997) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS 
IDAHO WOOL GROWERS ) 
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, individually and on behalf ) 
of its members; FRANK SHIRTS, JR., ) 
individually and as a member of the ) 
Idaho Wool Growers Association; ) 
RONALD W. SHIRTS, LESLIE ) 
SHIRTS and JOHN T. SHIRTS, ) 
individually and dba SHIRTS ) 
BROTHERS SHEEP and as ) 
members of the Idaho Wool Growers ) 
Association, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO FISH & 
GAME COMMISSION; IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF FISH & GAME; 
CAL GROEN, Director of Idaho 
Department of Fish & Game, 
Defendants. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS AND REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Case No. CV10-2567 
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Procedural HistorY 
Before the court is the First Amended Complaint filed by the Plaintiffs Idaho Wool 
Growers Association, Inc., Frank Shirts, Jr., Ronald W. Shirts, Leslie Shirts and John Shirts 
(IWGA collectively). IWGA asserts claims of Breach of Contract, Breach of Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing, Violation of Statute (Idaho Code 36-105(e)(5)(D), Promissory Estoppel, 
Equitable Estoppel and Quasi Estoppel against the Defendants State of Idaho, Idaho Fish & 
Game Commission, Idaho Department of Fish & Game, and Cal Groen (IDFG collectively). The 
First Amended Complaint was filed on April 20, 2010. On May 19,2010, IDFG filed a Motion 
to Dismiss along with supporting memorandum. IWGA's Response was filed on August 17, 
2010 with IDFG's Reply being filed on August 30,2010. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Response 
was filed on September 14, 2010 and Defendants' Supplemental Reply was filed on September 
27,2010. 
Oral argument was held on November 9,2010. Steven Strack, Deputy Attorney General, 
appeared on behalf of ID FG and Sam Diddle appeared on behalf of IW GA. Plaintiffs Ron Shirts 
and Frank Shirts, Jr. were also present. 
Analysis 
At the heart of this case is the conflict between domestic sheep operations in the Hells 
Canyon area and the efforts to reintroduce big hom sheep into the same area. In 1997, domestic 
sheep operators were informed that efforts to reintroduce big hom sheep into Hell's Canyon 
would be initiated and in response to opposition from the domestic sheep operations, 
participating governmental entities and a private support group functioning as the Hell's Canyon 
Bighorn Sheep Restoration Committee sent a letter (herein referred to as "the letter") dated 
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January 16,2007 to the Idaho Woolgrowers Association care ofMr. Stan Boyd, its executive 
director. The court has attached a copy of the letter to this memorandum decision to facilitate 
easy review. The letter was printed on United States Department of Agriculture letterhead and 
was signed by representatives of USDA Forest Service (Willowa-Whitman NF), Idaho 
Department of Fish and Game, Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, Washington 
Department ofFish and Wildlife, United States Bureau of Land Management, and the 
Foundation for North American Wild Sheep. The Plaintiffs have throughout their pleadings and 
memoranda referred to this document as the "Letter Agreement" (First Amended Complaint, ~ 
10-18). The letter states in part, that the Departments of Fish and Game from Idaho, Oregon, and 
Washington recognize the risk of disease transmission to bighorn sheep and that the departments 
will "assume the responsibility for bighorn losses and further disease transmission," and that the 
departments "will also take whatever action is necessary to reduce further losses of bighorn 
sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep operators."l 
In their amended complaint, IWGA asserts that the intent of the Letter Agreement was to 
ensure that the Departments would not only hold the domestic sheep operators harmless from 
bighorn sheep losses but that the Departments would "take whatever action was necessary so that 
Idaho domestic sheep operations and operators would not be harmed as a result of the 
introduction of Bighorn Sheep in Hells Canyon." (First Amended Complaint, ~ 20). 
Subsequent to the issuance of the letter by the committee, the Idaho Legislature amended 
I.C. 36-106 to include subsection (e)(5)(D) that stated that domestic sheep operators impacted by 
the bighorn sheep reintroduction would be provided a written letter indicating that the existing 
I The First Amended Complaint references the Letter Agreement as Exhibit A. The Complaint as filed did not 
include a copy of the Letter Agreement, however, the parties have supplied a copy to the court and stipulated that 
the court shall considered the Letter Agreement to be an attachment to the pleading for purposes of this motion. 
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operations would be recognized and the risk of disease transmission would be accepted. I.C.36-
1 06( e )(5)(D)(2007 version).2 
IWGA further alleges that beginning in April 2007 and continuing to the present, the 
United States Forest Service has modified grazing permits impacting domestic sheep operations, 
including those of the Shirts Plaintiffs. (First Amended Complaint, ~ 24). IWGA also alleges 
that economic losses have been suffered by the Plaintiffs as a result ofIDFG's failure to take 
any action to block the modification of the grazing permits. (First Amended Complaint, ~ 25-26). 
IWGA asserts that the letter is a contract between IWGA and IDFG and such is the basis for the 
Breach of Contract and Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing claims. IWGA 
also asserts that IDFG has violated I.C. 36-106(e)(5)(D) by failing to remedy harm to the 
Plaintiff's caused by the reintroduction of bighorn sheep. Finally, IWGA alleges that IDFG 
should be estopped from repudiating the promises and commitments contained in the letter. 
For the purpose of arguing the pending motion to dismiss, the Defendants made the 
limited concession that the letter be treated as an agreement, while at the same time preserving 
the right to contest the issue of whether the letter actually constitutes an agreement if Plaintiffs' 
claims survive this motion to dismiss. This Court likewise questions whether the propounded 
letter constitutes an agreement, but based on the Defendants qualified concession and giving the 
Plaintiffs the favorable inference of their allegation that the letter along with their alleged 
forbearance constitutes an agreement, the court will treat the letter as an agreement for purposes 
of this decision. 
2 I.e. 36-106(e)(5)(D) was amended in 2009 to change the word "letter" to "agreement." 
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Motion to Dismiss 
IDFG seeks dismissal of this action pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 12(b )(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted, and 12(b)(7) for failure to join an indispensible party. 
IDFG's Motion to Dismiss on basis that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 
this matter pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(l) 
The Defendants argue for dismissal of the IWGA complaint on the basis that this court 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to IRCP 12 (b)(l). The basis of this 
claim is IDFG's assertion that the Complaint should be dismissed on the grounds that IWGA's 
claims violate the requirements ofldaho Code 67-5270 et seq. Idaho Code 67-5270 provides 
that a party contesting the actions of an agency shall be entitled to judicial review of the action. 
However, Idaho Code 67-5271 requires a party to exhaust all administrative remedies prior to 
seeking judicial review of an agency's action. A request for judicial review of any agency 
action, other than a rule or order, must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the agency 
action. Idaho Code 67-5273. 
IDFG argues that IWGA's Complaint, if it were to be construed as a petition for judicial 
review oflDFG's actions, is time-barred because the claim was not timely filed in accordance 
with Idaho Code 67-5273. To the extent that the Complaint could be construed as a petition for 
judicial review, the court cannot determine from the Complaint when the actions ofIDFG 
occurred. IDFG wants to characterize the actions at issue, as the agency's failure to stop USFS 
from modifying grazing permits which allegedly began in 2007 and continued through 20 I O. 
IWGA, on the other hand, argues that the action of IDFG at issue here is IDFG's failure to pay 
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economic damages. IWGA does not provide the court with any information as to claims made 
directly to IDFG and the subsequent denial of those claims, thus this court cannot determine if 
the claim is timely filed or not pursuant to the requirements ofI.C. 67-5271 and I.C. 67- 5273. 
While the COUli does not find the Complaint, as filed, to be a petition for judicial review, if it 
were to so consider the pleading as such, it is likely that the petition would be untimely filed and 
thus, this court would not have jurisdiction to consider the request for judicial review ofIDFG's 
actions. 
For these reasons, the court does not dismiss the Complaint on the basis the court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(l) because the court does not have the 
information necessary to determine whether the claim was timely filed, or if all administrative 
remedies have been exhausted. 
IDFG'S IRCP 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss 
The following analysis address's the IDFG's Motion the Dismiss pursuant to IRCP 12 
(b)(6). In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the district court applies the same 
standards applied to a motion for summary judgment. Lasser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 
P.3d 758 (2008). The court must view all facts and inferences from the pleadings in favor of the 
non-moving party and detemline whether a claim for relief has been stated and whether the 
plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims before the court. Id. See also 
Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 115 P.3d 756 (2005). The court may only consider those 
facts appearing in the complaint, as well as those facts that the court may properly take judicial 
notice. Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273,796 P.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1990). See also Idaho 
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Rule of Evidence 201. A court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 
Rule 12(b)( 6) only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of the claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 
835 P.2d 1346 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Failure to State a Claim For Damages - Breach of Contract Claim 
ID FG also seeks dismissal of all claims in the Complaint pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) because neither the letter nor the facts of this case give rise to a claim for 
damages. 
In the Complaint, IWGA asserts that the Plaintiffs have suffered economic loss as a result 
of IDFG's failure to fulfill certain obligations it assumed pursuant to the letter. IWGA argues 
that IDFG agreed to prevent interference with the domestic sheep operations, or in the 
alternative, to provide economic damages for losses suffered as a result of such interference. 
IWGA is pursuing an award of economic damages on the theory that it suffered financial losses 
because the IDFG failed to prevent modification of historic grazing rights afforded by the USFS 
or alternatively, mitigate IWGA's loss by other means such as providing alternative sources of 
food or grazing opportunities. 
In order to form a valid contract, there must be a meeting of the minds between the 
parties who intend to be bound by the contract. Evidence of a meeting of the minds is found in 
the offer and acceptance that indicate that there is a mutual intent as to the terms of the contract. 
Justad v. Ward, 147 Idaho 509, 512, 211 P.3d 118, 121 (2009). A contract must be complete, 
definite, and certain in all its material terms, or contain provisions which are capable in 
themselves of being reduced to certainty. Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 204 P.3d 532 
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(Ct. App. 2009). In a dispute over contract formation it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove 
a distinct and common understanding between the parties. Id. Generally, so long as some 
consideration is provided for in the contract, the court will not inquire as to the adequacy of such 
consideration supporting the agreement. Sirius LC v. Erickson, 244 PJd 224 (2010). "To 
constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for. A 
performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his 
promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise." Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 71 (1981). Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 780 215 P.3d 
494, 500 (2009). 
In determining whether there is a breach of contract, the court looks to what contractual 
duties are required by the agreement and then determines whether there has been a failure to 
perform a contractual duty. Independence Lead Mines v. Hecla Mining Co.,143 Idaho 22, 137 
PJd 409 (2006). A breach of contract is a failure, without legal excuse, to perforn1 any promise 
which forms the whole or part of a contract. Id. A material breach of contract is a breach so 
substantial and fundamental that it defeats the object of the parties in entering into the contract. 
Tentinger v. McPheters, 132 Idaho 620, 622, 977 P.2d 234, 236 (1999); Ervin Constr. Co. v. Van 
Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 699, 874 P.2d 506, 510 (1993). There is no material breach of contract 
where substantial performance has been rendered. Tentinger, supra. See also J. CALAMARI & 
1. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11-22 (2d. ed.1977). Substantial performance is 
performance which, despite deviation from the contract or some omission, provides the 
important and essential benefits of the contract to the promisee. Tentinger, supra; Gilbert v. City 
of Caldwell, 112 Idaho 386, 394, 732 P.2d 355,363 (Ct.App.1987). 
In interpreting a contract, the court must begin by examining the language of the contract 
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itself and then must determine if the language of the contract is unambiguous. Cristo Viene 
Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 308, 160 P.3d 743, 747 (2007), citing Independence 
Lead Mines Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 26,137 P.3d 409,413 (2006); Shawver v. 
Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 361, 93 P .3d 685, 692 (2004). Idaho law is clear that 
when contract language is unambiguous, the interpretation of the language is a question of law 
and the language is to be given its plain meaning. Harris v. State, ex rei Kempthorn, 147 Idaho 
401,405,210 P.3d 86,90 (2009). Only when a contract is deemed ambiguous is the court to 
look beyond the contract to the intent of the parties. Swanson v. Beco Canst. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 
63-64, 175 P.3d 748, 752-53 (2007). 
The elements of indemnity are as follows: (1) an indemnity relationship, (2) actual 
liability of an indemnitee to a third party, and (3) a reasonable settlement amount. R. W Beck and 
Associates, Inc. v. Job Line Canst., Inc., 122 Idaho 92, 831 P.2d 560 (Ct. App. 1992) .. See also 
Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 115 Idaho 281, 284, 766 P.2d 751,754 (1988). The required 
indemnity relationship may arise as a result of express or implied agreement and also by 
operation oflaw to prevent an unjust result. Mitchell v. Valerio, 124 Idaho 283, 858 P.2d 822 
(Ct. App. 1993). When interpreting express contractual indemnity clau'ses, the language 
imposing indemnity must be clear, unequivocal, and certain. 41 Am Jur 2d Indemnity §7. That 
is the intent to be bound to indemnify must be stated in "clear and unequivocal terms." Id When 
a party claims a right to indemnity, absent an express agreement, the court must engage in 
contract interpretation looking to the language of the whole agreement, as well as the 
circumstances surrounding the agreement. Id 
A court determines the parties' intent by looking at the contract as a whole, the language 
used in the document, the circumstances under which it was made, the objective and purpose of a 
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particular provision, and any construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by 
their conduct or dealings. JR. Simp/ot v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614,167 P.3d 748, 751 (2007). 
In this case, the only document before the court is the January 16, 1997 letter to the 
IWGA from the committee referred to above. The letter begins with the salutation, "Dear Mr. 
Boyd." The following statements are contained within the body of the letter: 
• The Hells Canyon Bighorn Sheep Restoration Committee (the committee) is interested in 
having the support of the woolgrowers industry for this effort to repopulate parts of Hells 
Canyon with bighorn sheep. 
• [T]he Idaho Department ofFish and Game, the Oregon Department ofFish and Wildlife, 
and the Washington Department of Wildlife will assume the responsibility for bighorn 
losses and further disease transmission in their respective states. 
• The three Departments will also take whatever action is necessary to reduce further losses 
of bighorn sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep operators. 
• [T]he committee recognizes the existing domestic sheep operations in or adjacent to the 
Hells Canyon complex ... and accepts the potential risk of disease transmission and loss of 
bighorn sheep when bighorns invade domestic sheep operations. 
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.. The Committee will make every effort to keep interested parties informed about actions 
being considered by the Committee in its effort to repopulate Hells Canyon with bighorn 
sheep. 
As indicated above, the letter is signed by a representative from the USFS, IDFG, Oregon 
Department ofFish and Wildlife, Washington Department ofFish and Wildlife, Bureau of Land 
Management, and the Foundation for N. American Wild Sheep. The letter is not signed or 
acknowledged by any representative ofIWGA. 
Assuming the letter constitutes an agreement, the plain language of the letter is that the three 
fish and game departments will accept the risk of disease transmission between the domestic 
sheep and the bighorn sheep. The focus of the language is the acceptance of injury, loss or 
impact on the bighorn sheep. The language is couched in the fonn of a waiver or release to the 
effect that if the bighorn sheep become sick or die as a result of contracting diseases from 
encounters with domestic sheep, the departments will not attempt to hold any members of the 
IWGA responsible. The language also indicates the named departments will undertake actions to 
reduce further losses ofthe bighorn sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep 
operators. This language suggests that any of the actions taken by the department to reduce 
bighorn losses will be taken in such manner to minimize any adverse impact on the domestic 
sheep operators. 
The incorporated phrases that exemplify this interpretation are "will assume the 
responsibility for bighorn losses and further disease transmission in their respective states" and 
"accepts the potential risk of disease transmission and loss of big hom sheep when bighorns 
invade domestic sheep operations". The letter acknowledges that the bighorn are "at risk" to 
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become diseased from encounters with domestic sheep and that exposed bighorns may leave an 
area and spread disease to other bighorns. The letter also acknowledges the committee's 
understanding that domestic sheep operations are present in the Hell's Canyon Complex and 
"accepts the potential risk of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when bighorns 
invade domestic sheep operations." 
The language contained in the letter that is identified as being the basis for the Plaintiffs' 
articulated position is: "The three Departments will also take whatever action is necessary to 
reduce further losses of bighorn sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep 
operators." There is no dispute that this is a commitment by the three fish and game 
departments only. There is no factual allegation that the Idaho Department ofFish and Game 
caused the U. S. Forest Service to reduce the federal grazing allotments or could control the 
USFS decision to modify the grazing permits in any manner. There is no factual allegation that 
the Idaho Department of Fish and Game did not attempt to reduce losses of bighorn sheep 
without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep operators. In fact, other than specifying 
that it has been impacted by the USFS modification of the grazing allotments, the Plaintiff's 
acknowledge that IDFG has fulfilled its commitments to the IWGA. The Plaintiff's allegations 
based on this language are: 1. IDFG failed to prevent the USFS from modifying the existing 
grazing allotments; 2. IDFG failed to mitigate the impact on IWGA by performing some 
affirmative act such as making other state land under its control available for domestic sheep 
grazing or perhaps terminating or removing the bighorn herds; 3. IDFG should pay money 
damages to the Plaintiffs for their losses because the USFS modified their grazing permits. 
In its arguments, IWGA has acknowledged that IDFG could not prevent USFS from 
modifying the grazing permits. That is the crux of their argument that the USFS is not an 
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indispensible party to this action. IWGA also concedes that they are not pursuing an action for 
specific performance of some alternative means of mitigating the alleged damage caused to 
IWGA by the USFS actions. IWGA simply seeks an award of money damages for their 
economic loss. The claim is essentially an action for monetary indemnification from the IDFG 
for the act of the USFS reducing the Plaintiffs grazing allotment. 
Considering the cited relevant language from the letter standing alone or within the context 
of the whole document the plain meaning of the sentence does not suggest that the IDFG ever 
agreed to be responsible for the acts of the USFS or any loss to the IWGA caused by the acts of 
the USFS. The language only states that Department will be responsible for their own acts. This 
language also does not specifically state or imply that the Departments will pay money damages 
to the IWGA for any loss of grazing rights caused by the USFS or for any other act of the 
Departments. There are no clear and unequivocal temlS of indemnification. 
Based upon this court's reading of the plain meaning of the language cited by the IWGA 
from the letter, IWGA's count one for breach of contract fails and must be dismissed. 
Further, the court agrees with the IDFG position that if the cited language of the letter was to 
be is to be construed to create the liability claimed by the IWGA, then the agreement would be 
void as a matter of law because it would be an attempt to create indebtedness without proper 
appropriations pursuant to I.e. 59-1015, I.C. 59-1016 and Article VII § 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution. Also, Slate ex reI. Hanson v. Parsons, 57 Idaho 775,69 P.2d 788 (1937). 
Idaho Code 59-1015 provides that: 
59-l0I5.DEFICIENCIES -- CREATION PROHIBITED -- EXCEPTION. No 
officer, employee or state board of the state ofldaho, or board of regents or board of 
trustees of any state institution, or any member, employee or agent thereof, shall 
enter, or attempt to offer to enter into any contract or agreement creating any 
expense, or incurring any liability, moral, legal or otherwise, or at all, in excess of 
the appropriation made by law for the specific purpose or purposes for which such 
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expenditure is to be made, or liability incurred, except in the case of insurrection, 
epidemic, invasion, riots, floods or fires. 
Idaho Code 59-1016 provides that: 
59-1016.DEFICIENCIES -- CONTRACTS IN CREATION OF, VOID. Any 
indebtedness attempted to be created against the state in violation of the provisions 
of this chapter, or any indebtedness attempted to be created against the state in 
excess of the appropriation provided for in any act, shall be void. The income 
accruing to any state institution, after the same has been certified quarterly to the 
board of trustees of any such institution by the auditor, shall be deemed an 
appropriation to such institution, and shall be governed by the provisions of this 
chapter regarding appropriations, and regarding the creation of indebtedness in 
excess of such appropriation. 
The Plaintiffs' complaint does not allege a specific legislative appropriation for the asserted 
liability and the unrefuted legislative history recited by the Defendants confirms that no such 
specific appropriation has been made. If the letter were anagreement to indemnify the Plaintiffs 
for economic loss as alleged, said agreement would be void as a matter of law because it was not 
a liability authorized by appropriation. 
The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Breach of Contract Claim is granted. 
IWGA's Second Cause of Action based on Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing 
The Plaintiffs allege a second cause of action based on a breach of a covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires parties to a contract 
to perform their obligations in good faith. Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 
149 Idaho 299, 233 P.3d 1221 (2010). The covenant is violated when a party violates, qualifies, 
or significantly impairs any benefit or right of the other party under the contract-whether express 
or implied. Van v. PortneufiVledical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 212 PJd 982(2009). However the 
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covenant only extends to those agreed upon terms. Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 
764,203 P.3d 694 (2009). In Bushi, the Idaho Supreme COUli affirmed a trial court's entry of 
summary judgment because "[t]he implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arises only 
regarding terms agreed to by the parties." Citing, Taylor v. Brownhzg, 129 Idaho 483, 491,927 
P.2d 873, 881 (1996) (citing Idaho First Natl. Bank, 121 Idaho 266, 288.824 P.2d 841, 863 
(1991)). 
Since the Plaintiffs' claim based on breach of contract does not survive the Defendants' 
motion to dismiss, the cause of action based on a breach of a covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing likewise does not survive and will be dismissed .. 
IWGA Claim For Damages pursuant to I.e. 36-106(e)(5)(D) 
In its third cause of action, the IWGA alleges that I.e. 36-1 06(e)(5)(D) requires IDFG to 
protect domestic sheep operators from economic harm caused by the reintroduction of Bighorn 
Sheep. In response, IDFG argues that I.C. 36-106(e)(5)(D), was enacted after the letter from the 
Hells Canyon Bighom Sheep Restoration Committee was issued and that nothing in the statute 
indicates that it was to be applied retroactively. In addition, IDFG argues that IWGA has failed 
to show how IDFG has not complied with its duties pursuant to I.C. 36-106(e)(5)(D), and thus, 
the related cause of action should be dismissed. IDFG argues that at best, IWGA would only be 
entitled to a remedy of "preparation and implementation of best management practices," under 
the statute and nothing in the statute authorizes or suggests payment for economic damages. 
IWGA argue their claim under this code section is suppOited by the legislative history, 
the context of the enactment, and the plain language of the statute and that the legislature made it 
clear that it was the policy of Idaho that domestic sheep operations shall not be harmed by the 
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bighorn sheep reintroduction. IWGA also argue that IDFG has obligations to domestic sheep 
operations and it has failed to protect and fulfill those obligations. 
The basic rules of statutory construction as summarized by the Idaho Supreme Comi are 
set forth below: 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we exercise 
free review. It must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be 
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a 
whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply 
follows the law as written. A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of 
more than one reasonable construction. If the statute is ambiguous, then it must be 
construed to mean what the legislature intended for it to mean. To determine that 
intent, we examine not only the literal words ofthe statute, but also the 
reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and 
its legislative history. Statu[t]es that are in pari materia must be construed together to 
effect legislative intent. Statutes are in pari materia if they relate to the same subject. 
State, ex reI. Wasden v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 224 P.3d 1109 (2010) citing City of 
Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway District, 139 Idaho 65, 69, 72 P.3d 
905, 909 (2003) (internal citations omitted). 
Idaho Code 36-106(e)(5)(D), as enacted in 1997 stated: 
(e) Duties and Powers of Director. 
5. (D) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 36-408, Idaho Code, to the 
contrary, on and after the effective date of this act, the director shall not expend 
any funds, or take any action, or authorize any employee or agent of the 
department or other person to take any action, to undertake actual transplants of 
bighorn sheep into areas they do not now inhabit or to augment the number of 
bighorn sheep in existing herds until: 
(i) The boards of county commissioners of the counties in which the 
release is proposed to take place have been given reasonable notice of the 
proposed release. 
(ii) The affected federal and state land grazing permittees and owners or 
leaseholders of private land in or contiguous to the proposed release site 
have been given reasonable notice of the proposed release. 
(iii) The president pro tempore of the senate and the speaker of the house 
of representatives have received from the director a plan for the 
forthcoming year that details, to the best of the department's ability, the 
proposed transplants which shall include the estimated numbers of bighorn 
sheep to be transplanted and a description of the areas the proposed 
transplant or transplants are planned for. 
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Upon request, the department shall grant one (1) hearing per transplant if 
any affected individual or entity expresses written concern within ten (l0) days of 
notification regarding any transplants of bighorn sheep and shall take into 
consideration these concerns in approving, modifying or canceling any proposed 
bighorn sheep transplant. Any such hearing shall be held within thirty (30) days of 
the request. Upon any transplant of bighorn sheep into areas they do not now 
inhabit or a transplant to augment existing populations, the department shall 
provide for any affected federal or state land grazing permittees or owners or 
leaseholders of private land a written letter signed by all federal, state and private 
entities responsible for the transplant stating that the existing sheep or livestock 
operations in the area of any such bighorn sheep transplant are recognized and 
that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep 
when the same invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted. 
I.C. 36-106(e)(5)(D) (1997) (emphasis added). 
The statute is unambiguous. This court agrees that nothing in this statute or the 
legislative history offered by the parties suggest that it was the legislature's intent that the statute 
be applied retroactively. There is no allegation in the complaint that IDFG failed to comply with 
the notice and hearing requirements or the best management practices provided for in the statute 
in relation to the introduction of bighorn sheep as described in the January 16, 1997 letter. 
Finally, nothing in the words of the statute suggests that the legislature intended to 
obligate the State or the IDFG to pay damages or indemnify the Plaintiffs for any economic loss 
related to the described activities, let alone an economic loss occasioned by the act of a Federal 
agency. 
In addition, the language "shall provide ... a written letter" evinces the three fish and 
game departments intent that the 1997 letter was their expression of accepting the risk of bighorn 
sheep loss. In reaching this conclusion, the court has applied the principles of statutory 
construction cited above. The Plaintiffs designated third cause of action based on statutory 
violation is dismissed on the basis that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
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IDJi'G's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join Indispcnsible Party pursuant to 
IRCP12{b )(7) 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) allows for a motion regarding a party's failure to 
join an indispensible paI1y as defined by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(1) which states: 
IRCP 19(a)(l). Persons to be joined if feasible. 
A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action 
if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already 
parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is 
so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a 
practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) 
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring 
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed 
interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be 
made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person 
may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. 
IRCP 19(a)(I). 
Once a party has been determined to be an indispensible party, the court is then guided by 
IRCP 19(a)(2) in the decision to proceed with or dismiss an action. That rule states: 
IRCP 19(a)(2). Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. 
If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the 
court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should 
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being 
thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: 
first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial 
to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective 
provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice 
can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's 
absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy 
if the action is dismissed for nonj oinder. 
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The burden of proving a party is indispensible is placed on the moving party. Ada 
County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 179 P.3d 323 (2008). 
A district court's determination that a party was not indispensable is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard and the well-known three- factor test. The inquiry focuses upon: (1) whether 
the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted 
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the 
. specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise 
ofreason. Utter v. Gibbins, 137 Idaho 361, 48 P.3d 1250 (2002). 
IDFG has asserted that IWGA's Amended Complaint should be dismissed because the 
United State Forest Service is an indispensible party because the claims are based on the USFS's 
modification of grazing rights. IDFG argues that the case will require a determination of 
whether or not USFS breached a binding obligation by modifying the grazing rights and what 
impact that has on any duties owed by IDFG. In addition, IDFG argues that USFS is a necessary 
party because the rights ofUSFS may be impacted and without USFS in the case, IDFG faces the 
risk of inconsistent obligations and outcomes. 
IWGA argues that USFS is not an indispensible party as that agency is not even listed in 
the letter and because the plaintiffs are not asserting that USFS has violated the agreement, rather 
IWGA notes that the Complaint is driven by IDFG's failure to protect IWGA from economic 
losses. 
Based on the current record and state of the case, the court agrees with the IWGA's 
position on this issue. The complaint is limited to a claim for damages against the IDFG based 
upon the Plaintiffs assertion that IDFG breached an agreement to pay damages set forth in 
covenants made by the three participating fish and game departments. IWGA acknowledges that 
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IDFG cannot control the USFS's decision on the grazing allotments and that the USFS did not 
enter into the specific covenants cited from the letter that are the basis of its action. The 
Defendants have failed to meet the burden of demonstrating the USFS is an indispensible party 
to this action at this point in the action and based upon the respective claims asserted by the 
parties. 
The IWGA acknowledged that IDFG has no ability to prevent the USFS from modifying 
the grazing permits. IWGA action for damages does not seek damages from the USFS. IWGA 
action does seek to modify or alter USFS's administration of the grazing permits at issue. 
IWGA's claim is based on the language in the letter which refers to commitments made only by 
the three named state fish and game departments. It appears that in the absence of the USFS as a 
party, complete relief can be afforded the parties on the claims asserted by the IWGA. The 
USFS has not indicated that it claims an interest in this proceeding and both parties acknowledge 
that neither this court nor the IDFG can cause the USFS to modify its decision to modify the 
grazing privileges at issue. 
IWGA complaint will not be dismissed at this time on the basis ofIDFG's argument that 
the IWGA has failed to join an indispensible party pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(7) and 19(a)(l). This 
court recognizes that this is a matter of discretion and so exercises its discretion in issuing its 
decision on this issue. Because of the court's other rulings, this defense propounded by the 
IDFG is not dispositive of the Motion to Dismiss. 
IWGA's Estoppel Theories set forth in Causes of Action Four, Five and Six. 
In the Complaint, IWGA has asserted claims based on Equitable Estoppel, Quasi-
Estoppel, and Promissory Estoppel. While recognizing that the estoppel doctrines generally 
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cannot be applied to a govcnmlcntal agency acting in its sovereign capacity, in some instances, 
the notions of justice and fair play will require estoppel to be applied against a government, even 
when acting in its sovereign capacity when the effects of the estoppel would not unduly damage 
the public interest. Brandt v. State, 126 Idaho 101, 878 P.2d 800 (et. App. 1994). IWGA asselis 
that estoppel shall be applied in this action to prevent IDFG from taking an inconsistent position 
from the position taken at the time that the reintroduction committee was working to enact the 
reintroduction of the bighorn sheep. IWGA asserts that it would be manifest injustice to allow 
IDFG to now claim that it did not contemplate monetary damages would be sought by the 
Plaintiffs, or to claim that it cannot now fulfill the obligations agreed to in the Letter Agreement. 
In its fourth cause of action, IWGA asserts a claim of promissory estoppel. 
A claim for promissory estoppel must meet the following elements: 
(1) the detriment suffered in reliance was substantial in an economic sense; (2) 
substantial loss to the promisee acting in reliance was or should have been 
foreseeable by the promisor; and (3) the promisee must have acted reasonably in 
justifiable reliance on the promise as made. 
Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 229 P .3d 1164 (2010). 
IWGA asserts that it detrimentally relied on the express and/or implied representations of 
the IDFG found in the Letter Agreement, that IWGA (and Shirts) have suffered economic harm 
that was foreseeable to IDFG, and that such reliance by IWGA was reasonable and justified. 
This court has found that the letter does not contain a promise obligating IDFG to indemnify 
IWGA. Without such a promise or other representation by IDFG, IWGA's claim for promissory 
estoppel fails, first because there is no promise upon which IWGA could rely. Without that 
crucial element, IWGA cannot succeed on its claim for promissory estoppel. 
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In its fifth cause of action, IWGA asserts a claim for equitable estoppel. 
A claim for equitable estoppel must meet the following elements: 
(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or 
constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not 
know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the false representation or 
concealment was made with the intent that it be relied UpOll; and (4) that the 
person to whom the representation was made, or from whom the facts were 
concealed, relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to his 
prejudice. 
Ogden v. Griffith, 149 Idaho 489, 236 P.3d 1249 (2010). 
In the equitable estoppel claim, IWGA asserts that IDFG made express and/or implied 
representations to IWGA and its members (including the Shirts Plaintiffs) which were false or 
concealed a material fact, IDFG knew the representations in the Letter Agreement were false, 
that IWGA could not discover the truth or falsity of the representations but did rely on the 
representations and were damaged. The court cannot find that IWGA's claim for equitable 
estoppel can succeed. This court has explained its interpretation of the letter above, and having 
found that it does not contain a representation or promise to indemnify, the court cannot now 
find that the facts alleged in the Complaint support that the language of the letter contains false 
or misleading representations. Thus, IWGA cannot meet the first element required of a claim for 
equitable estoppel. IWGA's claim for equitable estoppel fails. 
In its sixth cause of action, IWGA asserts a claim for quasi estoppel. 
A claim for quasi-estoppel includes the following elements: 
(1) the offending party took a different position than his or her original position, 
and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a 
disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change 
positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to 
maintain an inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a benefit 
or acquiesced in. 
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Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437,235 P.3d 387 (2010). 
In the claim for quasi-estoppel, IWGA asserts that IDFG made express representations in 
the letter when it agreed to "take whatever action is necessary" and that IWGA believes that 
IDFG was representing that the domestic sheep operators would not be held responsible for 
losses of bighorn sheep, and that domestic sheep operators would not be harmed by the 
reintroduction. IWGA asserts that IDFG is now asserting a contrary position after IWGA was 
induced to change positions and did, in fact, change positions to their detriment. Thus, IWGA 
asserts that IDFG cannot repudiate the promises and commitments found in the letter. IWGA 
has failed to show how IDFG has taken a contrary position from the original position asserted in 
the letter. As decided above, the term of the letter "take whatever action is necessary" does not 
apply to the protection ofIWGA's interests, rather to the interests of the Departments committed 
to the reintroduction of the bighorn sheep. Without some kind of commitment from IDFG, 
IWGA cannot succeed on a claim of quasi-estoppel because the court does not find that IDFG 
can be estopped from disclaiming a duty that does not exist either through contract or statute. 
IWGA's claim for quasi-estoppel also fails. 
The Plaintiffs' fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action based on the three estoppel theories 
enumerated fail for the same reason the breach of contract action fails (see analysis above). 
There is nothing set forth in the letter to suggest that the IDFG was representing or committing to 
indemnify the Plaintiff or otherwise pay damages to the Plaintiff for the loss of grazing 
privileges as a result of the independent acts of the USFS. There is also no specific allegation of 
acts of undisclosed deception, collusion or misrepresentation, falsity, inconsistent representations 
or positions taken by IDFG. 
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Further, equitable estoppel may not ordinarily be invoked against a government or public 
agency functioning in its sovereign or governmental capacity. Young Elec. Sign Co. v. State ex 
ref. Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 810, 25 P.3d 117,123 (2001). The court concludes that in managing 
bighorn sheep, the IDFG is acting in a sovereign capacity not a proprietary capacity. In signing 
the letter and fulfilling any obligations under the letter, the IDFG was carrying out its sovereign 
responsibility of managing the state's wildlife and not engaging in a proprietary or commercial 
enterprise. Even in light of Plaintiffs citation to Brandt v. State of Idaho, 126 Idaho 101,878 
P .2d 800 (Ct. App. 1994) arguing that estoppel may be applied against the government even in 
its sovereign capacity when 'justice and fair play require it" this cOUli cannot conclude that the 
doctrine should apply when it does not interpret the letter in issue as making any kind of 
representation that IDFG would assume any responsibility for economic loss to IWGA based on 
the USFS's decision to deny or modify grazing privileges. 
Attorney fees 
IDFG seeks an award of attorney fees and other reasonable expenses pursuant to Idaho 
Code 12-117. The current version of that code section states: 
12-117. Attorney's fees, witness fees and expenses awarded in certain 
instances. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding or civil 
judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or political 
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as the 
case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees 
and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. 
The Defendants are the prevailing parties in this action. If the state intends to pursue a 
claim for attorney fees, the requisite memorandum will have to be timely submitted and the court 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES - 24 l q ~ 
will require additional argument on the issue of whether the complaint was filed with or without 
a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
The court is sympathetic with the Plaintiffs for the problems and economic loss they have 
experienced as a result of the USFS modification of their grazing allotments. However, this 
court is bound to follow the law in considering the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' 
complaint. For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiffs' first amended complaint filed in this 
case on April 20, 2010 is dismissed. In entering this memorandum decision and order the court 
has considered only the content of the amended complaint and the legislative histories cited by 
both parties in their respective memoranda. To that extent, the court takes judicial notice of the 
legislative history cited by the parties in their respective memoranda. Doe v. Boy Scouts of 
America, 148 Idaho 427 224 P.3d 494 (2009). The attorney for the Defendants' shall submit a 
proposed jUdgment in compliance with IRCP 54(a) within ten days of this order. Any request for 
an award of costs and attorney fees shall be submitted pursuant to applicable Idaho rule, statute 
or precedent. 
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CERTIFICATION OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION were 
forwarded to the following persons on the 1 day of ~fY, 2011. 
"Feb,"I.I-t<..\~ 
Samuel A. Diddle 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1368 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Steven W. Strack 
Attorney at Law 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
SHERR Y WARD, Clerk of the Court 
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The offort to t~ansplant 'bighorn s~eep. :into histor1"c )lab,ita.t~n Hells Clinyon 
.... -: .. 1s;~ c00l?-e.r.~.tive projac~ involviug. the States of Idal)o, O.);'&gon, ,and . 
..,." .Washil1gton·, .The Foundation fot' Noreh Arnodoan U1ld Sheap, the Forest 
'. S~~Vt.9,e.,.'-·~'Qd '.the Bureau of Land Management. The Hells Canyon Si,shorn Shoep 
Rut'orst'ion Committee (the committee) is interested in having the support of 
the ~oolgrowers industry for this ~ffort to r.epopulate parts of Hells C~nyon 
l'iith bigh~rn sheep. 
'rha' Committee understands ·that b1ghornsmay occasionally migrate outside 
of their designated range and corne into contact with domestic ,sheep. '.These 
'.' :" ~ -' .. ~ 
, bighorns::.w~n be considered lIat risk" for potential disease transmission and 
" ,:dd~th::: ~ere. is also the potential for an exposed bighorn to leave' tho area 
. ,.im~.·'~~(ire~{l .. d.hease to other bighorn sheep. Under these condit1ons, the ., 
Idaho Dep~rtment of Fish and Game, the Oregon Department of Fl$h and 
Wildlife, aod toe Washington Pepertment of Wildlife will assume the 
responsibility for bighorn,losnes and further disease transmission in their 
respective states. The three Departments will 1l1so take whatever ne'don is' 
necessary to ~Bduce further los~es of =bighorn sheep without adversely 
impacting existing domestic sheep operators. ThJ enolosed map cloarlY 
delilleates the projGct area within the Hells Canyon complex. Bighotns 
straying i.nto currently active sheep allotments will be considered "at risk" 
by all of the Commi.ttes entities. This means tha t the Committee recognizes 
the' existing domestic sheep operations in or adjacent to the Hells Canyon 
complex, on both National Forest and privata lands, and accepts the 
potellttal risk of disease transmiSsion arid 10s8 .of bighorn sheep' when 
bighorns 'invade domestic sheep operations. 
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Idaho Woolgrowers Association 2 
The COlllrdttee will make avery effort to keep inttlrosted parties iniortJed 
about: actions bein8 considered by the Committee l.n its effort to l"Bpopuhte 
Hells Canyon with bighorn sheep. We will provid$ all h~alth information 
gathered on bighorn sheep to the woolgrowers industry and other interested 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS 
IDAHO WOOL GROWERS ) 
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
indi vidually and on behalf of its members; ) 
FRANK SHIRTS, JR., individually and as a ) 
member of the Idaho Wool Growers ) 
Association; RONALD W, SHIRTS, LESLIE ) 
SHIRTS and JOHN T. SHIRTS, individually ) 
and d/b/a! SHIRTS BROTHERS SHEEP and ) 
as members ofthe Idaho Wool Growers 
Association, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH & GAME 
COMMISSION; IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF FISH & GAME; CAL GROEN, Director 
of Idaho Department ofFish and Game, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
---------------) 
Case No. CV-2010-2567 
JUDGMENT 
For the reasons set forth in this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Request for Attorney Fees, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
\ <) ~ 
1 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss all Counts in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(b)(7) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in 
part. The Motion is GRANTED as to Defendants' motion to dismiss all Counts in Plaintiffs' 
amended complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), and DENIED as to Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to 
join an indispensable party pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )(7). 
-r-..,q--\'V'_ day Of~20 11. 
B 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
\\MC.\ 
I hereby certify that on this --=1- day of Fe:b1:!:ITfl'y 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy ofthe foregoing JUDGMENT by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed as 
follows: 
Samuel A. Diddle 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd. 
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 
Post Office Box 1368 
Boise,ID 83701-1368 
Steven W. Strack· 
Deputy Attorney General 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
:z. 0 \ 
3 
Samuel A. Diddle, ISB No. 4967 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW & 
MCKLVEEN, CHTD. 
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 
Post Office Box 1368 
Boise, ID 83701-1368 
Telephone: (208) 344~8535 
Facsimile: (208) 344-8542 
sdiddle@eberle.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS 
IDAHO WOOL GROWERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation, Case No. CV 2010·2567 
individually and on behalf of its members; 
FRANK SHIRTS, JR., individually and as a 
member of the Idaho Wool Growers NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Association; RONALD W. SHIRTS, 
LESLIE SHIRTS and JOHN T. SHIRTS, 
individually and d/b!a SHIRTS BROTHERS 
SHEEP and as members of the Idaho Wool 
Growen; Association, 
Plaintiffs! Appellants, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH & 
GAME CON1MISSION; IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF FISH & GAME; CAL 
GROEN, Director of Idaho Department of 
Fish and Game. 
Defendants/Respondents. 
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TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO FISH & 
GAME COMMISSION, IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH & GAME AND CAt 
GROEN, AND THE PARTIES' ATTORl~EYS OF RECORD, STEVEN \V. 
STRACK, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, PO BOX 83720, BOISE, IDAHO 
83720 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellants, Idaho Wool Growers Association, Tnc., Frank 
Shirts, Jr., Ronald W. Shirts, Leslie Shirts, John T. Shirts, and Shirts Brothers Sheep, appeal 
against the above named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment 
entered in the above-entitled action on the 4th day of March, 2011, Honorable Bradly S. Ford 
presiding. 
2. The parties have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
Judgment described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 
1 1 (a)(l), LAR. 
3. The issues on appeal whieh the Appellants intend to assert in the appeal: 
a) Did the Court err in granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss all counts i.n 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6)? 
b) Does the 1997 Letter Agreement constitute a contract by or representation 
of the Idaho Department ofFish & Game'? 
c) Did the State of Idaho agree to indemnify domestic sheep operators from 
damages arising out of the reintroduction of Bighorn Sheep in Hells 
Canyon? 
d) Was there an appropriation by the State ofIdaho sufficient to support the 
Idaho Fish & Game Commission's promise to indemnify domestic sheep 
operators? 
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e) Does Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) oblig:lte Idaho Department ofFish & 
Game to protect domestic sheep operators? 
f) Can the Respondents be estopped? 
4. No order has been entered scaling any and all portion of the record. 
5. a) A reporter) s n-anscript is requested. 
b) The Appellants request the preparation oftne reporter's standard transcript 
as defined in Rule 25(c), l.A.R., supplemented by the followl11g: 
i) Transcript of the hearing of November 9,2010. 
6. The Appellants request the following documents to be included ln the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
a) All briefing and affidavits subm:itted in support of or opposition to 
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss. 
7. I certify: 
a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set 
out below: 
Sherry Ward 
Adams County Clerk of the Court 
POBox 48 
Council, ID 83612 
b) That the Clerk of the Court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation 
of the reporter's transcript. 
c) That the estimated fec for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
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e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20, and the Idaho Attorney General pursuant to § 67-1401(1), 
Idaho Code. 
DATED this /5 day of April, 2011. 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW 
& MeKL VEEN, TERED 
By: cJ~ 
S uel . Diddle, of the Finn 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this I S day of April, 2011, a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing document was served as follows: 
State of Idaho, Office of the Attorney General 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General 
Clive J. Strong~ Deputy Attorney General) 
Chief of Natural Resources Division 
Steven W. Strack) Depu.ty Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ill 83720-0010 
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Date 
4/1/2010 
4/2/2010 
4/5/2010 
4/20/2010 
5/612010 
5/19/2010 
Thi icial District Court - Adams County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0002567 Current Judge: Bradly S Ford 
Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc, etal. vs. Idaho, State Of, etal. 
Other Claims 
Plaintiff: Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc Appearance Samuel A 
Diddle 
New Case Filed - Other Claims 
Bradly S Ford 
Bradly S Ford 
Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not listed in categories B-H, Bradly S Ford 
or the other A listings below Paid by: Diddle, Samuel A (attorney for Idaho 
Wool Growers Association, Inc) Receipt number: 0012418 Dated: 
04/02/2010 Amount: $88.00 (Cashiers Check) For: Idaho Wool Growers 
Association, Inc (plaintiff), Shirts Brothers Sheep (plaintiff), Shirts, Frank Jr 
(plaintiff), Shirts, John T (plaintiff), Shirts, Leslie (plaintiff) and Shirts, 
Ronald W (plaintiff) 
Plaintiff: Shirts, Frank Jr Appearance Samuel A Diddle 
Plaintiff: Shirts, Ronald W Appearance Samuel A Diddle 
Plaintiff: Shirts, Leslie Appearance Samuel A Diddle 
Plaintiff: Shirts, John T Appearance Samuel A Diddle 
Plaintiff: Shirts Brothers Sheep Appearance Samuel A Diddle 
Complaint Filed and Demand for Jury Trial 
Bradly S Ford 
Bradly S Ford 
Bradly S Ford 
Bradly S Ford 
Bradly S Ford 
Bradly S Ford 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 04/05/2010 to Idaho, State Of; Bradly S Ford 
returned to attorney for service 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 04/05/2010 to Idaho Fish && Bradly S Ford 
Game Commission; returned to attorney for service 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 04/05/2010 to Idaho Department Bradly S Ford 
Of Fish And Game; returned to attorney for service 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 04/05/2010 to Cal Groen; Bradly S Ford 
returned to attorney for service 
First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial Filed Bradly S Ford 
Summons: Document Returned Served on 04/28/2010 to Idaho, State Of; Bradly S Ford 
ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE BY ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT STATE 
OF IDAHO (Clive Strong) 
Summons: Document Returned Served on 04/28/2010 to Idaho Fish & Bradly S Ford 
Game Commission; ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE BY ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT IDAHO FISH & GAME COMMISSION 
Summons: Document Returned Served on 04/28/2010 to Idaho Bradly S Ford 
Department Of Fish And Game; ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE BY 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH & GAME 
Summons: Document Returned Served on 04/28/2010 to Cal Groen; Bradly S Ford 
ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE BY ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT CAL 
GROEN 
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 
12(b)(6), and 12(b)(7), and Request for Attorney Fees 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Defendant: Idaho, State Of Appearance Steven W Strack 
Bradly S Ford 
Bradly S Ford 
Bradly S Ford 
Defendant: Idaho Fish & Game Commission Appearance Steven W Strack Bradly S Ford 
Defendant: Idaho Department Of Fish And Game Appearance Steven W Bradly S Ford 
Strack 
Defendant: Groen, Cal Appearance Steven W Strack Bradly S Ford 
Qo~ '?.ofp 
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ROAReport 
Case: CV-2010-0002567 Current Judge: Bradly S Ford 
Date 
7/23/2010 
8/10/2010 
8/17/2010 
8/18/2010 
8/30/2010 
9/212010 
9/14/2010 
9/27/2010 
10/8/2010 
10/13/2010 
11/912010 
21412011 
3/4/2011 
4/15/2011 
4/22/2011 
Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc, etal. vs. Idaho, State Of, etal. 
Other Claims 
Notice Of Hearing (9-3-10) Bradly S Ford 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 09/03/201009:31 AM) & Attorney Bradly S Ford 
Fees 
Notice Of Hearing (Order) (8-18-10) Canyon County (Status) 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/18/2010 11 :00 AM) Canyon County 
Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Request for 
Attorneys Fees 
Hearing result for Status held on 08/18/2010 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held 
Canyon County 
Defendants' Notice of Errata and Substitute Exhibit 
Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Stipulation to Vacate Hearing on September 3, 2010 
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on 09/03/201009:31 AM: 
Hearing Vacated & Attorney Fees 
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Bradly S Ford 
Bradly S Ford 
Bradly S Ford 
Bradly S Ford 
Bradly S Ford 
Bradly S Ford 
Bradly S Ford 
Bradly S Ford 
Bradly S Ford 
Defendants' Supplemental Reply Brief Re: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Bradly S Ford 
Joint Notice Of Hearing Re Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (11-9-2010 Bradly S Ford 
Canyon County) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 11/09/201009:00 AM) Bradly S Ford 
Defendants' - Canyon County 
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on 11/09/201009:00 AM: Case Bradly S Ford 
Taken Under Advisement Defendants' 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Bradly S Ford 
Request for Attorney Fees 
Submission of Proposed Judgment Bradly S Ford 
Civil Disposition entered for: Groen, Cal, Defendant; Idaho Department Of Bradly S Ford 
Fish And Game, Defendant; Idaho Fish & Game Commission, Defendant; 
Idaho, State Of, Defendant; Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc, Plaintiff; 
Shirts Brothers Sheep, Plaintiff; Shirts, Frank Jr, Plaintiff; Shirts, John T, 
Plaintiff; Shirts, Leslie, Plaintiff; Shirts, Ronald W, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
3/4/2011 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed Bradly S Ford 
Judgment 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Bradly S Ford 
Bradly S Ford 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid Bradly S Ford 
by: Diddle, Samuel A (attorney for Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc) 
Receipt number: 0015549 Dated: 4/15/2011 Amount: $101.00 (Credit 
card) For: Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc (plaintiff) 
Filing: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Diddle, Samuel A (attorney for Bradly S Ford 
Idaho Wool Growers Association, Inc) Receipt number: 0015549 Dated: 
4/15/2011 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) For: Idaho Wool Growers 
Association, Inc (plaintiff) 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Bradly S Ford 
STATUS CHANGED: Inactive Bradly S Ford 
Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal Bradly S Ford 
User: JAN 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS 
IDAHO WOOL GROWERS ASSOCIATION 
FRANK SHIRTS JR; RONALD W SHIRTS; 
LESLIE SHIRTS and JOHN T SHIRTS; 
Dba SHIRTS BROTHERS SHEEP, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs 
STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH & 
GAME COMMISSION; IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF FISH & GAME; CAL 
GROEN, Director, 
Defendants/Res ondents. 
SUPREME COURT #38743-2011 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Sherry Ward, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District ofthe State ofIdaho, 
in and for Adams County, do hereby certify that the foregoing Record in this cause was compiled and 
bound under my direction as, and is a true, correct and complete Record of the pleadings and 
documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I do further certify that there were no exhibits which were marked for identification or 
admitted into evidence during the course of this action. 
IN WITNES S WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at 
Council, Idaho, this day of __ -=~ ___ , 2011. 
Sherry Ward 
Clerk of the District Court 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS 
IDAHO WOOL GROWERS ASSOCIATION, 
FRANK SHIRTS JR; RONALD W SHIRTS; 
LESLIE SHIRTS and JOHN T SHIRTS; 
Dba SHIRTS BROTHERS SHEEP, 
Plaintiff/Appellants, 
vs 
STATE OF IDAHO; IDAHO FISH & GAME 
COMMISSION; IDAHO DEP AR TMENT OF 
FISH & GAME; CAL GROEN, Director, 
Defendant/Res ondents. 
SUPREME COURT #38743-2011 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Sherry Ward, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District ofthe State ofIdaho, 
in and for the County of Adams, do hereby certify that I have personally served or mailed, by United 
States Mail, one copy of the 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT AND CLERK'S RECORD 
TO each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
SAMUEL A DIDDLE 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & 
McKlveen Chtd 
PO Box 1368 
Boise,ID 83701-1368 
STEVEN W STRACK 
Deputy Attorney General 
Statehouse PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court 
this day of July ,2011. 
Sherry Ward 
Clerk of the District Court 
Deputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
